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THE  BALKAN 
WARS 


LECTURES 

OELIVERED  A  I 

tmp:  army  service  schools 

FORT  LEAVENWORTH,   KANSAS 


BY 

Clyde  Sinclair  ford 

MAJOR     MEDICAL  CORPS,    I'    "-.    * 


THE    ARMY  8ERYICE  SCHOOLS 


1915 


THE  BALKAN 
WARS 


BEING   A   SERIES  OF 

.    LECTURES 

DELIVERED   AT 

THE  ARMY  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 

FORT  LEAVENWORTH,    KANSAS 
BY 

CLYDE  SINCLAIR  FORD 

MAJOR,  MEDICAL  CORl'S,  U.  S.  A. 


PRESS  OF  THE  ARMY  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 


1915 


>> 


A 


<< 


So 


vUH.Hi 


Introduction 


IN  ACCEPTING  the  burden  of  proof  for  my  presumption,  as 
a  non-combatant,  in  addressing  a  body  of  officers  of  the 

combatant  arms  of  the  service  on  such  a  subject  as  "  The 
Balkan  Wars,"  I  feel  it  incumbent  upon  me  to  give  a  brief 
account  of  my  contact  with  the  Balkan  situation,  covering  a 
period  of  eighteen  months,  which  afforded  the  opportunity 
for  my  observations. 

About  the  1st  of  July,  1912,  I  landed  in  Trieste  on  sick 
leave  of  absence  which  was  later  arranged  to  terminate  with 
the  end  of  the  year.  From  this  port  I  took  passage  for  a  tour 
of  the  Dalmatian  coast,  on  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Adriatic, 
stopping  at  Pola,  the  principal  Austrian  naval  base,  Sebinicio, 
Spalato,  Ragusa,  and  as  far  south  as  Cattaro,  at  the  head  of 
the  Bays  of  Cattaro,  which  form  a  harbor  much  like  that  of 
New  York  with  the  sea  as  far  away  from  the  port  as  Sandy 
Hook  is  from  Castle  Garden.  Cattaro,  while  Austrian  and  one 
of  the  finest  naval  harbors  in  the  world,  is  the  logical  port  of 
Cetenje,  the  capital  of  Montenegro.  As  an  automobile  post- 
route  line  between  Cattaro  and  Cetenje  was  discovered,  I  con- 
tinued my  journey  to  Cetenje  and  the  Lake  of  Scutari.  On 
returning  to  the  northern  Adriatic  by  the  same  route,  I  landed 
at  Flume,  crossed  by  rail  to  Trieste  and  thence  by  sea  to 
Venice. 

In  September,  1912,  I  went  by  rail  from  Vienna,  through 
Buda-Pest,  Belgrade,  Sofia  and  Adrianople,  to  Constantinople, 
where  I  remained  three  weeks  with  my  friend.  Major  J.  R.  M. 
Taylor,  our  capable  and  accomplished  military  attacM.  There 
were,  at  that  time,  echoing  about  Constantinople  large  and 
glowing  rumors  of  the  coming  war,  but  as  one  can  always  hear 
anything  and  everything,  both  true  and  false,  anywhere  in 
the  near  East,  and  not  knowing  what  or  whom  to  believe,  I 
grew  so  impatient  in  waiting  for  the  long-advertised  and  often 
postponed  "Balkan  conflagration'*  that  I  sought  refuge  again 
in  the  less  distrustful  environments  of  Paris,  returning  there 
by  way  of  the  Black  Sea  through  Constanza  and  Bucharest. 

War  was  actually  declared  between  the  Balkan  States 
and  Turkey  on  October  17, 1912.      In  the  last  days  of  October 

'"  333434 


the  interest  of  the  Parisian  public  seemed  to  be  divided 
between  the  two  great  and  absorbing  world's  events— the 
debacle  of  the  Turkish  army  in  Thrace,  which  promised  the 
celebration  of  another  Christian  mass  in  the  Mosque  of  St. 
Sofia,  and  the  progress  of  the  Becker  murder  trial  in  New 
York,  which  revealed  a  police  conspiracy  of  a  magnitude 
that  threatened  the  security  of  the  American  Republic,  My 
own  personal  interests  were  so  unpatriotically  prejudiced  that 
on  the  last  day  of  October  I  abandoned  my  own  country  to  its 
destiny,  completed  my  monthly  personal  report  with  a  re- 
putable European  capital  as  my  temporary  address  and,  after 
nightfall,  boarded  a  sleeping-car  which  carried  me  through 
Roumania  to  Constanza,  whence  I  sailed  for  Constantinople 
to  arrive  November  3d,  or  just  about  the  time  the  Turkish 
army  began  to  dig  itself  in  on  the  Chatalja  line  for  the  stubborn 
defense  of  Constantinople. 

A  local  chapter  of  the  American  National  Red  Cross 
Society,  formed  under  the  presidency  of  the  late  lamented 
Mr.  Rockhill,  the  American  ambassador,  had  been  at  work  for 
several  weeks  assembling  material  and  collecting  funds,  but  a 
field  party  had  not  been  organized.  Five  thousand  dollars 
had  been  received  from  the  American  National  Red  Cross 
Society  and  many  times  that  amount  had  been  secured  from 
private  sources  at  home  and  abroad,  through  the  personal  in- 
fluence of  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Rockhill,  Mr.  Hoffman  Philip  of  our 
Embassy,  Dr.  Gates  of  Roberts  College,  Dr.  Patrick  of  Con- 
stantinople College,  and  other  members  of  the  American 
colony.  I  deeply  regret  that  neither  the  time  nor  this  oppor- 
tunity permits  further  mention  of  that  personal  service  which 
the  American  ambassador  and  ambassadress  rendered  in  their 
most  capable  and  devoted  administration  of  the  American 
National  Red  Cross  Chapter  in  Constantinople. 

On  the  day  of  my  arrival  I  was  named  as  chief  surgeon  of 
the  Red  Cross  field  party  and  began  at  once  its  organization 
and  a  search  for  a  field  of  labor.  After  much  importunity  and 
in  the  face  of  the  great  obstacles  of  inertia  in  Turkish  adminis- 
tration, we  found  a  service  in  a  large,  crude  military  hospital 
which  had  just  been  improvised  in  the  old  military  barracks 
of  Tash  Kishla,  well  within  the  European  quarter  of  Con- 
stantinople. We  assumed  the  professional  care,  administration 
and  financial  support  of  an  operating  room  and  two  wards 
with  a  total  of  120  beds  and  as  many  wounded  soldiers.  After 
about  a  month's  service  when  I  was  due  to  leave  Constanti- 
nople on  account  of  the  termination  of  my  sick  leave,  I  was 
placed  on  a  duty  status  at  the  American  Embassy,  on  the  re- 
iv 


quest  of  the  American  ambassador.  Our  service  was  continued 
six  months,  and  we  treated  atTashKishla  Hospital 600  patients 
with  three  deaths  and  no  complete  amputations.  For  the 
second  two  weeks  of  this  period,  in  company  with  Mr.  Hoff- 
man Philip  and  the  Rev.  Robert  Frew,  a  Scotch  Presbyterian 
minister  of  Constantinople,  I  also  had  personal  charge  of  our 
specially  organized  Red  Cross  party  which  assumed  the  pro- 
fessional management,  subsistence  and  financial  support  of 
the  cholera  camp  at  San  Stephano,  in  the  suburbs  of  Con- 
stantinople, where  we  had  corraled  in  a  compound,  with  the 
aid  of  an  efficient  guard,  600  Turkish  soldiers,  among  whom 
there  were  400  cholera  cases  with  200  deaths. 

During  the  period  of  the  second  armistice,  or,  in  April 
1913,  I  made  two  visits  to  the  Chatalja  line.  On  the  first 
occasion  the  Sanitary  Inspector  General,  Abdul  Selim  Pasha, 
sent  me  in  an  automobile  through  the  camps  and  sanitary 
stations  on  the  right  wing  of  the  army  from  Heydemkeui,  the 
rail  base,  to  the  Black  Sea.  When  I  returned,  some  days  later 
1  accompanied  this  distinguished  and  courteous  officer  on  a 
special  two-daj^  sanitary  inspection  trip  through  all  the  camps 
and  sanitary  stations  on  the  left  wing,  extending  from  the 
same  starting  point  to  the  Sea  of  Marmora,  and  including  the 
advanced  left  flank  beyond  Buyuk-Checkmudje. 

The  Second  Balkan  War  began  began  July  1,  1913,  and  on 
July  11th  I  was  able  to  accompany  a  gentleman,  whose  transit 
had  been  arranged  through  foreign  offices,  from  Constanti- 
nople by  way  of  the  Black  Sea  to  the  Bulgarian  port  of 
Burghas,  thence  by  rail  to  Sofia.  A  few  days  later  I  was  as- 
signed to  regular  military  duty  with  a  Bulgarian  evacuation 
hospital  for  wounded  on  the  Macedonian  frontier  atKustendil, 
which  was  also  the  headquarters  of  the  5th  Bulgarian  Field 
Army.  1  remained  there  for  a  month,  during  which  time 
about  one  half  of  the  10.000  cases  which  passed  through  this 
hospital  during  the  war  were  admitted.  During  the  armistice 
which  terminated  hostilities,  I  was  taken  by  the  chief  surgeon 
over  the  positions  of  the  5th  Army  and  through  the  camps  and 
sanitary  stations. 

After  the  conclusion  of  peace,  in  company  with  the 
American  and  British  iniMtsLvy  attaches  in  Sofia,  who  secured  the 
permission  of  the  Servian  War  Office,!  went  from  Sofia  to  Nish 
and  from  there  to  Komanovo  and  as  far  as  Kochina,  in  the 
Valley  of  the  Bregalnitca,  in  Macedonia,  covering  the  battle- 
fields of  the  Servian  armies  which  were  opposed  to  the  Bul- 
garian 4th  and  5th  Armies  with  which  I  had  had  my  service. 
I  returned  to  Constantinople  late  in  September,  1913,  by  way 

V 


of  the  Danube,  Coiistaiiza  and  the  Black  Sea.  In  October, 
just  one  year  after  the  defeat  of  the  Turkish  army  in  Thrace, 
but  after  the  unopposed  Turkish  reoccupation  of  that  province, 
I  went  to  Adrianople  and  from  there  followed  the  route  from 
the  field  of  its  defeat  to  Chorlu,  where  the  headquarters  took 
the  train  in  flight  to  the  Chatalja  line.  My  return  to  Con- 
stantinople was  by  the  Port  of  Rodosto  on  the  Sea  of  Marmora. 
Later,  I  went  again  to  the  Chatalja  district  to  view  the  scene 
of  devastation  wrought  by  the  five  different  mihtary  move- 
ments which  had  swept  over  Thrace  in  a  year.  My  return 
from  this  trip  was  by  way  of  JSilivri  and  the  Marmora.  In 
December,  1913,  I  took  my  leave  of  Constantinople  by  way  of 
the  Oriental  Railway,  stopping  at  Belgrade,  and  continuing 
through  Buda-Pest  and  Vienna  on  my  return  to  Paris. 


VI 


irst     Lecture 


The  Causes  and  Course  of  the 
Balkan  Wars 

WHILE  some  recent  events  in  the  Balkan  Penin- 
sula may  be  cited  as  providing  occasion  for  the 
Turko-Balkan  War  of  1912,  the  causes,  obscured  by 
racial  prejudices,  religious  traditions  and  political 
aspirations,  are  so  confused  with  the  early  history  of 
Eastern  Europe  and  even  with  that  of  Asia,  that  an 
understanding  of  the  fundamental  forces  must  involve 
a  cursory  survey  extending  back,  at  least,  beyond  the 
time  of  the  Moslem  invasion  of  Christian  Europe  to 
the  earlier  period  when  the  eastern  flank  of  the 
Roman  Empire  was  the  bulwark  for  Europe  against 
the  barbaric  hordes  advancing  from  the  East  and 
North. 

A  settlement  on  the  Bosphorus,  founded  by  the 
Megarian  Greeks  in  the  Seventh  Century  b.  c.  (658), 
was  first  called  Byzantium,  but  after  a  well-seasoned 
maturity  of  1,000  years  (330  A.  D.)  it  replaced  Rome 
as  the  capital  of  the  Roman  Empire  and  since  has 
been  known  as  Constantinople  from  the  emperor 
who  made  the  change,  Constantine  the  Great.  The 
inhabitants  of  the  city  at  this  time  were  almost 
entirely  Greeks  and  the  language  of  the  people  and 
commerce  was  Greek.  Only  the  ruling  classes  and 
the  aristocrats,  whom  Constantine  induced  to  come 
from  Rome,  spoke  the  official  Latin,  and  later,  after 
the  fall  of  the  Latin  Empire  in  the  Thirteenth  Century 
(1261),  the  language  of  the  court  and  the  people  alike 
was  again  Greek.      For  this  reason  the  region  that 


— 2— 

was  once  the  Eastern  Empire  is  still  cherished  by  the 
modern  Greek  as  their  patrimony.  This  spirit  was 
most  ingeniously  revivified  when  Napoleon  paid  some 
attention  to  the  Greeks.  From  their  philology  of  his 
name  and  the  fact  of  early  Greek  immigration  to 
Corsica,  he  was  hailed  as  a  descendent  of  their  race, 
and  it  is  said  that  the  women  of  Maina  kept  a  lamp 
lighted  before  his  portrait  "as  before  that  of  the 
Virgin.''  In  the  dreams  of  ''the  glory  that  was 
Greece''  the  Hellenic  race  saw  visions  of  the  restora- 
tion of  the  Byzantine  Empire  under  the  Greek 
Emperor,  Napoleon  I.  The  victories  of  two  years 
ago  have  revived  again  the  vision  of  ancient  empire, 
currently  known  as  ''The  Great  Idea." 

History  did  not  wait  until  the  beginning  of  the 
Eighteenth  Century  for  an  appreciation  of  the 
strategical  advantages  or  a  desire  for  possession  of 
Constantinople,  like  that  of  Peter  the  Great  who 
said:  "Whoever  shall  reign  there  will  be  the  true 
master  of  the  world."  In  the  Fourth  Century  B.  c. 
(390)  Philip  of  Macedon  laid  an  almost  successful 
siege  to  the  Greek  Byzantium,  until  Demosthenes 
aroused  the  Athenians  to  send  a  relief  expedition 
which  saved  the  city  until  the  Romans  came  several 
centuries  later.  The  siege  habit  thus  formed 
became  so  chronic  that  the  great  sieges  of  Con- 
stantinople, down  to  the  present  time,  are  said  to 
number  about  thirty.  The  Roman  emperors  had  not 
reigned  a  century  (405-450,  Theodosius  II)  before  the 
capital  was  threatened  by  the  Huns  who  came  again 
within  the  next  hundred  years  (527-562,  Justinian) 
and  made  an  almost  successful  assault. 

The  Slavs  followed  the  Huns  into  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  and  they  in  their  turn  battled  at  the  walls 
of  Constantinople.  Late  in  the  Sixth  Century  (580- 
600)  the  Slavs  likewise  in  their  turn  were  overrun 
and   suffered  the    outrage    of    their    "culture    and 


.— 3— 

civilization''  by  a  yet  fiercer  and  wilder  horde,  de- 
tached from  a  biological  glacier  of  Northern  Asia, 
which  swept  from  the  banks  of  the  Volga  across  the 
Danube  and  out  onto  the  Balkan  plateau.  This  grim, 
raw,  invading  race  was  called  by  the  Greeks  Voul- 
garia,  and  Gibbon  interpreted  this  name  of  a  ''Volga- 
folk''  into  the  form  in  which  it  occurs  today  as 
*'Bulgar"  or  ''Bulgarian."  The  very  name  of  these 
people,  once  an  epithet  of  hatred  and  contempt  of 
the  Byzantine  culture  of  the  Seventh  Century,  is  still 
cherished  by  the  modern  Greeks  as  a  term  of  bitter 
scorn  applied  to  the  derided  and  alleged  civilization 
of  the  simple  but  worthy  people  bearing  that  name 
today.  The  racial  characteristics  of  these  invading 
Bulgars,  despite  the  recent  studies  of  the  modern 
Greeks  who  have  discovered  that  they  once  had 
hoofs,  horns,  and  hairy  bodies,  were  so  little  opposed 
to  the  good  manners  of  the  comparative  civilization 
and  culture  of  the  Balkan  Slavs  whom  they  conquered, 
that  within  a  century  they  were  racially  absorbed  by 
their  subject  people  and  left  only  their  name,  as  a 
mark  of  their  passing  dominance,  to  an  empire  which 
pushed  its  frontier  almost  to  the  Bosphorus  at  the 
time  a  Bulgarian  prince  laid  siege  to  Constantinople 
early  in  the  Ninth  Century.  We  can  thus  see  how 
in  origin  the  people  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  are  so 
confused  and  how  futile  has  been  their  struggle  to 
unravel  the  ethnological  tangle  that  has  been  so 
complicated  by  their  many  changes  of  sovereignty. 
The  Goths,  Huns  and  Vandals  passed  elsewhere 
without  leaving  trace  of  their  few  centuries  of 
sojourn.  But  there  are  people  in  the  Balkans  today, 
living  in  different  colonies,  who  trace  their  origin 
to  the  Illyrians,  Thracians,  Greeks,  Romans,  Slavs 
and  Bulgars,  and  upon  these  several  boasted  ances- 
tries they  are  still  striving  to  perpetuate  race  and  to 
erect  national  institutions. 


The  Slavs  in  the  western  part  of  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  who  were  undefiled  by  the  blood  of  the 
Northern  Asiatics  preserved  their  racial  entity  and 
developed  national  aspirations  out  of  which  arose  the 
ancient  Kingdom  of  Greater  Servia.  At  one  time  or 
another,  in  the  Middle  Ages,  a  Bulgarian  or  a  Servian 
Empire  covered  the  greater  part  of  the  Balkan  Pen- 
insula. In  the  Tenth  Century  (892-927)  the  Bulgarian 
Czar  Simeon  assumed  the  somewhat  confident  title  of 
*'Czar  of  the  Bulgars  and  Autocrat  of  the  Greeks/' 
His  successor  Samuel  extended  the  empire  until 
Bulgaria,  in  this  heroic  age,  reached  from  Adrianople 
to  the  Adriatic.  As  Macedonia  was  embraced  by 
these  boundaries,  the  ''Macedonian  Question, ''  which 
still  remains  unsolved  after  all  the  attempts  of  ten 
centuries,  was  thus  incidentally  opened.  It  seems  to 
have  started,  however,  with  those  characteristic 
attributes,  which,  still  preserved  in  the  form  of 
''atrocities,"  have  continually  re-echoed  the  cry, 
"Come  over  into  Macedonia  and  help  us!''  It  may 
be  that  the  "Macedonian  Question"  was  made  some- 
thing of  a  permanent  issue  by  the  Bulgarian  Czar 
Simeon,  who  had  such  bad  manners  as  to  send  back 
to  Emperor  Leo  in  Constantinople  the  Roman  noses 
which  he  had  removed  from  the  latter's  vanquished 
legions. 

But  the  tide  turned,  as  it  has  so  often  turned  in 
the  Balkans,  and  the  Bulgarians  were  suppressed  for 
a  century  and  a  half.  Then  the  Orthodox  Christian 
Emperor  Basil  in  Constantinople,  not  wishing  to 
be  outdone  in  convincing  cultural  methods,  sent  to 
the  Bulgarian  Czar  Samuel  15,000  Bulgarian  prisoners 
whom  he  had  blinded,  except  for  one  eye  left  to 
every  hundredth  man  to  lead  his  sightless  comrades 
back  to  Samuel,  who  is  said  to  have  died  from  grief 
for  their  wretched  plight.  So  it  seems  that  atrocities 
are  indigenous  to  the  Balkans  and  were  practiced  by 


Christian  races,  at  least  in  their  grosser  forms,  be- 
fore the  Turks  came  to  add  some  of  their  own  peculiar 
refinements. 

About  the  end  of  the  Twelfth  Century,  when  the 
Bulgarian  Empire  was  almost  identical  in  extent 
with  the  ''New  Bulgaria,''  delimited  by  the  treaty  of 
San  Stefano  in  1877,  the  Byzantine  Empire  was 
hurrying  to  its  end.  Then  Servia  became  so  for- 
midable that  in  another  century  Bulgaria  was  en- 
gulfed by  a  Servian  Empire  with  a  real  czar  like 
Duzan,  who,  in  1346,  proclaimed  himself  ''Czar  of 
Macedonia,  Monarch  of  the  Serbs,  Greeks,  Bulgarians 
and  people  of  the  Western  Coast.*'  With  traditions 
of  such  a  monarch,  how  could  any  people  forget 
their  national  destiny? 

About  this  time  a  new  and  graver  complication 
menaced  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  when  the  Turks,  in 
1359  A.  D.,  crossed  the  Dardenelles  and  made  their 
first  entry  into  Europe.  This  was  the  real  occasion 
for  the  first  Balkan  League,  for,  at  that  time,  had 
the  Bulgars  and  Serbs  joined  the  Greeks  against  the 
Turks,  they  could  have  prevented  the  injection  into 
Europe  of  an  element  that  has  always  been  non- 
assimilable and  which  must  some  day  be  returned  to 
the  shores  of  Asia.  Von  der  Goltz  Pasha,  who,  as 
military  adviser,  was  with  the  Turks  for  twelve 
years  prior  to  1895,  has  told  them  repeatedly,  and  he 
said  again,  just  before  the  last  war,  that  their  place 
was  in  Asia  and  their  only  hope  and  salvation  lay  in 
return  to  Anatolia  to  establish  their  capital  on  the 
ancient  site  of  their  early  grandeur  at  Konia. 

The  Turks  soon  occupied  Thrace  and  established 
an  European  capital  at  Adrianople.  Then,  as  the 
Bulgarian  state  had  been  absorbed  by  the  Servian 
Empire,  the  Balkan  Slavs  (Serbs  and  Bulgarians) 
under  the  Servian  Czar  Lazar,  made  their  last  stand 
against    the    Turks    at    Kossovo    in   Northwestern 


—6— 

Macedonia  in  1389.  With  their  defeat,  the  Turkish 
inundation  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  was  complete 
except  for  Montenegro,  which  alone  was  unsub- 
merged.  This  little  state  began  its  existence  at  this 
time  with  a  remnant  of  the  Servian  army  which  fled 
to  the  Black  Mountains  on  the  Adriatic,  where  they 
have  since  remained  with  the  unique  distinction  and 
intense  personal  satisfaction  of  being  the  only  people 
in  Southeastern  Europe  to  have  escaped  the  Turkish 
yoke. 

The  Turkish  possession  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula 
was  completed  when  Mohammed  the  Conqueror 
crossed  the  Bosphorus  and  captured  Constantinople 
in  1452,  when  Columbus  was  yet  a  boy. 

In  the  Sixteenth  Century,  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
in  the  reign  of  Suleman  the  Magnificent  (1520-1586) , 
attained  the  zenith  of  its  glory,  when  it  reached 
from  the  Persian  Gulf  to  Buda-pest,  although  a 
century  later  (1683)  the  western  border  was  tem- 
porarily advanced  to  the  walls  of  Vienna,  from  where 
the  armies  of  the  decadent  sultans  were  turned  back 
on  that  long  recession,  which,  at  last,  bids  fair  to  go 
beyond  the  Bosphorus.  In  the  following  or  Eighteenth 
Century  the  Turks  were  driven  out  of  Hungary  and 
Transylvania,  and,  with  Roumania  always  from  that 
time  on  more  of  a  Russian  than  a  Turkish  province, 
the  Ottoman  Empire  had  entirely  receded  within  the 
Balkan  Peninsula  and  became  a  wholly  eastern  state, 
lying  south  of  the  Danube  and  the  Save  and  between 
the  Adriatic  and  the  Black  Sea.  In  this  period  and 
state  of  repose  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  the  ''Eastern 
Question'^  assumed  its  modern  form.  It  has  been 
described  as  "the  problem  of  filHng  up  the  vacuum 
created  by  the  disappearance  of  the  Turk  from 
Europe,"  and  now,  after  the  diplomatic  conferences 
and  wranglings  of  two  or  three  centuries,  an  approved 
solution  seems  about  to  be  submitted  by  the  more 


— 7— 

definite  processes  of  war.  In  the  next  or  Nineteenth 
Century,  Greece  waged  a  successful  war  of  indepen- 
dence (1815-21). 

Servia,  after  passing  through  various  vicissitudes, 
somewhat  influenced  by  Austrian  and  Russian  di- 
plomacy and  intervention  in  Turkish  affairs,  was 
offered,  in  1820,  recognition  by  the  Porte  as  a  sort  of 
an  autonomous  province.  Servian  delegates  sent  to 
Constantinople  for  negotiations  were  kept  there  under 
observation  for  five  years;  then,  after  another  revo- 
lution and  when  Turkey  was  involved  in  Egypt,  the 
Porte  finally  recognized  the  Servian  principality  and 
thus  liberated  the  latent  forces  of  racial  and  national 
sentiment  which  developed  into  a  powerful  factor  in 
the  later  disruption  of  European  Turkey. 

The  next  eventful  discussion  of  the  **  Eastern 
Question,"  in  1854,  assumed  the  form  of  the  Crimean 
War,  and  although  the  Turk  and  his  territory  were 
the  unconfessed  elements  of  contention,  the  cause 
was  given  to  the  world  in  the  sublime  spectacle  of 
two  Christian  nations  (Russia  and  France)  flying  at 
each  others'  throats  over  the  custody  of  the  tomb  of 
Christ,  which  happened  to  be  in  the  keeping  of  the 
followers  of  Mohammed.  It  came  about  by  Russia's 
thinking  the  final  collapse  of  Turkey  was  near  and 
demanding  the  recognition  of  her  protectorate  over  all 
the  Orthodox  Christian  subjects  of  the  Sultan.  But 
as  this  was  equivalent  to  the  destruction  of  the  Otto- 
man Empire,  France,  England  and  Sardinia  supported 
the  Turks  and  defeated  Russia.  The  only  result  of 
this  belligerent  discussion  of  the  "Eastern  Question'' 
was  the  treaty  of  Paris  (1856)  which  bound  the 
signatories  "to  respect  the  independence  and  terri- 
torial integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire." 

This  period  was  followed  by  the  development  of 
a  Bulgarian  national  spirit  which  had  been  gradually 
awakening  to  consciousness  from  the  beginning  of 


the  century,  although  it  had  been  persistently  and 
maliciously  suppressed— not  by  the  Turks,  but  by  the 
Greek  national  spirit,  exhibited  through  the  political 
organization  of  the  Orthodox  Church  in  which  all 
Bulgarians  were  communicants.  But  the  Turkish 
government,  at  last,  in  1870,  in  conformity  with  its 
long  established  policy  of  playing  both  ends  against 
the  middle,  saw  its  opportunity  to  array  one  subject 
race  against  another,  in  order  to  keep  them  so  occu- 
pied with  their  own  troubles  that  they  would  be  of 
less  trouble  to  their  masters.  The  Sultan  then 
established  an  independent  Bulgarian  Church  and 
placed  its  ecclesiastical  machinery  in  the  hands  of  a 
Bulgarian  hierarchy  under  a  Bulgarian  exarch. 

In  this  connection  one  might  recall  the  incident 
of  300  years  before,  when,  in  1472,  twenty  years 
after  the  fall  of  Constantinople,  the  separation  of 
the  Church  of  Constantinople  and  the  Church  of 
Rome  was  announced— the  former  taking  the  name 
of  ''Orthodox*'  and  the  latter  remaining  ''Roman.'' 
The  Greeks  charged  to  the  Latin  Pope  of  Rome  the 
responsibility  for  the  desertion  of  the  Bulgarians 
from  the  Orthodox  Church  and  the  Pope  construed 
the  event  as  a  just  and  natural  consequence  of  the 
schism  of  the  Greeks.  The  Greeks,  naturally  out- 
raged, resented  the  blow  to  their  civilization  and 
culture  in  the  turning  over  to  such  a  barbarous  people 
as  the  Bulgarians  a  perfectly  good  religion  which 
they  had  held  in  custody  so  long,  and,  besides,  they 
maintained  vehemently  that  it  was  all  the  worse, 
because  there  were  no  Bulgarians.  Horrible  spiritual 
atrocities,  administered  with  vengeance  and  vin- 
dictiveness,  were  perpetrated  by  the  Greeks  upon 
the  Bulgarians  in  the  form  of  excommunications  and 
damnation.  The  Bulgarians,  however,  had  some 
little  claim  to  a  specialized  religion  of  their  own,  if 
they  wanted  one,  because  their  Czar  Boris  accepted 


— 9— 

Christianity  in  the  middle  of  the  Seventh  Century 
and  became  such  an  enthusiastic  advocate  of  the 
newly  adopted  system  of  worship  that  he  gave  his 
subjects  the  choice  of  the  new  faith  or  one  of  his 
several  favorite  forms  of  extermination.  The  new 
faith  became  immediately  very  popular  among  the 
Bulgars. 

Two  Greek  monks,  Cyril  and  Methodus,  went  as 
missionaries  to  Bulgaria;  Cyril  invented  an  alphabet 
and  reduced  the  Bulgarian  language  to  written  form. 
From  the  Cyrillic  alphabet  the  Russian  written  lan- 
guage was  derived  and  in  this  language  the  Russian 
Orthodox  religion  was  taught.  The  Bulgarians, 
however,  seemed  to  thrive  on  the  expurgated  religion 
of  the  Greeks  as  they  used  their  own  ecclesiastical 
organization  so  effectively  in  the  awakening  of  a 
national  spirit  in  their  people  that  they  produced, 
after  only  a  few  years  (1876),  an  insurrection  in 
Macedonia  that  was  far  from  being  contemptuous 
and  which  was  reechoed  in  the  Herzegovnia.  The 
Turks  were  held  to  have  practiced  such  cruel  atrocities 
in  the  efforts  to  suppress  these  uprisings  that  Russia 
again  espoused  the  cause  of  the  Sultan's  Christian 
subjects.  The  Russo-Turkish  War  in  1877  was  the 
direct  result. 

This  war  was  closed,  after  the  complete  defeat 
of  the  Turks,  with  the  prevention  of  the  entry 
of  the  Russians  into  Constantinople  by  the  armed 
protest  of  Europe.  Peace  was  established  at  San 
Stephano  in  1878  by  direct  negotiations  between  the 
belligerents.  Though  the  terms  were  Slavonic  and 
the  principal  provisions  of  this  treaty  established  an 
independent  state  of  Bulgaria,  of  about  the  same 
extent  as  the  empire  of  the  Middle  Ages,  it  might 
have  succeeded,  if  it  had  remained  in  effect,  in 
establishing  the  equilibrium  of  the  Balkans  by  bring- 
ing a  homogeneous  people  under  one  national  govern- 


—10— 

ment.  And  if  the  Treaty  of  San  Stephano  had  not 
been  supplemented  by  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  the  sub- 
sequent attempts  to  make  the  ethnographic  conform 
to  geographic  boundaries  in  Macedonia  might  have 
been  indefinitely  postponed. 

The  local  interests  of  the  Balkans  could  not  be 
isolated  from  the  politics  of  Europe,  which  were 
united  against  Russia  and  forced  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 
as  a  substitute  for  the  Treaty  of  San  Stephano,  and 
thereby  effected  a  Teutonic  instead  of  a  Slavonic 
settlement.  As  England  at  this  time  feared  more 
the  aggression  of  the  Slav  than  the  Teuton,  Beacons- 
field  supported  Bismarck  in  the  determination  to 
prevent  an  eastern  extension  of  the  strong  Slavonic 
frontier  in  the  form  of  a  new  and  strong  Slav  state. 

The  dissatisfaction  of  Europe  with  the  Treaty  of 
San  Stephano  was  so  definite  that  the  suggestion  for 
its  revision  at  Berlin  was  not  made  without  some 
demonstration.  England  ordered  her  Indian  troops 
to  Malta  and  called  out  her  reserves.  Austria 
mobihzed.  England  at  this  time  feared  more  from 
Russia  than  she  cared  for  Macedonian  Christians, 
but  Lord  Salisbury,  the  British  Foreign  Secretary 
who  negotiated  the  Berlin  Treaty,  afterwards  said 
that,  in  her  support  of  the  Turks,  *  *  England  backed  the 
wrong  horse.'' 

What  the  Treaty  of  San  Stephano  had  formed 
into  one  state,  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  divided  into 
three  parts,  namely:  The  Turkish  principality  of 
Bulgaria,  the  Turkish  province  of  Eastern  Roumelia 
with  a  Christian  governor,  and  Macedonia,  restored 
to  Turkey  with  certain  reforms  in  government  im- 
posed. Besides  this,  Austria  was  permitted  to  occupy 
and  administer  Bosnia  and  the  Herzegovnia  and  to 
establish  garrisons  and  other  controls  in  the  Sanjak 
of  Novi  Bazar,  which,  as  Turkish  territory,  extended 
to  the  Bosnian   frontier  between  Montenegro  and 


—11— 

Servia,  and  thus  effectually  separated  these  two 
Slav  states. 

While  all  these  details  may  be  tedious  and  are  of 
little  interest  to  Americans,  the  man-in-the-street  in 
Europe  is  quite  well  versed  in  them.  My  first  and 
violent  projection  into  the  maze  of  European  politics 
was  occasioned  by  an  Austrian  whom  I  met  in  a 
railway  carriage  in  his  country,  much  after  the 
fashion  in  which  one  meets  the  representative 
American  in  the  smoking  compartment  of  a  Pullman 
car  in  this  country.  He  said  something  about  the 
' '  Sanjak  of  Novi  Bazar. ' '  In  my  ears  the  unfamiliar 
name  seemed  to  awaken  some  sort  of  association 
with,  perhaps,  the  wandering  Sinbad  the  Sailor,  or 
the  adventures  of  Robinson  Crusoe,  but  my  Austrian 
friend  informed  me  that  his  country  would  be  com- 
pelled to  go  to  war  if  any  nation  violated  the  treaty 
rights  and  economic  supervision  that  Austria  exer- 
cised over  the  * 'Sanjak  of  Novi  Bazar."  This  was 
more  than  two  years  ago,  and  this  gentleman  was 
neither  a  politician  nor  a  diplomat;  he  was  only  a 
doctor.  This  irritating  geographical  blight  is  not 
really  funny— except  its  name,  and  even  that  is  very 
ordinary,  after  all.  Turkish  administrative  divisions 
are  *'vila jets''  or  states  and  ''sanjaks''  or  counties, 
and  in  this  particular  sanjak  there  is  the  town  of 
Novi  Bazar;  hence  the  name. 

While  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  was  made  to  suit  the 
convenience  of  Europe  as  a  bond  of  peace  for  thirty- 
six  years,  it  received  several  little  jolts  before  it  was 
entirely  jarred  to  pieces  by  Austria's  recent  ultimatum 
to  Servia. 

In  view  of  the  decidedly  opposed  opinions  of  at 
least  two  of  America's  **first  citizens"  as  to  whether 
a  treaty  is  really  a  ''peace  bond"  or  only  a  "scrap 
of  paper,"  it  may  be  interesting  to  quote,  in  refer- 
ence to  the  Berlin  Treaty,  the  words  of  a  contempor- 


—12— 

ary  historian  (William  Miller),  who,  in  March,  1913, 
long  before  the  current  controversy  arose,  wrote  the 
last  pages  of  his  ''Ottoman  Empire,  1801-1913,'" 
After  giving  a  number  of  instances  in  which  almost 
every  signatory  power  and  more  than  one  small  state 
had  violated  their  solemn  international  agreements, 
he  concludes:  **But  to  regard  the  tattered  Berhn 
Treaty  as  an  inviolable  law  of  nature  is  to  ignore 
the  fact  that  in  the  imperfect  world  of  politics,  inter- 
national arrangements  are  only  binding  as  long  as 
the  contracting  parties  choose  to  be  bound  by  them 
or  the  population  concerned  are  weak  and  disunited. 
When  for  the  first  time  in  history,  the  *  Little 
Neighbors'  of  Turkey  joined  hands  against  her  with 
the  double  strength  of  enthusiasm  and  organization, 
the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  like  all  artificial  creations, 
succumbed  before  the  force  of  nature/'  An  Areo- 
pagus seems  now  to  be  sitting  through  a  winter 
session  in  both  Belgium  and  Poland,  which  is  de- 
voting itself  to  the  revision  of  this  now  obsolete 
document. 

Bulgaria's  national  existence  began  under  Prince 
Alexander  of  Battenburg  in  1878.  From  the  be- 
ginning, this  young  and  patriotic  ruler— he  was  only 
23  years  of  age  when  he  was  called  to  his  brand-new 
Bulgarian  throne— showed  more  interest  in  the  future 
of  his  state  than  in  [respecting  Russia  as  its  parent 
and  regarding  himself  as  the  tutor  of  her  child. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  Russia  intended  to  do  what 
her  political  antagonists  believed  she  would  do;  and 
that  was  to  turn  Bulgaria  into  an  outpost  for  the 
Slavonic  advance  on  the  Bosphorus.  In  fact,  Europe 
did  not  believe  that  Russia's  southern  progress  had 
been  stopped.  It  was  known  that  her  advance  was 
only  retarded,  and  it  was  also  realized  that  another 
checking  process  would  have  to  be  applied  on  the 
sign  of  her  next  move. 


—13— 

But  the  Bulgarians  had  no  intention,  after  their 
escape  from  the  oppression  of  one  master,  to  accept 
the  rule  of  another,  even  though  the  latter  had  been 
their  benefactor.  This  attitude,  however,  has  eminent 
historical  precedent,  for  Bismarck  has  said  that  a  lib- 
erated people  are  always  most  exacting  of  their  Hber- 
ators.  In  1885,  after  seven  years  of  Bulgaria's  na- 
tional existence,  Prince  Alexander  annexed  Eastern 
Roumelia,  after  the  almost  entirely  Bulgarian  popu- 
lation had  begun  a  revolution  against  Turkish  sover- 
eignty. Russia  was  offended  and  Servia  was  induced 
to  declare  war  on  Bulgaria  on  account  of  the  threat- 
ened disturbance  of  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Balk- 
ans. Russia's  intention  to  discipline  her  ungrateful 
offspring  was  shown  in  her  malicious  efforts  to  cripple 
the  defense  of  Bulgaria,  so  as  to  render  her  an 
easy  prey  to  Servia.  At  the  time  of  Servians 
declaration  of  war,  Bulgaria's  army  was  concen- 
trated in  Eastern  Roumelia,  on  the  Turkish  frontier, 
in  anticipation  of  a  conflict  with  the  Turks.  The 
strength  of  this  army,  including  reserves  and  about 
35,000  volunteers  from  Eastern  Roumelia,  was  about 
90,000  men,  which  represented  the  entire  military 
resources  of  the  state. 

The  military  instruction  of  the  Bulgarians  had 
been  begun  by  and  was  then  in  the  hands  of  Russian 
officers,  with  a  Russian  Minister  of  War.  For  the 
eight  years  of  the  Bulgarian  army's  existence,  the 
educational  system  had  produced  enough  Bulgarian 
officers  to  fill  all  the  subaltern  grades  and  about  half 
of  the  captaincies.  All  other  commissioned  grades 
in  line  and  staff,  from  the  Minister  of  War  down, 
were  filled  by  Russians.  With  this  organization  of 
the  army,  and  with  Turkey  as  a  likely  enemy  to  pre- 
vent the  annexation  of  Eastern  Roumelia,  the  Czar 
delivered  a  thunderbolt  to  the  Bulgarians  when  he 
ordered  all  Russian  officers  to  return  to  Russia  just 


—14— 

at  the  time  Servia  declared  war.  It  was  for  Russia 
to  visit  upon  recalcitrant  Bulgaria  just  retribution. 
The  offish  and  uppish  Bulgarian  braggarts  were  to 
receive  their  fitting  reward,  as  the  Servians  would 
march  at  once  on  Sofia  to  find  everything  in  disorder 
and  to  achieve  an  easy  victory.  Crushed  and  humili- 
ated, Bulgaria  could  then  be  brought  to  terms.  On 
the  day  that  war  was  declared  the  Servians  had  at 
least  70,000  men  mobilized  on  their  frontier,  ready 
for  immediate  action.  Whatever  disadvantage  this 
situation  may  have  had  for  the  state,  it  certainly 
made  a  fine  day  for  promotion  in  the  Bulgarian 
army.  Captains,  overnight,  became  Minister  of 
War,  lieutenant,  major  and  brigadier  generals, 
saying  nothing  of  the  few  score  of  colonelcies  and 
majorities  that  were  scattered  around.  The  success- 
ful work  of  army  reorganization  and  the  leading  of 
the  Bulgarian  army  to  decisive  victory,  which  dis- 
persed the  Servian  army  amply  demonstrated  the 
capacity  of  these  young  officers  to  discharge  the 
functions  of  their  new  offices.  The  Bulgarians  could 
and  certainly  would  have  marched  to  Belgrade  but 
for  Austria's  warning  that  her  troops  would  be  met 
there  in  that  event. 

As  an  illustration  of  the  hardy  vigor  of  the  Bul- 
garians in  this  campaign,  an  incident  of  their  march- 
ing capacity  may  be  worthy  of  mention  in  passing. 
A  regiment,  which  had  maintained  its  full  strength 
of  5,000  men  through  a  number  of  days  of  hard 
marching  from  the  eastern  toward  the  western  Bul- 
garian frontier,  arrived  in  the  evening  at  Ischkeman, 
a  town  fifty  kilometers  (thirty-one  miles)  east  of 
Sofia.  As  a  decisive  engagement  with  the  Servian 
army  seemed  imminent  within  a  day  or  two,  this 
regiment  was  ordered  to  proceed  with  all  possible 
expedition  towards  the  western  frontier. 

Without  camping  for  the  night,  the  march  was 


—15— 

resumed  and  Sofia  was  reached  by  morning.  As 
there  were  some  foot-sore  and  sick  which  could  not 
keep  the  pace  of  the  column,  a  rather  ingenious 
device  was  employed  to  help  them  along.  There 
were  at  Sofia,  at  that  time,  300  unbroken,  untrained 
Hungarian  remounts  which  could  not  be  used  in  any 
regular  military  service.  From  the  civilian  com- 
munity a  fleet-footed  leader— woman,  boy,  or  old 
peasant  unfit  for  military  service— was  turned  out 
for  each  horse.  The  horses  were  led  along  the  road 
until  they  met  the  regiment,  when  two  stragglers 
were  mounted  on  each  led  horse,  and  all  were  able 
to  keep  pace  with  the  column  as  it  arrived  in  Sofia. 
Here  the  peasantry  had  turned  out  along  the  roadside 
with  rations  prepared  for  the  entire  regiment,  which 
fell  out  to  eat  and  rest  on  the  spot  for  four  hours. 
The  march  was  then  continued  for  thirty-three 
kilometers  (twenty-one  miles)  to  Slivetza,  where  the 
decisive  engagement  had  begun,  and,  as  the  regi- 
ment had  not  been  previously  engaged  and  had 
maintained  its  full  strength,  its  arrival  contributed 
materially  to  the  Bulgarian  victory. 

This  regiment  had  thus  marched  fifty-two  miles 
in  twenty-four  hours.  Packs  and  all  equipment 
except  rifle,  ammunition  and  overcoats  were  aban- 
doned, by  order,  as  the  indication  arose  along  the 
line  of  march. 

While  this  reference  may  be  a  diversion  from  the 
subject,  the  incident  furnishes  details  that  are  of 
sufficient  interest  to  be  reviewed  again  under  the 
caption  of  "A  Forgotten  Campaign.'' 

As  it  did  not  suit  the  convenience  of  the  Ottoman 
government  to  make  armed  resistance  against  the 
Bulgarian  annexation  of  Eastern  Roumelia,  and  as 
Europe  acquiesced  in  this  violation  of  the  Treaty  of 
Berlin,  rather  than  risk  the  general  dangers  of 
readjustment.  Eastern  Roumelia  became  a  part  of 


—16— 

Bulgaria  and  the  territorial  limits  of  the  Bulgarian 
principality  so  remained,  as  thus  established,  until 
again  disturbed  by  the  Turko-Balkan  War. 

Following  this  successful  accomplishment  of 
Prince  Alexander,  Russian  intrigues  resulted  In  his 
abdication.  Prince  Ferdinand  of  Saxe-Coburg  then 
accepted  an  invitation  to  the  Bulgarian  throne. 
About  this  time  the  Bulgars,  as  well  as  the  Serbs, 
seriously  and  studiously  renewed  their  active  and 
forceful  protest  against  the  Turkish  administra- 
tion in  Macedonia,  through  well  organized  and  gen- 
erally supported  societies  which  were  called  "com- 
mittees,*' with  agents  known  as  "comitajies.'* 
These  comitajies  sought  to  avenge  the  wrongs  of 
their  brothers  in  Macedonia,  who  still  bore  the  gall- 
ing weight  of  the  Turkish  yoke,  and  they  also  hoped 
to  create  such  a  disturbance  as  to  induce  the  Christian 
world  to  release  the  Macedonian  Christians  from 
Moslem  oppression.  These  Servian  and  Bulgarian 
comitajies,  as  agents  of  retaliation  and  discord,  were 
*' patriots '*  to  their  own  race,  either  in  or  out  of 
Macedonia,  although  they  were  ''brigands''  to  the 
Turks.  It  was  one  of  these  Bulgarian  comitajies, 
operating  in  Macedonia,  who  through  his  adventurous 
enterprise  in  holding  for  ransom  our  own  Miss  Stone, 
embarrassed  the  Turkish  government  into  an  ac- 
knowledgment of  its  helplessness  to  suppress  such 
depredations,  and  held  up  the  American  missionary- 
supporting  public  for  13,000  pounds  of  Turkish  gold, 
or  about  59,000  American  dollars.  I  saw  this  enter- 
prising financier  — Sandansky,  by  name — in  Sofia  at 
the  time  the  National  Assembly  there  granted  him 
amnesty.  I  also  learned  the  details  of  the  money 
transaction  from  Mr.  Peet,  the  manager  of  American 
missions  in  Constantinople,  who  counted  out  the 
Turkish  gold  to  the  *' patriot-brigand"  in  a  Mace- 
donian village  while  under  the  surveillance  of  an 


—17-- 

escort  of  a  squadron  of  Turkish  cavalry,  charged 
with  the  duty  of  preventing  the  American  ransom 
from  passing  into  the  comitajie's  hands.  A  personal 
friend  of  Sandansky,  whom  I  knew  well  in  Sofia, 
assured  me  that  Sandansky  had  not  applied  to  his 
personal  advantage  a  cent  of  the  American  contribu- 
tion, but  that  it  had  all  been  spent  in  thecause  of 
Macedonia. 

In  defense  of  the  methods  of  the  Macedonian 
revolutionists  and  the  Bulgarian  comitajies,  it  may 
be  said  that  their  cause  could  only  be  advanced  by 
violence  and  that  their  resistance  was  made  against 
a  Turkish  administration  which  every  creditable 
European  observer  has  invariably  pronounced  as 
economically  abominable  and  personally  intolerable 
to  any  but  a  crushed,  spiritless  and  hopeless  people. 
But  the  Turk's  faults  were  in  his  methods  of  ad- 
ministration more  than  in  his  natural  cruelty.  His 
massacres  and  atrocities  were  no  more  than  economic 
expediences,  which  to  his  form  of  government  were 
necessities.  The  Turkish  government  in  Europe  has 
never  been  more  than  that  of  an  army  of  occupation, 
and  its  subject  and  resentful  races  were  disciplined 
by  military  methods  which  grew  harsher  with  in- 
creased and  repeated  insubordination.  The  unhappy 
conditions  in  Macedonia  continued,  as  the  reforms, 
though  always  promised,  were  never  executed,  re- 
gardless of  the  assurances  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin. 
Outrages  against  Turkish  authority  were  answered 
by  Macedonian  massacres. 

The  "Powers  of  Europe''  had  so  long  regarded 
the  troubles  in  the  Balkans  as  within  their  own  par- 
ticular sphere  for  adjustment,  and  the  Christian 
inhabitants  had  so  often  appealed  to  this  supreme 
authority  for  relief  that  the  powers,  viewing  only 
their  own  selfish  interests,  seemed  to  overlook  the 
possibility  of  the  Balkan  States  themselves  under- 


—18— 

taking  the  solution  of  that  part  of  the  Eastern 
Question  which  they  had  come  to  conclude  was  their 
own  immediate  concern.  This  very  situation  arose 
when  Bulgaria,  Servia,  Greece  and  Montenegro 
entered  into  an  alliance  in  1911  to  make  a  common 
cause  against  the  Turk  and  settle  by  force  of  arms 
the  grievances  which  400  years  of  Eastern  inter- 
ference had  failed  to  assuage.  The  chancelleries  of 
Europe  were  all  the  while,  secretly  at  least,  advised 
of  the  progress  of  this  project,  but  being  unable  to 
trust  any  one  of  their  own  number  to  exercise  police 
authority  or  guarantee  protection,  the  Balkan  States 
were  simply  admonished  that  whatever  they  started, 
the  powers  would  see  that  their  disturbances  did  not 
result  in  territorial  rearrangement. 

Just  a  little  while  before,  however,  the  attention 
of  Europe  was  drawn  to  the  Ottoman  Empire  by  an 
event  that  created  the  favorable  season  for  the  Allies 
to  settle  with  the  Turks  their  long  standing  grudge. 
This  was  the  breaking  out  of  the  Constitution,  for 
Turkey  had  long  since  shown  a  tendency  to  catch  the 
Constitution,  which  seemed  to  erupt  on  the  exposed 
portion  of  her  body  in  the  form  of  a  transitory  rash 
and  which  tended  to  act  as  a  sort  6f  vaccination 
against  any  of  the  more  serious  contagious  diseases 
which  so  often  threatened  her  dissolution.  Turkey 
first  caught  the  Constitution  in  the  beginning  of  the 
reign  of  Abdul  Hamid,  just  before  the  Russo-Turkish 
War,  when  Russia  was  pressing  the  Porte  for  some 
atonement  for  the  Macedonian  massacres  of  that 
time.  Then  the  crafty  Sultan  turned  to  the  Con- 
stitution as  a  means  of  escape  from  Russian  chastise- 
ment. The  personal  liberty  and  other  things  guar- 
anteed by  a  Constitution,  the  Sultan  argued,  ought 
to  be  sufficient  answer  to  Russian  claims. 

But  as  the  war  actually  came  on  and  the  Con- 
stitution had  no  further  purpose  to  serve,   it  was 


—19— 

withdrawn  to  await  thirty  years  for  a  recrudescence. 
This  second  attack  came,  in  spite  of  Abdul  Hamid,  in 
the  summer  of  1908  when  Nazi  Bey,  a  major  of 
infantry  and  an  enthusiast  of  the  Young  Turk  Party 
which  was  then  well  organized  in  the  army,  marched 
his  battalion  up  into  the  mountains  of  Macedonia, 
beyond  the  railhead  of  Monastir,  and  announced 
himself  in  arms  against  the  Sultan.  Two  weeks 
later  at  Salonika  the  Constitution  was  proclaimed  by 
Major  Enver  Bey,  now  Enver  Pasha,  Minister  of 
War  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  one  of  the  three 
men  who,  for  the  while  at  least,  hold  in  their  hands 
the  destiny  of  the  empire.  The  Young  Turks  were 
not  quite  prepared,  but  their  revolution  was  precipi- 
tated by  an  unmistakable  indication  of  a  preparation 
of  the  powers  for  another  interference  in  Macedonian 
affairs.  The  Sultan,  however,  making  virtue  of 
necessity,  accepted  the  situation  and  announced  the 
restoration  of  the  Constitution  which  had  been  sus- 
pended since  1878.  He  started  off  by  fulfilling  its 
provisions  for  a  National  Assembly. 

This  change  in  the  Ottoman  government,  and  its 
threatened  invigoration,  suggested  an  Austrian  ad- 
vance on  the  Balkans,  especially  as  Russia  at  this 
time  had  not  recovered  her  military  strength  which 
was  somewhat  debilitated  by  the  Manchurian  war, 
and,  being  at  this  time  unable  to  defend  Slavonic 
interests  in  the  Balkans,  the  Germanic  influences 
were  free  to  operate  without  fear  of  material  opposi- 
tion. The  psychological  moment  thus  arrived  for 
Prince  Ferdinand  to  proclaim  himself  *' Tzar  of  the 
Bulgars"  October  5,  1908,  and,  two  days  later,  for 
Austria  to  annex  Bosnia  and  Herzegovnia.  The  Bul- 
garian army  was  ready;  the  Prince  had  met  the 
Austrian  Emperor  at  Buda-Pest  only  a  short  time 
before;  the  Austrian  army  would  support  the  Bul- 
garians.    The  Turks  were  fatalistically  resigned,  as 


—20— 

they  were  unable  to  resort  to  arms,  but  the  Servians 
wailed  bitterly,  though  helplessly,  for  the  defeat  of 
their  national  aspirations  to  regain  Bosnia  and  the 
Herzegovnia  which  they  regarded  as  their  lost 
provinces,  because  they  were  once  a  part  of  a  Servian 
kingdom  of  the  Middle  Ages.  Servia  was  on  the 
point  of  declaring  war  against  Austria,  and  Monte- 
negro, always  spoiling  for  a  fight,  was  eager  to  join 
her,  but  European  diplomacy  intervened,  because  no 
great  power  was  ready  to  espouse  Servians  cause. 

The  formal  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  the  Herze- 
govnia by  Austria,  after  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  in  1878 
had  specified  the  limited  functions  of  Austria's 
occupation  of  these  Turkish  provinces,  in  the  words 
of  Prince  von  Buelow,  the  German  ex-Chancellor, 
*'led  up  to  a  great  crisis.''  He  states  very  frankly 
that  Emperor  Nicholas  showed  his  great  wisdom 
in  his  resignation  to  a  diplomatic  acceptance  and  that 
this  incident  was  the  first  test  of  the  Austro-German 
AlHance  as  **the  German  sword  had  been  thrown 
into  the  scale  of  European  decision." 

Turkey's  bleeding  wounds  were  soothed  by  an 
immediate  application  of  a  financial  balm  in  the  form 
of  an  Austrian  indemnity  of  $5,000,000  and  then  she 
demanded  $25,000,000  from  Bulgaria.  At  this  junc- 
ture Russian  diplomacy  played  a  tactful  and  tender 
part  which,  in  a  way,  wooed  Bulgaria  away  from  the 
Austrian  blandishments  to  which  it  had  so  lately 
yielded.  Bulgaria  offered  only  sixteen  and  three 
quarters  millions  for  the  twenty-five  million  demanded 
by  Turkey.  Russia  effected  a  settlement  by  assum- 
ing the  Bulgarian  obligation  to  Turkey  and  accepting 
from  Bulgaria  in  small  annual  installments  the  six- 
teen and  three  quarters  millions  which  Bulgaria  had 
offered  to  Turkey.  Russia  thus  satisfied  Turkey's 
Bulgarian  claim  by  cancelling  forty  of  the  seventy- 
four  annual   installments  which    Turkey    owed    to 


—21— 

Russia  as  an  indemnity  for  the  Turko-Russian  War. 
Turkey,  in  turn,  was  able  to  negotiate  another 
foreign  loan  upon  the  resources  relieved  from  the 
Russian  mortgage  and  all  contentions  were  thus 
happily  reconciled. 

On  the  19th  of  April,  1910,  the  Porte  finally 
recognized  the  independence  of  Bulgaria  and  this 
peaceful  passing  of  the  last  of  the  Sultan's  vassal 
states  in  the  Balkans  made  identical  the  real  and 
pretended  frontiers  of  Turkey  in  Europe. 

The  Constitution,  which  was  restored  in  August, 
1908,  had  been  received  throughout  the  Ottoman 
Empire  with  such  wild  and  hysterical  delight  that  a 
Bulgarian  dignatory  actually  embraced  a  Greek 
bishop;  Turks  bowed  reverently  to  Armenian  prayers 
in  Armenian  cemeteries  for  the  repose  of  the  souls  of 
the  Armenian  victims  of  Turkish  massacres;  the 
Bulgarian  brigand  Sandansky  was  received  like  a 
prodigal  son;  a  Turkish  officer  actually  imprisoned  a 
Moslem  for  insulting  a  Christian  and  Sir  Edward 
Grey  announced:  **The  Macedonian  Question  and 
others  of  a  similar  character  will  entirely  dis- 
appear.'' Enver  Bey  made  the  beautiful  and  assur- 
ing announcement  that  "arbitrary  government  had 
disappeared.  Henceforth  there  will  be  no  Bulgars, 
Greeks,  Roumanians,  Jews  or  Musselmen;  under 
the  same  blue  sky  we  are  all  equal  and  we  all  glory 
in  being  Ottomans." 

Less  than  a  year  was  passed  by  all  Ottoman 
subjects  in  this  hysterical  enjoyment  of  the  fancied 
benefits  of  constitutional  government,  as  this  time 
was  necessary  for  the  Sultan  to  secure  the  loyalty  of 
the  garrison  of  Constantinople.  In  April,  1909, 
Abdul  Hamid  gave  a  regimental  review  in  the  hall  of 
the  National  Assembly,  as  a  ceremony  in  honor  of  its 
adjournment  sine  die,  which  he  offered  as  a  celebra- 
tion of  the  recovery  of  the  nation  from   the  late 


—22— 

outbreak  of  the  Constitution.  Coincident  with  this 
event  was  another  but  more  tragic  one  in  Armenia, 
at  Adana,  in  which  several  thousands  of  Armenians 
and  two  American  missionaries  were  massacred. 
These  were  really  the  concluding  functions  of  the 
*'Red  Sultan's''  long  reign,  for  in  less  than  two 
weeks  the  Army  Corps  of  Salonika,  under  Mahmoud 
Shefket  Pasha,  marched  to  Constantinople,  attacked 
and  subdued  the  Sultan's  loyal  garrison,  hanged 
forty  of  its  officers  and  deposed  Abdul  Hamid.  A 
new  Sultan  was  made  by  girding  the  sword  of  Osman 
on  Abdul  Hamid's  brother,  who  had  been  his  brother's 
prisoner  and  had  not  read  a  newspaper  for  years. 
The  Constitution  was  again  proclaimed  and  the 
counter-revolution  was  complete. 

The  Young  Turk  government  again  restored,  it 
was  soon  inspired  with  fatuous  and  fanatical  dreams 
of  "Turkification"  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  by  which 
the  various  races  and  regions  were  to  be  reduced  to 
the  dead  level  of  Turkish  uniformity,  and,  in- 
cidentally, induced  to  adopt  the  Turkish  language. 
This  form  of  pernicious  activity  awoke  the  Sultan's 
non-Turkish  subjects— Arabs,  Albanians  and  Chris- 
tians alike— from  the  hysteria  with  which  they  had 
accepted  the  Constitution  as  a  balm  for  all  their  woes 
and  gave  all  the  Balkan  Christians,  both  in  European 
Turkey  and  in  the  neighboring  states,  a  new  and 
sharp  incentive  to  forget  their  own  differences  and 
unite  against  a  constitutional  tyranny  more  de- 
structive to  their  hopes  and  aspirations  than  any- 
thing that  had  been  conceived  in  the  darkest  days  of 
the  Hamidean  reign. 

The  Young  Turks  were  soon  awakened  from 
their  wild  ideaHsm  by  the  following  disturbances: 
(1)  Bulgarian  protests  against  Moslem  immigration 
from  Bosnia  into  Macedonia;  (2)  renewed  activities  of 
Macedonian   revolutionists   and   comitajies;    (3)   the 


—23— 

murder  of  a  Greek  bishop;  (4)  protests  and  threats 
from  Crete;  (5)  a  revolution  of  Moslems  in  Albania; 
(6)  the  appearance  of  a  new  Madhi  in  the  Yamen; 
and  (7)  the  Italian  war. 

The  prophecy  of  an  European  ambassador  (Neli- 
doff )  that  surely  twenty  months  of  the  Young  Turks 
would  be  worse  for  Turkey  than  twenty  years  of 
Abdul  Hamid  seemed  to  come  true.  This  reactionary 
policy  laid  the  way  for  the  Balkan  League,  which 
was  founded  on  the  suggestion  and  with  the  aid  of | 
an  Englishman  — a  Mr.  Bourchier,  the  Sofia  cor- 
respondent of  the  London  Times  and  one  of  those 
accompHshed  Britishers  who  spend  their  lives  in 
voluntary  exile  among  a  people  whose  affairs  and 
language  they  learn  and  whose  councillors  or  advisors 
they  become.  He  first  brought  about  an  agreement 
between  Bulgaria  and  Servia,  and  then  Greece  and 
Montenegro  were  eager  to  join. 

A  little  incident  in  connection  with  the  forma- 
tion of  the  Balkan  League  may  not  be  without 
interest  in  relation  to  some  recent  accusations  against 
monarchs  in  leading  their  people  into  war.  The 
Servian  minister  in  Constantinople  was  calling  on  an 
ambassador  to  the  Sublime  Porte  at  the  time  when 
rumors  of  the  preparation  of  the  Balkan  States  to 
make  war  on  Turkey  were  passing.  The  ambassador 
asked  the  minister  if  he  (the  minister)  did  not  think 
it  possible  that  some  European  diplomacy  might 
influence  his  King  to  withdraw  from  the  Balkan 
League.  5The  minister  replied  rather  significantly, 
''In  Servia  we  kill  kings.'' 

General  Savoff  had  completed  the  reorganization 
of  the  Bulgarian  army.  A  French  military  commis- 
sion had  done  much  for  the  Greek  army,  and  English 
naval  officers  had  tuned  up  the  Greek  navy.  The 
Bulgars,  too,  were  well  advised  as  to  the  actual 
progress  made  in  the  German  reorganization  in  the 


—24— 

Turkish  army.  As  a  vassal  state  Bulgaria  could 
only  maintain  a  commercial  agency  in  Constantinople 
which  did  not  include  a  military  attache,  I  met  in 
Bulgaria  an  officer  who  had  been  rated  as  a  clerk  in 
the  Bulgarian  agency  in  Constantinople.  He  was 
selected  for  this  service  because  of  his  knowledge  of 
English,  and,  while  he  did  not  enjoy  the  social  status 
of  a  military  attache,  he  was  able  to  discharge  such 
duties,  through  his  confidential  relations  with  the 
British  military  attache  who  gave  him  all  the  material 
that  was  sent  to  the  British  War  Office. 

The  Balkan  League  did  not  long  await  an  occasion 
to  present  its  demands  to  Turkey,  for  in  August, 
1912,  the  signs  of  the  coming  storm  were  so  plain  to 
diplomatic  meterologists  that  they  definitely  fore- 
casted ''unsettled,''  ''threatening,''  and  then 
"stormy  weather"  in  the  Balkans.  About  this  time 
the  comitajies  set  off  a  bomb  among  some  Moslem 
officials  in  the  little  town  of  Kochina  in  Macedonia, 
and  the  Turks  responded  promptly  and  reliably  in 
quite  a  spirited  massacre  of  a  considerable  number 
of  Bulgarian  and  other  Christian  residents  of  the 
village.  This  not  unusual  incident  was  repeated  in 
Berane  and  Ishtip,  where  Servians  and  Greeks  were 
the  victims.  I  was  in  Kochina  about  a  year  after 
these  incidents  and  just  after  the  close  of  the  second 
Balkan  War,  when  the  Servians  were  finally  in  con- 
trol, although  the  Bulgars  had  taken  the  town  first 
from  the  Turks  and  had  alternated,  several  times 
after  then,  its  occupation  with  the  Servians.  The 
quiet  little  village  has  a  most  attractive  site  at  the 
foot  of  a  mountain  valley  from  which  a  clear,  cool 
stream  tumbles  past  several  primitive  mill  sites  and 
the  usually  pleasantly  disposed  cafes  and  furnishes 
that  characteristic  feature  of  "good  water"  of  most 
every  Macedonian  community.  The  town  bore 
numerous  and  unmistakable  scars  of  the  bitter  strife 


—26— 

that  had  been  so  recently  waged  in  the  alternating 
supremacy  of  hereditary  enemies. 


Map.  Of 
South  Eastern  Europe 

1912 


Army  Service  Schools 


t? 


" """  I 


There  is  a  conventional  sign  of  a  prejudice 
recently  expressed  by  the  Moslem  against  the  Chris- 
tian group,  or  vice  versa,  in  any  Turkish  village.  It 
is  seen  in  the  quarter  last  to  be  disciplined,  in  the 
suggestive  absence  in  all  dwellings  of  doors,  windows 
and  sometimes  roofs,  and  all  easily  removable  and 
usable  pieces  of  lumber.  This  despoilation  not  only 
gives  a  very  uninhabitable  character  and  appearance 


—26— 

to  the  places  of  abode,  but  also  stimulates  quite  a 
visible  building  boom  in  the  dominating  portion  of 
the  village. 

These  latest  Macedonian  outrages  gave  the 
Balkan  Allies  splendid  occasion  to  deliver  on  October 
14,  1912,  to  the  Sublime  Porte  an  ultimatum,  which 
they  knew  would  be  rejected,  although  they  were 
able  to  base  it  on  the  high  and  just  grounds  of  a 
demand  for  the  immediate  enforcement  of  the  23d 
Article  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  guaranteeing  Mace- 
donian reforms,  which  the  Ottoman  government  for 
thirty-four  years  had  entirely  failed  to  respect.  This 
ultimatum  was  just  like  that  more  recent  one  that 
marked  the  beginning  of  a  greater  war.  A  demand 
was  made  on  a  government  which  the  government 
could  not  force  the  people  to  accept.  The  Porte 
answered  with  characteristic  insolence  by  the  seizure 
of  forty-five  Creusot  guns,  then  en  route  through 
Constantinople  to  Servia,  and  by  the  detention  of  all 
Greek  shipping  in  the  Bosphorus.  Bulgaria  then 
became  a  bit  peevish  and  expressed  some  annoyance 
at  the  so-called  Turkish  "maneuvers''  in  Thrace, 
although  Bulgaria  had  not  overlooked  her  own  mili- 
tary preparations,  which  had  been  continued  from 
the  time  of  her  maneuver  mobilization  in  August. 
All  of  this  diplomatic  conversation  was  held  in  the 
first  weeks  of  October,  and  I  passed  over  the  Oriental 
Railway  from  Sofia,  through  Adrianople,  to  Con- 
stantinople in  September  when  the  sidings  at  every 
station  were  filled  with  military  trains  carrying 
forage,  stores,  horses,  wagons  and  field  guns  so  new 
that  their  bright,  fair  leather  muzzle  caps  showed 
the  first  few  greasy  finger-prints.  Everything 
seemed  to  be  moving  toward  the  Turkish  frontier. 
Every  culvert  and  bridge  on  the  line  had  a  guard  of 
a  few  soldiers  with  their  shelter  tents  pitched  nearby. 
Maybe  Bulgaria  was  not  mobilizing,  but  at  any  rate 


—27— 

she  was  moving  a  few  hundred  thousand  men  with 
rifles  and  munitions  of  war  to  her  eastern  frontier, 
by  which  timely  providence  she  was  able  to  complete 
her  mobilization  with  the  wonderful  rapidity  that 
startled  Europe  and  enabled  the  Bulgarian  army  to 
cross  the  Turkish  frontier  one  day  after  the  declara- 
tion of  war. 

The  powers,  though  concerned  only  with  their 
own  larger  interests  in  near  Eastern  affairs,  became 
greatly  alarmed  at  the  military  activity  of  the  rude 
little  Balkan  States  and  gravely  admonished  all  con- 
cerned that  the  powers  would  prevent,  in  case  of 
conflict,  any  modification  of  the  territoral  statu  quo. 
In  the  course  of  these  diplomatic  conversations,  little 
Montenegro,  on  October  the  8th,  became  impatient 
and  fired  the  first  shot  at  the  great  and  invincible 
Ottoman  Empire,  and  the  world  was  amused  if  not 
amazed. 

On  October  the  17th,  Turkey  declared  war  on 
Bulgaria  and  Servia;  the  next  day  Greece  declared 
war  on  Turkey;  and  so  in  answer  to  the  question 
*'Who  started  it?''  the  measure  of  responsibility  can 
be  equally  divided. 

On  the  following  day,  October  18th,  a  Bulgarian 
army  crossed  the  Turkish  frontier  to  attack  Adrian- 
ople,  and  in  the  next  two  days  two  more  Bulgarian 
armies  had  crossed  the  northern  border  of  Thrace 
and  started  south  for  Kirk  Kilisse.  In  about  a  week 
after  the  first  contact,  the  Turkish  army  was  in  a 
confused  and  disorderly  mass,  in  mad  flight  towards 
the  Chatalja  lines,  thirty  miles  west  of  Constantinople, 
where  Nazim  Pasha,  the  Turkish  generalissimo,  was 
able  to  reorganize  and  intrench  his  frightened  mob 
so  as  to  repulse  the  Bulgarian  attack  which  was  made 
two  weeks  later. 

In  the  meantime,  the  Servian  main  army  started 
down  the  Valley  of  Morava,  while  one  corps  passed 


—28— 

through  western  Bulgaria  to  cross  into  Macedonia. 
At  Komanovo,  on  October  24th,  near  the  field  of 
Kossovo,  where  the  Turks  had  vanquished  the  Serbs 
500  years  before,  the  Servian  army  gained  a  decisive 
victory  in  a  three  days'  battle.  Less  than  a  year 
later  I  was  on  the  field  of  Komanovo  with  two  mili- 
tary attacheSy  and  I  give  it  as  their  opinion,  rather 
than  my  own,  that  it  possessed  the  physical  features 
that  should  provide  a  sense  of  tactical  delight  for 
either  attack  or  defense  as  well  as  that  splendid 
avenue  for  retirement— of  which  the  Turks  were 
glad  to  enjoy  the  benefits.  It  surely  seemed  to  both 
the  Bulgars  and  the  Serbs  that  the  victories  over  the 
Turks  were  not  only  the  result  of  superior  arms,  but 
a  divine  answer,  though  somewhat  delayed,  to  their 
Christian  prayers  of  centuries  for  deliverance  from 
their  Moslem  masters. 

The  Bulgars  marched  to  a  battle  song,  not  lack- 
ing in  many  of  the  qualities  of  the  ''Marsellaise,'' 
with  its  refrain,  "On  to  the  Maritza,''  which  they 
sang  as  they  went  out  to  avenge  their  defeat  on  the 
banks  of  that  river  centuries  before,  and  it  was  on 
this  same  Maritza,  at  Adrianople,  that  their  prayers 
were  answered. 

The  Serbs,  in  their  battle  hymn,  had  sung  "Re- 
member Kossovo''  as  they  marched  against  their 
ancient  enemy  to  meet  him  so  nearly  on  the  field  of 
Kossovo  that  they  could  regard  his  utter  defeat  as 
none  other  than  providential. 

And  so  it  is  httle  wonder  that  these  hereditary 
enemies  of  the  Turks  marched  and  fought  with  a  fire 
and  frenzy  which  gave  them  strength,  endurance 
and  impetus  that  might  have  vanquished  even  better 
soldiers  than  the  Turks.  After  Komanovo,  the 
Servians,  like  the  Greeks  at  Salonika,  were  invited 
to  enter  Uskub,  which  they  at  once  rechristened 
"Skoplje,"  as  this  was  its  name  when   capital  of 


—29- 


their  ancient  empire.     Then,  after  an  engagement 
that  could  be  called  a  battle,  at  Monastir,  the  Serbs 
completed  the  conquest  of  their  portion  of  Macedonia. 
The  Greeks  crossed  their  frontier  in  two  columns, 
one  into  Epirus  and  the  other  into  southern  Mace- 
donia.    They  invested  and  laid  siege  to  Janina,  near 
their  own  frontier,  and  then,  hurrying  on  in  a  mad 
rush  to  beat  the  Bulgars  to  Salonika,  arrived  No- 
vember the  18th,  just  as  a  Bulgarian  division  appeared 
before  another  quarter  of  that  city.     On  November 
10th,  or  two  days  after  the  arrival  of  the  Bulgarians, 
the  Turkish  commander  surrendered  to  the  army  of 
the  Greek  Crown  Prince,  who  refused  to  share  the 
honors  with  the  rival  forces.      The  Bulgarian  troops 
entered  the  eastern  part  of  the  city  by  their  own 
leave,  very  much  to  the  irritation  of  the  Greeks,  who 
stopped  short,  for  the  time,  of  using  arms  to  drive 
them  away.     The  Bulgarian  division  was  reduced  to  a 
battalion  during  the  course  of  the  first  war,  and  the 
force  was  at  this  strength  when  the  second  war 
began. 

The  Montenegrins,  in  their  comic  opera  splendor 
and  with  ferocious  valor,  had  fought  their  way  to- 
wards Scutari,  the  Turkish  stronghold  that  not  only 
resisted  the  longest  but  still  more  tragically,  was  to 
be  denied  them  finally  through  the  intervention  of 
European  politics.  The  British  military  observer, 
who  was  with  the  Montenegrin  army  throughout 
their  campaign,  told  me  that  these  unconquerable 
mountaineers  fought  with  a  courage  that  was  abso- 
lutely fearless  as  individuals,  but  with  tactics  that 
were  entirely  ridiculous  as  soldiers. 

So  it  was  that  in  four  weeks  after  the  first  en- 
gagement of  the  Turkish  army  with  the  enemy,  all 
that  was  left  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  in  Europe, 
except  for  the  beleagured  and  hopeless  cities  of 
Adrianople,  Janina  and  Scutari,  and  the  Peninsula  of 


—30— 

Gallipoli,  which  forms  the  western  littoral  of  the 
Dardenelles,  was  the  very  tip  of  the  Balkan  Pen- 
insula extending  twenty  miles  from  Constantinople. 
An  armistice  was  declared  between  Turkey  and  all 
the  Allies  except  Greece,  who  continued  her  hostihties 
during  the  following  two  months  of  suspended  hos- 
tilities. 

The  Ottoman  government  at  this  time  was  in  the 
hands  of  a  party  which  had  shortly  before  deposed 
the  Young  Turks.  The  most  palpable  defeat  of 
Turkish  arms  could  no  longer  be  denied,  and  on 
November  29th,  the  ambassadors  in  Constantinople 
were  requested  by  the  Turkish  government  to  inter- 
cede for  peace.  Nazim  Pasha  and  General  Savoff 
met  between  their  lines  on  December  3d,  and  an 
armistice  was  signed  between  Turkey  and  all  the 
Allies  except  Greece. 

A  conference  was  held  shortly  after  in  London, 
and  on  January  22,  1913,  after  much  wrangling,  the 
Turkish  government  agreed  to  accept  the  conditions 
demanded  by  the  Allies.  On  the  following  day, 
while  the  Grand  Council,  in  session  at  the  Sublime 
Porte,  was  drafting  the  document  of  acceptance, 
Enver  Bey  and  Tallat  Bey,  with  a  street  crowd  of 
not  more  than  fifty  partisans,  entered  the  council 
chamber,  murdered  Nazim  Pasha,  the  Minister  of 
War,  and  forced  the  resignations  of  the  Grand  Vizier 
and  Cabinet.  Perhaps  this  event  was  more  of  a 
coup  d'etat  than  a  revolution,  but  whatever  it  may 
be  called,  there  was  no  public  manifestation  of  con- 
cern and  but  Httle  evidence  of  the  overthrow  to  be 
seen  in  the  street.  The  Young  Turks  with  Mahmoud 
Shefket  Pasha  would  not  commit  the  sacrilege,  as 
they  said,  of  ceding  besieged  Adrianople  and  the 
''tombs  of  the  Sultans,''  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  none  are  buried  there,  nor  could  they  sully  the 
glory  of  the  empire  by  sacrificing  the  ^gean  and 


—Si- 
Mediterranean  islands,  which  had  already  been  lost 
in  war. 

On  February  3d,  the  armistice  was  denounced 
and  war  was  renewed.  There  was  no  rational  hope 
of  relieving  Adrianople,  for  the  Bulgars  were  at  least 
as  secure  on  the  west  of  the  Chatalja  line  as  the 
Turks  had  been  on  the  east.  Early  in  March,  1913, 
Enver  Bey  personally  conducted  a  pathetic  and  frantic 
expedition  from  Constantinople  with  the  purpose  of 
landing  on  the  north  shore  of  the  Marmora  at 
Rodosto  to  take  the  Bulgars  at  Chatalja  in  the  rear 
and  to  relieve  Adrianople.  The  effort  failed  in  its 
beginning  with  unorganized  troops  without  rations, 
suitable  transport  or  landing  facilities. 

I  saw  the  daily  progress  of  the  preparation  as 
made  in  Constantinople.  The  only  seaworthy  trans- 
port in  the  fleet  was  tied  up  at  the  dock  adjoining 
the  great  floating  bridge  across  the  Golden  Horn. 
The  decks  were  crowded  for  several  days  with  sol- 
diers arranged  in  the  same  order  that  exists  on  a 
Coney  Island  boat  on  the  Fourth  of  July,  and  these 
troops  almost  starved  before  the  transport  put  to 
sea.  The  other  craft  in  the  fleet  were  of  the  New 
York  ferry  boat  variety,  equipped  for  shore  water 
supply,  and  they  were  almost  ruined  by  being 
kept  at  sea  for  two  weeks  with  salt  water  in  their 
boilers.  A  German  doctor,  who  accompanied  Enver 
Bey  personally,  and  who  saw  the  landing  operations 
from  the  pilot  house  of  the  "flag  ship,''  told  me  that 
only  one  battalion  were  able  to  get  ashore  and  they 
were  soon  driven  back  to  the  beach  by  the  Bulgarian 
batteries  on  the  hills  above  the  town.  This  is  an 
incident  of  the  frantic  but  misguided  energy  of 
which  the  desperate  and  fatalistic  Turk  is  capable  at 
times. 

After  this  last  gasp  of  Turkish  arms,  there  was 
no  other  important  event  in  the  Eastern  theater  until 


—32— 

the  fall  of  Adrianople  on  March  26,  1913.  The 
fortress  of  Janina  had  fallen  to  the  Greeks  on  March 
6,  1913.  The  Servians  had  gone  to  the  aid  of  the 
Montenegrins,  who  were  still  struggling  before 
Scutari,  and  the  last  vestige  of  hope  for  the  only 
remaining  Turkish  outpost  in  Europe  thus  passed. 
Hostilities  for  the  second  time  were  suspended  on 
the  Chatalja  lines. 

With  the  fall  of  Scutari,  April  23d,  the  mailed 
fist  of  Europe  appeared  once  more  in  Balkan  affairs. 
Austria,  stinging  from  the  wound  that  Servia  and 
Montenegro  had  given  her  parental  pride  by  their 
forcible  adoption  of  her  cherished  child  in  their  joint 
occupation  of  the  Sanjac  of  Novi  Bazar,  turned 
frantically  for  maternal  solace  to  Albania,  as  the 
product  of  a  violent  and  vicarious  accouchement  force, 
and  wildly  warned  the  world  that  not  a  hand  should 
be  lifted  against  the  waif.  Scutari  was  the  head  of 
Albania  and  Austria  would  not  permit  the  savage 
Montenegrins  to  bite  it  off.  This  cannibal  act  was 
prevented  by  th-e  rattling  of  European  sabers,  which 
restored  Scutari  to  Albania  and  left  the  Montenegrins 
again  smarting  under  Austria's  wrongs.  Here  in 
this  remote  and  obscure  corner  of  the  Balkans,  after 
the  local  conflagration  had  passed,  lay  the  still  burn- 
ing embers  which  so  soon  spread  into  the  tinder  box 
of  Europe.  On  May  21st,  the  second  peace  conference 
assembled  in  London.  On  May  30th,  peace  prelimi- 
naries were  signed  with  the  delimitation  of  the 
Turkish  frontier  on  a  line  running  from  Enos  on  the 
iEgean  to  Media  on  the  Black  Sea.  The  Bulgarians 
had  been  in  undisputed  possession  of  the  western 
littoral  of  the  Marmora,  except  the  Peninsula  of 
Gallipoli  which  formed  the  eastern  shores  of  the 
Dardenelles,  but  the  interest  of  Europe  demanded 
the  removal  westward  of  the  Bulgarian  frontier  to 


—33— 

leave  in  the  custody  of  the  Turks  the  great  highway 
from  the  Black  Sea  to  the  Mediterranean. 

In  this  war  thus  closed,  the  most  interesting  and 
important  feature  was  the  Bulgarian  campaign  in 
Thrace  where  the  Turkish  Army  of  the  East  was  so 
quickly  and  decisively  defeated.  Whatever  the 
other  Allies  accomplished,  in  the  defeat  of  the 
Turkish  Army  of  the  West,  is  only  incidental  to 
the  Bulgarian  success  in  the  east,  without  which 
the  other  Allies  could  not  have  brought  their  cam- 
paigns to  so  definite  an  issue.  The  Greeks  con- 
tributed a  very  important  part  by  keeping  the  Turkish 
fleet  in  the  Dardenelles  and  preventing  the  transport 
of  Turkish  troops  by  sea,  and  the  Servians  brought 
an  important  support  to  the  investment  and  final 
reduction  of  Adrianople;  but  for  all  this,  Bulgaria 
had  the  brunt  of  the  hardest  battles  and  endured  the 
stress  of  the  longer  campaign. 


Second     Lecture 


The  Campaign  in  Thrace 

WHAT  little  I  know  in  a  general  way  of  the 
campaign  in  Thrace  I  shall  relate  in  the  form 
of  a  story  of  a  visit  I  was  permitted  to  make  to 
Adrianople  and  to  the  battlefields  and  terrain  of  the 
rout  of  the  grande  armee  of  the  Ottoman  Empire 
just  one  year  after  that  event  had  passed  into  history. 
The  details  of  the  strategy  and  tactics  of  the  cam- 
paign may  be  found  in  the  very  complete  report  of 
the  German  General  Staff.  Mahmoud  Moukhtar 
Pasha,  who  commanded  the  3d  Corps  of  the  Turkish 
Army  of  the  East,  has  written  an  apologetic  narrative 
of  about  the  same  import  in  which  he  defends  his 
own  tactical  efforts  and  professional  capacity.  I  had 
with  me  Mahmoud  Moukhtar' s  report  and  the 
Austrian  General  Staff  maps  from  which  it  was  not 
difficult  to  locate  any  of  the  positions.  I  arrived  in 
Adrianople  with  letters  from  Tallat  Bey,  the  triumvir 
Minister  of  Interior  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  to  the 
Civil  Governor,  and  from  Izzet  Pasha,  the  Minister 
of  War  to  the  Commandant  de  Place.  These  letters 
conveyed  in  true  Oriental  form  an  acknowledgment 
of  obligation  for  my  moral  and  material  support, 
which  had  done  so  much  to  sustain  the  empire  in 
an  hour  of  peril,  and  instructions  to  all  civil  and  mili- 
tary authorities  to  make  such  signs  of  appreciation 
as  might  seem  appropriate  and  discreet.  The 
courteous  and  distinguished  commandant,  Mahmet 

34 


—35— 

Ali  Pasha,  told  me  that  I  had  shown  commendable 
zeal  in  paying  him  the  distinction  of  a  visit  to  his 
command  because  any  city,  if  it  were  the  birthplace 
of  a  great  man,  the  place  of  signature  of  a  great 
treaty,  or  a  scene  of  defense  against  a  great  siege, 
might  well  become  a  shrine. 

During  the  course  of  my  reception,  a  tall,  sol- 
dierly officer  attracted  my  attention  as  he  cracked 
his  heels  before  his  chief,  with  whom  he  exchanged 
a  few  formal  words.  After  the  officer  had  retired, 
the  Pasha  asked  me  if  I  had  noticed  him  and  if  I 
knew  who  he  was.  I  could  assure  his  excellency 
that  I  had  not  failed  to  observe  his  visitor,  but  that 
I  was  deeply  humiliated  by  my  ignorance  of  his 
identity.  The  Pasha  then  treated  me  to  what  I  felt 
I  was  expected  to  appreciate  as  a  most  interesting 
revelation:  "That  officer  you  have  just  seen,''  he 
said,  *'is  none  other  than  the  son  of  the  great  Osman 
Pasha,  the  defender  of  Plevna.''  As  sieges  in  gen- 
eral, and  that  of  Adrianople  in  particular  had  just 
been  under  discussion,  it  seemed  quite  appropriate 
to  have  thus  awakened  the  memory  of  one  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire's  most  distinguished  soldiers,  who 
had  won  his  fame  in  one  of  the  great  defensive 
operations,  upon  which  the  later  military  glory  of 
the  Turks  seems  to  have  rested. 

On  the  following  morning  the  Pasha  sent  his 
best  automobile  and  his  favorite  aide  de  camp  for  a 
daylight  start  on  a  tour  of  inspection  of  both  the 
offensive  and  defensive  positions  concerned  with 
the  siege.  We  went  first  to  the  southwest  sector 
at  Kartal  Tepe,  a  height  from  which  the  city  and 
many  positions  can  be  viewed  and  which  was  the 
scene  of  the  first  desperate  and  successful  strug- 
gles in  the  course  of  the  Bulgarian  investment  in  an 
effort  to  secure  the  observation  station.  The  morn- 
ing was  hazy  and  damp;  the  automobile  was  left  on 


—36— 

a  road.  We  reached  on  foot  the  summit  of  Kartal 
Tepe  just  as  a  heavy  fog  fell  which  not  only  veiled 
the  anticipated  panorama,  but  entirely  defeated,  for 
more  than  a  hour,  all  the  strategy  and  tactics  of  our 
party  in  a  reconnaissance  fired  in  an  heroic  endeavor 
to  locate  the  position  of  our  transportation.  Had  it 
not  been  for  the  exercise  of  some  considerable  force, 
if  not  skill,  in  the  art  of  vocal  signalling,  our  units 
would  have  been  so  hopelessly  separated  that  rescue 
could  have  been  effected  only  by  the  noonday  sun. 
While  enduring  the  failure  of  our  line  of  communica- 
tion and  waiting  for  the  fog  to  raise  we  may  turn  to 
some  conditions  that  are  of  interest  in  relation  to  the 
siege  of  Adrianople. 

The  city  rests  in  a  depression  surrounded  by  a 


Contour  Interval  40 Meters 


TURKS, Black.    BULGARS.BIue. 


Army  Service  Schools 


—37— 

ring  of  hills  which  form  a  natural  defense,  except  on 
the  southwest,  where  the  ridge  is  broken  by  the 
broad  Valley  of  the  Arda.  To  the  northeast,  the 
slopes  are  gradual  towards  the  town,  but  drop  away 
more  abruptly  to  the  front.  It  requires  no  great 
military  sagacity  for  an  observer  to  appreciate  the 
natural  elements  of  defense  in  this  quarter  which  is 
of  particular  interest  as  it  is  the  site  of  the  assault 
which  terminated  the  siege.  Three  confluent  rivers 
(Arda,  Maritza  and  Tunga)  within  the  fortified  area 
provide  important  strategical  elements.  The  domi- 
nating architectural  feature  is  the  Mosque  of  Sultan 
Selim,  said  by  many  critics  to  be  the  most  perfect 
Turkish  mosque,  with  its  four  tall  minarets  visible 
a  dozen  miles  in  every  direction,  and,  on  a  clear  day, 
from  the  environs  of  Kirk  Kilisse,  thirty-five  or  forty 
miles  away.  On  the  other  hand,  as  the  minarets 
commanded  a  far  view  of  surrounding  country,  they 
were  used  as  observation  stations  during  the  siege. 
In  peace  times  the  civil  population  of  Adrianople 
was  about  80,000,  but,  by  the  influx  from  surround- 
ing villages,  it  must  have  increased  to  100,000  during 
the  siege.  Among  the  inhabitants  there  were  more 
Turks  than  Christians,  with  the  Bulgarians  predomi- 
nating among  the  latter. 

The  strategic  value  of  Adrianople  has  always 
been  appreciated  and  it  has  been  frequently  spoken 
of  as  the  **Key  to  Constantinople.'^  Its  natural  ad- 
vantages have  not  been  developed  by  the  construc- 
tion of  roads  in  Thrace,  although  the  value  of  its 
position  as  a  base  or  pivot  for  operations  against  the 
Bulgarian  frontier  was  recognized. 

The  railway  from  Sofia  to  Constantinople  runs 
two  miles  south  of  the  city  through  the  station  village 
of  Karagach.  There  are  only  a  few  scattered  trees 
in  or  out  of  Adrianople,  except  on  that  island  in  the 
Tunga,  known  in  the  turcophile  romance  of  Pierre 


—38— 

Loti  as  **The  Isle  of  Anguish. '^  Adrianople  had  been 
fortified  in  some  way  since  it  first  became  the 
European  capital  of  the  Turks  in  1363.  Plans  for  its 
defensive  rehabilitation,  directed  by  Von  der  Goltz 
Pasha  prior  to  1896,  were  never  entirely  or  perfectly 
executed.  The  works,  all  more  or  less  remodeled 
ancient  structures,  consisted  of  thirty  permanent  re- 
doubts not  at  all  well  concealed,  protected  by  a  com- 
plete circle  of  wire  entanglements  constructed  a  very 
short  time  before  the  war.  The  perimeter  of  the 
line  of  fortification  is  about  thirty  miles  with  axes 
varying  from  eight  to  ten  miles.  I  think  it  has  been 
generally  conceded  that  Adrianople  at  the  time  of 
the  siege  was  not  a  modern  fortress,  although  the 
the  work  began  under  German  direction,  especially 
in  the  northwest  sector— which  might  have  been 
finished  in  several  years— would  have  added  con- 
siderable strength.  Communication  was  not  very 
good,  because  of  a  failure  to  provide  sufficient  bridges 
for  the  movement  of  troops  over  the  several  un- 
fordable  streams  within  the  fortress  area.  The 
British  military  consul,  who  was  in  the  siege  and  had 
been  stationed  at  Adrianople  for  four  or  five  years 
prior  to  the  event,  told  me  that  the  Turks  had  no 
good  working  maps  of  the  fortress  and  that  the  only 
reliable  and  complete  ones  were  to  be  found  in  Sofia 
and  London.  The  British  Military  Consular  Service 
is  a 'Peculiar  hybrid  diplomatic  institution,  but  it 
serves  quite  effectually  the  ends  of  the  British  War 
Office  in  gaining  military  information  in  the  remotest 
quarters  of  the  world  where  the  interests  of  the 
empire  are  vested,  by  assigning  army  officers  to 
consular  stations  where,  although  they  are  known 
to  be  military  officers,  all  the  nominal  and  apparent 
duties  are  diplomatic  and  civil.  I  understand,  how- 
ever, that  there  is  no  regulation  which  prevents  an 
officer  on  such  duty  from  working  overtime  or  at 


—so- 
night  in  a  purely  professional  way.  To  the  pro- 
fessional industry  of  the  incurhbent  of  the  office  in 
Adrianople,  at  the  time  of  which  I  speak,  I  have 
reason  to  believe,  is  due  the  satifactory  military 
information  on  Adrianople  which  the  British  War 
Office  possessed. 

Shukri  Pasha,  a  general  of  artillery,  who  com- 
manded the  artillery  in  Thrace,  was  in  command 
during  the  siege.  The  garrison  in  time  of  peace  was 
an  army  corps  of  about  25,000  men,  but  at  the  time 
of  the  siege  it  has  been  estimated  at  from  50,000  to 
55,000  men.  But  as  the  Bulgarians  reported  60,000 
military  prisoners  at  the  time  of  the  capitulation, 
and  as  the  losses  probably  were  at  least  15,000,  the 
garrison  must  have  been  at  least  75,000.  The  dis- 
crepancy in  numbers  is  probably  due  to  the  many 
impressed  Christians  gathered  from  the  surrounding 
villages.  The  investing  force,  before  the  armistice 
and  when  the  fortress  was  only  blockaded,  was  about 
80,000,  including  two  Servian  army  corps.  After 
the  armistice,  when  it  was  determined  to  take  the 
fortress  by  assault,  the  besieging  army  consisted  of 
105,000  Bulgarians  with  342  guns  and  47,000  Servians 
with  98  guns,  a  total  of  152.000  men  with  440  guns. 
One  observer  remarks:  ''The  garrison  was  large, 
but  badly  trained;  the  artillery  was  strong,  but  badly 
sited,  and  at  the  head  was  a  man  irresolute  and  weak 
in  character.'' 

It  is  said  that  for  fifteen  years  General  Fitcheff, 
the  Bulgarian  chief  of  staff  during  the  war,  devoted 
himself  entirely  to  the  preparation  for  the  attack  of 
Adrianople.  On  the  study  and  secret  reconnaissance 
of  officers  and  agents  in  the  preparation  of  a  military 
map  of  Adrianople,  the  Bulgarians  spent  annually 
from  $10,000  to  $12,000  for  a  number  of  years.  The 
work  was  finished  in  July,  1911— just  a  little  over  a 
year  before  the  war.      It  was  complete  and  accurate 


—40— 

up  to  that  date,  but  it  failed  to  show  the  most 
recently  constructed  positions  and  the  barbed  wire 
entanglements.  Correct  information  on  this  de- 
tail had  been  submitted  by  agents,  but  it  was  not 
accepted  as  rehable  because  the  locations  seemed  so 
absurd.  The  Turkish  officer  in  charge  of  the  con- 
struction of  these  obstacles,  when  the  responsibility 
for  this  practical  joke  on  the  Bulgarian  War  Office 
was  being  passed  around,  explained  that  the  wire 
was  put  up  by  soldiers  during  his  absence  and  with- 
out his  direction. 

The  attack  on  Adrianople  was  provided  for  in 
the  mobilization  and  concentration  of  the  three  field 
armies  with  which  Bulgaria  organized  for  the 
Thracian  campaign.  The  First  Army  was  disposed 
for  an  attack  on  the  center  of  the  Turkish  front 
extending  from  Kirk  Kilisse  to  Adrianople.  The 
Third  Army  was  prepared  for  a  descent  from  the 
north  on  the  Turkish  right  at  Kirk  Kilisse.  The 
Second  Army  was  formed  for  a  direct  attack  on 
Adrianople  and  was  placed  near  Mustapha  Pasha, 
the  Turkish  frontier  station  from  which  the  railway 
and  highway  lines  lead  directly  to  Adrianople.  This 
entire  arrangement  was  not  consistent  with  the 
Turkish  understanding  of  Bulgarian  strategy,  for  the 
Turks  had  been  told  by  Von  der  Goltz,  in  words  often 
quoted,  that  Kirk  Kilisse  was  * '  so  strong  that  only  a 
Prussian  army  could  capture  it  and  then  only  after  a 
three  months'  siege.**  Subsequent  events,  however, 
seem  to  have  shown  that  even  a  German  general  can 
be  mistaken,  if,  indeed,  he  were  not  joking  or  trying 
to  intimidate  the  Bulgarians.  It  was  considered  by 
the  Turks  impracticable  for  the  Bulgarians  to  ad- 
vance in  force  from  the  north  on  Kirk  Kilisse  over 
the  very  rough  and  roadless  country  that  intervened, 
and,  expecting  the  Bulgarians  to  attempt  to  turn 
their  left  flank  by  way  of  Demotika,   thirty  miles 


—41— 

south  of  Adrianople  on  the  Salonika  railway,  the 
Turks  laid  great  stress  on  the  defense  of  Adrianople. 

In  the  first  phase  of  the  war,  before  the  armistice, 
the  Second  Bulgarian  Army  accomplished  its  task  of 
investing  Adrianople  with  the  aid  of  two  Servian 
divisions,  which  arrived  November  12th,  soon  after 
the  battle  of  Komanovo,  in  which  the  Servians  de- 
feated the  main  Turkish  army  in  Macedonia.  At 
this  time  Adrianople  was  not  much  more  than 
blockaded  and  it  was  not  until  after  hostilities  were 
resumed  that  it  was  definitely  and  resolutely  de- 
termined to  take  the  fortress  by  assault.  Bombard- 
ment was  first  begun  on  November  25th,  Kartal  Tepe 
was  taken,  as  it  was  required  for  an  observation 
station  and  attacks  were  frequently  made  to  develop 
the  strength  of  defensive  positions.  Artillery  fire 
was  continued  from  time  to  time  with  the  object  of 
rendering  residence  in  the  city  undesirable,  but  no 
general  assault  was  attempted  during  the  first  phase 
of  the  war. 

In  the  possession  of  Adrianople  the  enemy  im- 
posed upon  the  Bulgarian  operations  a  great  em- 
barassment  by  the  interruption  of  rail  communication 
from  Sofia  to  Chatalja.  The  railway  line  ran  for 
several  miles  within  the  fortress  area,  where  it  also 
crossed  the  Arda  on  a  bridge  of  some  proportion  and 
of  great  importance.  This  break  in  the  railway 
necessitated  a  detour  of  thirty  miles  over  bad  roads, 
from  a  station  west  of  Adrianople,  for  ten  miles  along 
the  west  bank  of  the  Arda  to  SeminH,  where  the  river 
was  crossed,  and  from  there  to  Demotika  on  the 
railway  to  Salonika. 

The  map  prepared  by  the  Bulgarians  had  marked 
on  it  in  red  stars  the  ''strong  positions''  to  be  occu- 
pied in  making  the  investment.  This  arrangement 
aided  materially  in  both  the  early  and  later  stages  of 
the  siege,  as  orders  could  be  issued  in  simple  form 


—42— 

for  units  to  take  definite  positions.  The  preparations 
made  for  the  final  assault  were  very  complete  and  it 
was  fully  believed  by  General  Ivanhoif,  the  Bul- 
garian commander,  that,  except  for  some  unforseen 
and  almost  impossible  accident,  the  operation  would 
be  successful.  Two  elements  determined  the  sector 
that  was  to  be  assaulted.  First,  the  burden  must  be 
borne  by  the  Bulgars,  rather  than  the  Serbs,  as  the 
moral  right  belonged  to  the  former  on  account  of 
their  greater  interest;  and,  as  it  was  not  feasible  to 
make  changes  in  the  positions  of  the  troops  which 
had  already  been  relocated  several  times,  only  the 
sector  invested  by  the  Bulgarians  could  be  considered. 
Second,  in  the  Bulgarian  invested  sectors,  the  posi- 
tion of  the  greatest  natural  strength  was  believed  to 
be  most  vulnerable  on  account  of  the  bad  tactical 
handling  of  the  defense  and  it  was  thought  that  the 
greatest  surprise  could  be  effected  there  because  the 
garrison  would  least  expect  a  determined  attack  at 
that  point. 

These  considerations  determined  the  northeast 
sector  as  the  place  of  assault.  An  engineer  ofl^icer  of 
high  professional  attainment  and  Russian  military 
education,  General  Vasov,  was  selected  to  conduct 
the  strictly  ''one  man*'  fire  control,  which  was  de- 
cided upon.  Double  lines  of  communication  cables 
were  laid  from  all  positions  to  the  fire  control  station. 
In  order  to  conceal  from  the  Bulgarian  troops  the 
date  selected  for  the  attack,  General  Vasov  was 
given  a  fake  leave  order  and  it  was  widely  advertised 
that  he  would  be  absent  for  the  time  covering  the 
period  for  which  the  attack  was  set. 

At  1:00  p.m.,  March  23,  1913,  the  artillery 
preparation  was  commenced  on  all  sides  except  the 
northeast  sector,  where  the  heavy  guns  were  not 
fired  in  order  to  mislead  the  fortress  garrison.  The 
final  objective  was  to  be  the  three  forts  in   the 


—43— 

northeast  sector— Tash  Tabija,  Avas  Baba  and  Aiji- 
Yolu.  The  artillery  fire  was  continued  with  full 
force  until  8:00  p.m.,  when  under  cover  of  darkness 
the  infantry  advance  began.  Some  artillery  fire 
continued  all  night.  In  the  darkness  two  divisions 
of  infantry  advanced  on  the  east  and  the  reenforced 
56th  Regiment  advanced  on  the  north  until  each  met 
the  Turkish  infantry  fire  at  about  800  yards'  range. 
Here  the  attacking  infantry  halted  until  5:00  a.m., 
March  24th.  Then  the  100  heavy  guns  placed  to  the 
north  and  east  opened  fire.  The  Turks  in  their 
advanced  position  fled  to  their  nearby  forts,  pursued 
by  the  Bulgarians,  until  the  former  encountered 
their  own  wire  entanglements  where  they  were 
nearly  all  killed  or  captured  by  the  Bulgarians. 
Twenty  field  guns  and  several  machine  guns  which 
were  taken  were  at  once  turned  on  the  Turks.  The 
greater  part  of  this  melee  had  occurred  in  the  dim 
light  of  the  early  dawn. 

By  7:00  a.m.  the  fire  of  the  Turkish  forts  in  the 
northeast  sector  had  been  silenced,  when  a  heavy 
fog  fell  which  gave  the  Turks  a  chance  to  recover 
and  caused  the  Bulgarians  to  suffer  heavily  while 
digging  themselves  in  at  the  foot  of  the  hill,  within 
150  to  200  yards  of  the  fort  lines.  In  this  trying 
situation  part  of  the  56th  Regiment  found  a  dead 
space  beneath  the  glacis  of  Avas  Baba.  The  attack- 
ing force  from  the  east  found  some  shelter  in  the 
captured  advanced  positions,  but  the  northern  group 
fared  badly  in  the  Provadiisca  Valley,  where  they 
received,  at  dawn,  a  heavy  flank  fire  from  the  Tash 
Tabija  fort.  All  day  long  the  Bulgarians  were  pro- 
tected by  their  artillery  fire  which  made  most  all  of 
the  Turkish  trenches  untenable  and  reduced  the 
Turkish  artillery  response.  When  night  came,  March 
24th,  covered  by  the  full  strength  of  their  artillery 
fire,  the  Bulgarian  pioneers  opened  passages  in  the 


—44— 

wire  entanglements.  The  pioneers  were  divided  into 
parties  of  four  or  five,  to  each  of  which  some  in- 
fantry from  the  54th  and  56th  Regiments  was 
assigned.  Along  this  whole  front  about  forty  pas- 
sages were  cut,  each  from  four  to  forty  yards  wide 
and  from  five  to  fifty  yards  apart.  The  entire  front 
through  which  these  openings  were  made  was  about 
one  mile  long.  The  loss  due  to  this  operation  was  only 
about  sixty  men.  At  2:00  p.m.  the  final  assault  was 
made  and  the  forts  were  entered.  Shukri  Pasha 
could  not  believe  that  his  favorite  forts  were  the  first 
to  fall.  He  had  been  deceived,  also,  by  the  vigorous 
demonstrations  on  the  south  sector,  to  which  he  had 
ordered  all  of  his  reserves.  The  fort  Aiji  Yolu  was 
entered  some  little  time  before  Avas  Baba,  but  with 
no  resistance  to  the  final  charge  by  the  fleeing  Turks. 
Other  positions  were  not  taken  by  assault,  but  sur- 
rendered from  necessity  as  they  were  defenseless 
against  attack  from  the  rear. 

The  losses  in  the  besieging  armies  in  the  final 
operations  has  been  given  as  follows: 


KILLED 

WOUNDED 

Bulgarians 
Servians 

Officers         Men 
24           1274 

6            268 

Officers         Men 

82            6573 

7           1166 

Total  30  1542  89    ^     7739 

In  the  final  siege  the  Bulgarians  lost  8.5  per  cent 
and  the  Servians  4.5  per  cent  of  their  troops  engaged. 
The  total  casualties  were  9,300  or  about  6  per  cent. 
Including  all,  the  losses  arising  during  the  entire  four 
months  of  the  siege,  the  casualty  rate  was  hardly 
greater  than  10  per  cent.  The  Turkish  losses  during 
the  siege  as  estimated  by  the  Bulgarians  were  about 
15,000  killed  and  wounded,  or  about  20  per  cent,  as 
the  prisoners  numbered  60,000  men  and  2,000  officers. 

The  Turkish  medical  officer  in  command  of  the  mil- 


—45— 

itary  hospital  at  Adrianople,  the  time  of  my  visit,  told 
me  substantially  the  same.  He  said  that  a  garrison  of 
about  60,000  men  had  surrendered.  Ten  thousand 
wounded  had  been  admitted  to  the  hospitals  with  but 
a  small  mortality -2  per  cent  to  5  per  cent.  Two 
thousand  were  killed  and  there  were  thirty  cases  of 
cholera.  There  were  two  hospitals:  one,  the  regular 
military  hospital  of  the  garrison  adjoining  the  bar- 
racks near  the  town;  the  other,  an  Ottoman  Red 
Crescent  hospital  at  Karagach,  near  the  railway 
station.  There  were  no  foreign  Red  Cross  missions 
in  Adrianople  during  the  siege.  The  comparatively 
slight  cost  paid  by  the  attacking  forces  and  the 
heavy  losses  of  the  defenders  seem  to  be  due  to  the 
efficient  plan  and  execution  of  the  assault,  to  the 
tactical  errors  in  the  conduct  of  the  defense,  and  to 
the  technical  faults  in  the  construction  of  the  fortress. 

The  Scene  of  the  Assault 

The  fog  which  covered  Kartal  Tepe  and  veiled 
the  panorama  of  the  fortress  of  Adrianople,  which 
we  had  hoped  to  view,  left  nothing  to  be  seen  except 
the  ground  beneath  our  feet,  which  showed  the 
enormous  amount  of  digging  that  had  been  done  to 
provide,  first  for  the  Turks  and  afterwards  for  the 
Bulgars,  shelter  for  the  living  and  graves  for  the 
dead.  The  dogs  of  that  yellow  cur  variety— so 
closely  akin  to  the  coyote— had  already  opened  many 
of  the  graves  and  spread  about  the  bleached  evi- 
dences of  the  passed  struggle  for  this  position.  A 
particularly  fine  specimen  showing  the  effect  of  a 
gunshot  wound,  which  I  carried  away  from  Kartal 
Tepe  and  preserved  for  a  long  time,  has  finally 
slipped  out  of  my  possession — by  the  accidents  of 
travel,  I  believe,  rather  than  by  the  cupidity  of  man. 

The  automobile  finally  recovered,  the  reestab- 


lished  line  of  communication  enabled  us  to  reach  the 
northeast  front  where  the  greatest  interest  lay  about 
the  fort  Avas  Baba,  which  the  Bulgarians  carried  by- 
direct  assault.  The  commandant's  aide  tried  in  vain 
to  induce  a  sentry  who  guarded  the  sally-port  to 
admit  us  to  the  interior  of  this  somewhat  delapidated 
structure.  There  was  no  magic  or  open  sesame  in 
the  name  or  "by  the  order''  of  the  commanding 
general,  for  the  soldier  insisted  that  his  own  military 
acquaintance  did  not  extend  beyond  his  immediate 
and  personal  commanding  officer,  who,  though  in- 
definitely absent,  had  left  him  with  instructions  to 
admit  no  one— under  the  penalty  of  having  his  eyes 
gouged  out  or  being  subjected  to  some  other  and 
more  terribly  devastating  form  of  mutilation.  In- 
spection was  limited,  therefore,  to  the  surroundings 
of  this  position  which  at  that  time— more  than  a 
year  after  the  siege  operations— appeared  as  though 
some  great  hog  had  rooted  it  full  of  waist-deep 
craters.  The  barbed  wire  entanglements  still 
stretched  about  the  foot  of  the  glacis  with  suggestive 
gaps  at  frequent  intervals,  but  with  no  signs  of  de- 
struction by  artillery  projectiles.  The  aide  very 
politely  recalled  an  order  which  strictly  forbade  the 
use  of  a  camera,  but  while  his  attention  was  diverted 
by  my  companion,  a  few  harmless  exposures  were 
made. 

There  was  one  characteristically  Turkish  in- 
dication of  recent  military  activity,  seen  in  the 
almost  completed  work  of  regrading  the  glacis,  so  as 
to  remove  the  dead  space  that  had  sheltered  the 
Bulgarians  in  their  assault,  and  on  which,  no  doubt, 
complacent  and  comforting  Oriental  resignation  had 
placed  the  whole  tangible  responsibility  for  the  fall 
of  Adrianople.  The  aide  told  me  that  the  shrapnel 
fire  was  so  destructive  that  *'only  dead  men  could 
live*'  in  the  infantry  trenches  about  the  fort,  and, 


—47— 
after  several  regiments  had  been  almost  destroyed 
and  driven  out,  it  was  found  impossible  to  induce 
soldiers  to  return  to  them.  There  had  been  much 
rifle  fire  both  going  and  coming  about  the  wire  en- 
tanglements as  most  every  one  of  the  angle-iron 
standards  had  one  or  more  bullet  holes  flanged  on 
either  side,  indicating  a  heavy  fire  in  both  directions. 
The  trenches  on  the  bank  of  the  little  stream  about 
500  yards  from  the  foot  of  the  bluff  were  much  in  evi- 
dence, and  it  was  said  that  the  greatest  Bulgarian 
casualties  occurred  here  where  the  right  flank  was 
exposed  to  the  enfilading  machine  gun  fire  from  Fort 
Tash-Tabija,  which  killed  every  man  in  the  right 
sector.  It  is  quite  likely  that  the  husky  Bulgarian 
soldier,  in  digging  himself  in  under  these  inspiring 
conditions,  made  a  world's  record  on  hasty  intrench- 
ments  that,  probably,  will  not  soon  be  broken. 

From  Avas  Baba  and  the  crescent  ridge  of  the 
northeast  sector  we  motored  to  Fort  Hederlick,  the 
headquarters  during  the  siege,  of  the  fortress  com- 
mander, Shukri  Pasha,  which  could  be  seen  near  the 
opposite  rim  when  one  looked  toward  the  southeast 
across  the  great  shallow  bowl  which  held  the  city. 
This  position  had  no  defensive  value,  as  it  lay  behind 
the  crest  of  the  second  ridge.  It  was  the  site  of  the 
radio  station,  by  which  communication  with  Con- 
stantinople was  kept  up  during  all  of  the  siege. 
The  original  apparatus  had  been  destroyed  just  before 
the  surrender,  but  a  duplicate,  an  ordinary  field  radio 
set  mounted  on  a  specially  constructed  wagon  truck, 
was  then  in  operation.  By  the  time  we  returned  to 
the  city  the  afternoon  had  passed  and  there  was  not 
time  remaining  for  an  inspection  of  other  positions, 
although  I  had  had  the  opportunity  of  seeing  the 
positions  from  which  the  operations  began  and  where 
they  finished -the  beginning  and  the  end  of  the 
siege  of  Adrianople. 


A  visit  was  made  to  that  island  in  the  Tunga 
where  the  Bulgars  concentrated  their  prisoners  im- 
mediately after  the  capture  of  the  city.  Pierre  Loti 
has  described  the  situation  there  (without  seeing  it) 
as  a  harrowing  scene  of  Turkish  suffering  and  of 
Bulgarian  cruelty  when  he  gave  it  romantic  publicity 
as  "The  Isle  of  Anguish/'  I  refer  to  this  one  in- 
cident because  ''atrocities  in  time  of  war''  is  a 
current  subject  and  we  can  appreciate  the  difficulties 
besetting  the  search  for  the  truth,  even  when  the 
accusations  and  denials  concern  the  several  most 
loudly  self-acclaimed  standard  bearers  of  **  civiliza- 
tion." I  have  seen  recently  in  the  public  press  the 
"Isle  of  Anguish"  incident  finally  settled  by  a  quota- 
tion from  the  Carnegie  Commission's  Report  of  the 
Balkan  Wars.  The  assertion  that  1,800  prisoners 
were  confined  on  an  island  in  the  Arda  (?)  River  and 
that  200  of  these  died  of  hunger,  cold  and  disease  is 
supported  by  the  following  from  the  Carnegie  Report: 

"A  member  of  the  commission  visited  the  island.  He 
saw  how  the  bark  had  been  torn  off  the  trees,  as  high  as  a 
man  could  reach,  by  the  starving  prisoners.  He  even  met  on 
the  spot  an  aged  Turk  who  had  spent  a  week  there,  and  said 
he  had  himself  eaten  the  bark.  A  little  Turkish  boy,  who 
looked  after  the  cattle  on  the  island,  said  that  from  across 
the  river  he  had  seen  prisoners  eating  the  grass." 

It  all  came  about  through  the  unwise  heroism  of 
Shukri  Pasha  in  his  destruction  of  Turkish  commis- 
sary stores  and  his  demolition  of  the  railway  bridge 
over  the  Arda  which  interrupted  communication  with 
the  source  of  future  Bulgarian  supplies.  The  Bul- 
garians simply  segregated  all  Turkish  prisoners  on 
this  island  in  the  Tunga  — not  the  Arda— fed  them 
from  the  remaining  Turkish  commissary  stores,  and 
left  the  sick  with  only  that  medical  attention  which 
the  Turkish  medical  officers  might  give.  The  British 
military  consul  told  me  that  this  treatment  of  the  sick 
was  the  most  atrocious  thing  the  Bulgarians  did.     He 


—49— 

said  that  to  his  personal  knowledge  a  fair  ration  was 
always  issued  and  that,  too,  even  before  the  railway 
communication  was  restored.  Loti,  however,  pub- 
lished a  heartrending  account  of  the  suffering  of  the 
Turkish  prisoners  who  were  so  starved  that  they  ate 
the  bark  from  the  trees.  It  is  true  that  the  bark  of 
trees  is  gone,  but  it  went  for  firewood  rather  than 
food.  Our  Turkish  carriage  driver  began  to  give  us 
the  usual  assurance  that  the  Bulgarians  starved  their 
prisoners  into  "eating  the  bark  off  the  trees  like 
animals,'*  but  our  companion  and  guide,  a  Heutenant 
colonel  in  the  Turkish  Medical  Corps,  contemptuously 
asked  the  driver  if  he  had  no  sense  of  shame  in 
affronting  the  intelligence  of  his  auditors  by  such  a 
monstrous  assault  upon  verisimiltude  and  the  truth. 
This  officer  then  assured  me  that  no  intelligent  per- 
son could  be  expected  to  believe  the  bark-eating 
romance. 

From  Adrianople  to  Kirk  Kilisse  we  made  a 
comfortable  journey  of  nearly  forty  miles  in  about 
eight  hours.  The  country  showed  none  of  the  tech- 
nical battle  scars  of  trenches  and  earthworks,  but 
the  incidental  signs  of  military  devastation  and 
reprisal  were  painfully  evident  in  every  village  in 
this  region,  as  in  all  other  parts  of  Thrace.  This 
wretched  country  had  known  in  the  year,  just  then 
passed  the  scourge  of  five,  pillaging  punitive  armies, 
which  came  in  the  following  order:  First,  the  Turks 
when  they  advanced  towards  the  Bulgarian  frontier; 
and  second,  when  they  retreated;  third,  the  Bul- 
garians when  they  pursued;  and  fourth,  when  they 
withdrew;  and  fifth,  when  the  Turks  returned  to 
Adrianople.  As  the  villages  in  Thrace  are  either 
Christian  or  Moslem,  each  army  as  it  passed  through 
a  community  of  the  opposite  religious  faith  played 
the  role  of  foreign  invaders.  Many  of  the  wretched 
people  we  saw  in  the  villages  had  returned  to  poke 


—50— 

around  in  the  charred  or  crumpled  remains  of  their 
homes  in  a  struggle  to  find  enough  material  to  make 
shelter  for  the  coming  winter. 

From  Kirk  Kilisse  we  journeyed  again  by  car- 
riage to  the  villages  of  Petra  and  Eskipolos,  about 
ten  miles  from  the  Bulgarian  frontier,  from  where 
could  be  seen  the  field  of  the  first  disaster  of  the 
Turkish  Army  of  the  East  in  its  initial  contact  with 
the  Bulgarians.  Eskipolos  marks  the  site  of  one  of 
the  fortified  cities,  extending  from  Adrianople  through 
Bunar  Hissar  to  Visa  and  then  on  to  the  Black  Sea. 
They  formed  a  line  of  frontier  forts  of  the  Byzantine 
Empire  and  are  attributed  to  Justinian  in  the  Seventh 
Century.  It  seemed  rather  fatalistic  that  the 
strategic  position  of  these  ancient  citadels  should 
again  mark  the  line  of  battle  in  a  conflict  which 
would  again  change  the  frontier  of  a  state,  Each 
one  of  these  ancient  forts  surmounted  an  acropolis. 
From  the  ruined  citadel  of  Eskipolos  I  could  see  the 
Bulgarian  frontier  and  the  openings  of  the  valleys 
through  which  the  1st  and  3d  Bulgarian  Armies  in- 
vaded Thrace.  We  were  insistently  assured  by  the 
merry  villagers  who  flocked  with  us  that  on  a  clear 
day  we  could  see  the  minarets  of  the  Mosque  of 
Sultan  Selim  in  Adrianople.  The  field  of  the  first 
engagement  of  the  Thracian  campaign  lay  before  us. 

Mahmoud  Moukhtar  Pasha,  who  commanded  the 
3d  Corps  of  the  Turkish  Army  of  the  East,  in  a  pub- 
fished  volume  entitled  *'My  Command  in  the  Balkan 
Campaign, '^  to  which  I  have  already  referred,  has 
thrown  a  few  spotlights  on  his  command  which  seem 
to  clearly  illuminate  the  unhappy  internal  condition 
of  the  whole  Turkish  army  and  to  frankly  reveal 
some  of  the  causes  which  led  to  its  defeat.  This 
officer,  who  may  be  accepted  as  one  of  the  most 
aristocratic  and  distinguished  of  the  Turkish  service, 
was  for  many  years  under  instruction  in  German 


—51- 


military  schools  and  the  German  army.  His  report 
naturally  confesses  the  otherwise  well-known  dis- 
astrous results  of  his  operations,  but  its  greater 
burden  seems  to  be  a  defense  of  his  own  military 
conduct  and  training.  His  high  standing  and  pro- 
fessional accomplishments  may  be  better  appreciated 
when  it  is  known  that  both  prior  to  and  during  his 
incumbency  as  a  corps  commander  he  was  Minister 
of  Marine  in  the  Turkish  cabinet  and  that,  after  he 
left  the  army  on  account  of  wounds  he  received  at 
Chatalja,  he  became  the  Ottoman  ambassador  in 
Berlin. 

Mahmoud  Moukhtar  Pasha  joined  his  corps 
October  17th,  five  days  before  its  engagement.  He 
was  promoted  to  command  of  the  2d  Field  Army 
November  1,  and  returned  to  his  corps  when  the  army 
was  reorganized  at  Chatalja.  In  the  beginning  of 
his  report  he  speaks  naively  of  the  innumerable  diffi- 
culties which  arise  at  the  last  moment  in  what  he 
calls  ''bringing  an  organization  to  the  height  of 
modern  standards. ' ' 

"It  had  been  the  custom  of  corps  headquarters  to  work 
until  2:00  a.m.  which  naturally  prevented  any  work  at  all 
during  the  following  morning.  I  gave  positive  orders  at  once 
for  everybody  to  abandon  such  habit  and  to  commence  work 
at  7:00  a.m.  and  for  clerks  to  begin  at  5:00  a.m.  From  9:00  to 
12:00  officers  were  ordered  to  mount  and  go  to  the  troops. 
At  3:00  p.m.  all  officers  were  to  assemble  at  headquarters,  but 
it  was  not  possible  to  abandon  the  offices  completely  from  9:00 
a.m.  to  3:00  p.m." 

On  October  22d,  one  of  his  division  commanders 
made  the  following  report  concerning  an  incident  of 
a  disordered  retreat  of  the  night  before  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Petra  and  Evikler:  ''Only  the  men  who 
knew  the  cause  of  the  noise  remained  in  position. 
A  certain  number  of  officers,  thinking  of  the  fortunes 
of  their  families,  left  the  ranks  and  disappeared, 
and,  as  a  good  many  soldiers  were  natives  from  the 


—52— 

surrounding  towns,  they,  too,  took  advantage  of  the 
darkness  to  return  to  their  homes. ' '    (Page  38. ) 

Djemil  Bey,  then  a  division  commander  in  the 
3d  Army  Corps,  but  at  the  present  time  one  of  the 
triumvirs  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  the  Minister 
of  Marine,  seemed  to  have  been  most  energetic  and 
discerning.  He  reported  to  his  chief  the  cause  of 
the  rout  in  the  retreat  on  Visa  as  follows:  ''If  we 
have  not  succeeded  in  reorganizing  the  troops,  the 
fault  is  due  more  to  the  lack  of  instruction  than  to 
moral  force.  The  companies  generally  had  only  one 
officer,  who  often  did  not  know  what  to  do.  At  the 
least  difficulty  these  officers  would  cross  their  hands, 
remain  inert,  and,  in  some  cases,  would  quit  the 
ranks  and  leave  their  men  to  get  out  of  their  awk- 
ward positions  without  assistance,  saying  at  the 
time:     'They  do  not  obey  us.' ''     (Pages  46-47.) 

On  October  29th,  Ali  Bey  sent  the  following 
report  to  Mahmoud  Moukhtar:  "When  the  enemy 
threatened  our  left  with  two  battalions,  our  men 
yielded,  crying  out:  'We  do  not  want  to  stay  with- 
out artillery  support,  our  troops  are  now  retreating 
towards  the  town;  nothing  can  stop  them.'  ''  (Page 
61.) 

October  30th,  Mahmoud  Moukhtar  Pasha  pub- 
lished an  order  which,  in  the  following  paragraphs, 
reveals  something  of  the  sanitary  situation:  "The 
wounded  will  be  gathered  by  the  men  from  the  regi- 
ments and  then  transferred  to  Karakal  with  the 
means  available  at  the  time.  Their  transfer  to  Visa 
will  be  effected  afterwards,  using  the  empty  ration 
and  ammunition  wagons.''  (Page  84.)  This  corps 
in  its  first  engagement,  one  week  before,  had  had 
six  [field  hospitals,  and  while  1  do  not  find  it  so  re- 
corded, I  have  no  doubt  that  at  this  time  the  Bul- 
garians had  them.  On  the  follwing  day,  October 
31st,   Mahmoud    Moukhtar    issued    an    order  which 


—53— 
sought  to  set  aright  some  slight  deficiencies  which 
had  arisen  in  his  supply  department: 

"1.  In  order  to  assure  the  subsistence  of  your  division, 
organize  two  kitchens.  Use  the  battalions  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  the  banks  of  the  Soghudjuk.  Have  a  company 
prepare  dinner  for  everybody.  The  company  commander 
will  report  immediately  to  the  corps  commander  and  will  then 
receive  orders  from  the  chief  of  staff. 

*'The  detachment  of  engineers  attached  to  the  corps  is 
directed  to  procure  the  necessary  wood  and  to  build  ovens. 

"The  battahon  from  the  Denzli  Division  will  furnish  the 
necessary  men  for  transportation."     (Page  91.) 

Of  the  situation  on  this  day,  Mahmoud  Moukhtar 
makes  the  following  comments: 

'*  Besides,  the  convoys  were  pillaged  en  route, 
and  on  this  account  some  of  the  troops  occupying 
the  trenches  remained  without  bread  and  water. 
On  account  of  the  small  number  of  officers  it  was  not 
possible  to  prevent  the  disorganized  battalions  from 
abandoning  their  positions  and  going  after  rations/' 

On  November  1st,  orders  from  the  same  source 
were  published,  of  which  the  following  is  a  para- 
graph: "As  it  appears  necessary  to  provide  rations 
for  the  men  who  have  not  drawn  bread, in  the  last 
few  days,  two  flocks  of  100  sheep  will  be  driven,  one 
towards  the  left  bank  of  the  stream,  the  other  to- 
wards Porgalikoj.  To  the  flank  guard  (three  bat- 
talions and  one  battery)  there  will  be  sent  hardtack 
and  the  necessary  sheep.''     (Page  101.) 

On  the  night  of  October  31st,  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Raghib  made  this  report  to  Djemil  Bey,  his  division 
commander:  ''Under  such  conditions,  the  detach- 
ment fled  to  a  more  favorable  position  where  they 
spent  the  night.  Two  hundred  men  failed  to  answer 
reveille  and  were  counted  missing,  as  no  one  knew 
what  had  become  of  them.  The  companies  had  just 
been  formed  out  of  irregular  elements,  so  that  no 
one  knew  his  neighbor.      The    Egerdu    Battalion, 


—54— 

which  fell  into  an  ambuscade,  had  lost  eight  wounded 
and  two  dead.  My  men  were  already  crying  with 
hunger  at  the  time  of  leaving  Visa  and  have  received 
nothing  to  eat  since  then.  I  ask  that  orders  be  sent 
me  relative  to  their  supply.''  The  stern  Djemil 
Bey,  shocked  by  this  brutal  outrage  of  the  first  com- 
mandment of  the  art  of  war,  but  unmoved  to  pity  by 
this  cry  of  bread,  gave  back  this  cruel  stone:  "If 
your  detachment  has  fallen  into  an  ambuscade,  it 
shows  that  you  have  not  taken  the  precautions  pre- 
scribed by  Field  Service  Regulations.  The  responsi- 
bility for  this  incident,  so  definitely  prohibited,  falls 
upon  the  commander.  Stay  were  you  are  and  occupy 
the  important  points.*'    (Pages  104-105.) 

On  November  1st,  Lieutenant  Mahmed  Sia 
Effendi,  a  subordinate  officer  with  a  battery  attached 
to  two  infantry  battalions,  made  the  following  report: 
**At  this  critical  moment  all  of  the  advance  battalions 
began  to  run  away  and  no  attention  was  paid  to  any 
command."    (Page  105.) 

Mahmoud  Moukhtar,  after  he  had  discovered  a 
very  filthy  condition  in  his  camp  on  the  Chatalja 
lines,  issued  another  sanitary  order  of  some  signifi- 
cance: ' '  By  reason  of  cholera,  the  intensity  of  which 
is  increasing,  there  will  be  established  in  each  camp, 
latrines  of  one  meter  in  depth.  These  will  be  filled 
up  every  other  day  and  new  ones  dug.  There  will 
be  an  inspection  by  the  corps  commander  in  person." 
(Page  155.) 

Communication  and  information  was  not  very 
good  at  any  time.  Two  days  after  the  first  action 
the  right  wing  was  out  of  communication  with 
Abdulla  Pasha  (the  army  commander)  and  all  official 
correspondence  was  addressed  to  Nazim  Pasha,  the 
generalissimo  and  Minister  of  War  at  Tscherkesol. 
Out  of  this  situation  difficulties  arose,  as  Abdulla 


—55— 

decided  to  retreat  to  the  bank  of  the  Ergene,  and 
Nazim  ordered  a  stand  at  Karach-dere. 

On  October  28th-29th,  Nazim  telegraphed  Mah- 
moud  Moukhtar  the  following  information: 

*' Vienna  newspapers  announce  the  right  wing  of  the 
Bulgarian  army  at  Adrianople,  and  its  left  is  about  to  envelop 
Kirk  Kilisse  where  they  expect  great  results. 

"The  correspondent  of  the  Reichpoat  informs  me  that  the 
Bulgarian  revictualing  is  complete  and  that  their  march  is 
resumed.  The  west  wing  of  Dimitrieff' s  army  is  on  the  line 
Jenikoj-Baba-Eski.  The  center  is  about  Kawalki.  The  right 
wing  is  advancing  on  Bunar  Hissar -Visa- Sara j.  The  Bul- 
garians seek  to  cut  the  Turks  off  from  Constantinople  and 
terminate  the  campaign  in  one  week." 

This  information  proved  substantially  correct, 
and,  as  it  was  received  by  a  very  roundabout  way 
from  newspaper  sources,  it  seems  to  have  some  bear- 
ing upon  the  place  of  a  newspaper  correspondent 
with  an  army. 

The  Turkish  commanders,  however,  seemed  to 
have  held  the  tactical  aid  of  Providence  in  somewhat 
higher  esteem  than  did  Napoleon,  because  Mahmoud 
Moukhtar,  in  an  order  informing  his  corps  of  an 
offensive  movement,  said:  "With  the  aid  of  Allah 
the  enemy  has  been  compelled  to  retreat.''  About 
this  time,  November  1st,  Mahmoud  Moukhtar  was 
given  command  of  the  2d  Field  Army  and  Nazim 
telegraphed  him:  ''May  Allah  wish  that  your 
offensive  may  be  crowned  with  success.''  Mahmoud 
Moukhtar  telegraphed  his  acknowledgment  of  his 
new  appointment  to  Nazim  and  said:  "Allah  has 
permitted  the  3d  Corps  to  cause  the  enemy  to  retreat 
today."    (Page  116.) 

The  history  of  the  Thracian  campaign  might 
almost  be  written  in  tragic  incidents  which  marked 
the  conduct  of  the  Turkish  army.  A  story  which  I 
heard  in  Bulgaria  and  which  is  given  in  the  German 
General  Staff  report  would  fittingly  make  the  first 


—56— 

record.  On  October  18th,  the  day  war  was  declared, 
the  2d  Bulgarian  Army,  concentrated  on  the  railroad, 
started  by  that  route  to  march  on  Adrianople  and 
crossed  the  frontier  about  noon.  In  the  morning  of 
this  day  the  commander  of  the  Turkish  frontier 
guard  sent  over  to  the  Bulgarian  outpost  a  polite 
request  for  a  few  rations  of  bread,  as  the  Turkish 
commissary  had  grown  so  poor  about  then  that  his 
men  had  not  had  much  to  eat  for  several  days.  The 
bread  was  supplied,  but  it  had  hardly  been  expended 
before  the  Bulgarian  advance  guard  wandered  down 
the  railroad  track  and  explained  their  business  so 
definitely  that  the  Turkish  guard  surrendered  without 
resistance. 

There  were  a  few  Turkish  battalions  and  batteries 
near  Mustapha  Pasha,  the  first  town  on  the  railroad 
and  on  the  Maritza,  which  were  so  astonished  at  the 
appearance  of  a  large  number  of  Bulgarians  that 
they  hurried  on  to  Adrianople  without  much  discus- 
sion. There  was  a  very  important  bridge  over  the 
Maritza  at  this  point  which  had  been  prepared  for 
demolition,  but  only  part  of  the  explosive  charge 
was  detonated.  A  bit  of  the  bridge  railing  and  a 
piece  of  the  roadbed  was  blown  up,  but  was  at  once 
repaired  and  did  not  delay  the  Bulgarian  column  at 
all.  Not  even  the  telegraph  line  was  touched,  so 
that  the  whole  railroad  system  fell  into  Bulgarian 
hands  and  enabled  them  to  establish  their  base  at 
once  beyond  the  Maritza  River,  which  could  have 
been  made  a  serious  obstacle  to  their  advance. 


The  Campaign 

The  general  features  of  the  Thracian  campaign, 
jipart  from  the  investment  of  Adrianople  by  the  2d 
Army,  may  be  briefly  sketched  in  the  advance  from 
the  Bulgarian  frontier  (October  18th)  of  the  1st  and 


—57— 

3d  Bulgarian  Armies,  with  a  total  strength  of  75,000 
each,  or  a  combined  force  of  150,000,  which  comprised 
about  one  half  of  the  total  of  300,000  Bulgarian 
fighting  men  then  in  the  field. 

The  Turkish  Army  of  the  East,  exclusive  of  the 
garrison  of  Adrianople,  was  at  this  time  incompletely 
mobilized  in  two  armies,  with  a  front  along  the  line 
Adrianople— Kirk  Kilisse,  and  a  strength  of  from 
110,000  to  120,000  men.  The  1st  Bulgarian  Army, 
marching  towards  the  south,  met  the  advance  guard 
of  the  1st  Turkish  Army  a  little  in  advance  of  the 
center  of  the  line  Adrianople  — Kirk  Kilisse  (October 
23d  at  Seliolu)  in  an  engagement  which,  while  not  of 
a  general  character,  is  said  to  have  been  one  of  the 
fiercest  incidents  of  the  campaign,  as  one  Bulgarian 
regiment  lost  250  killed  and  750  wounded. 

The  3d  Bulgarian  Army,  marching  as  the  ad- 
vanced left  wing  to  the  southeast  in  the  direction  of 
Kirk  Kilisse,  encountered  with  some  resistance  the 
Turkish  2d  Army,  or  right  wing  (October  -  23d  at 
Petra  and  Erikler),  a  few  miles  in  front  of  Kirk 
Kilisse.  During  the  night  following  these  two  en- 
gagements, both  of  the  Turkish  forces  became  de- 
moralized and  retreated  in  disorder  under  conditions 
which  Mahmoud  Moukhtar  Pasha  has  described  in 
his  report  already  quoted.  The  3d  Army  passed  on 
to  Kirk  Kilisse  without  obstruction,  as  the  Turks  had 
fled  towards  Luli  Burgas  and  Visa,  but  it  delayed  at 
Kirk  KiHsse  three  days  without  pursuing  the  ad- 
vantage so  unexpectedly  gained.  The  1st  Army  was 
not  permitted  to  advance,  as  under  instructions  from 
general  headquarters  it  was  held  back  between  the 
two  other  armies  to  await  the  results  of  their  opera- 
tions. 

A  bitter  controversy  has  lately  arisen  between 
General  Dimitrieff,  commanding  the  3d  Army,  and 
General  Fitcheif,  Chief  of  the  General   Staff,  con- 


—58— 

cerning  the  delay  in  the  advance  of  both  armies 
which,  in  the  Hght  of  subsequent  events,  was  fatal 
to  the  Bulgarian  prospects  of  a  termination  of  the 
war  shortly  after  this  time.  General  Dimitrieff  says 
that  he  wished  to  advance  at  once  from  Kirk  Kilisse, 
and  that,  after  his  enforced  three  days'  delay,  when 
he  again  attacked  the  Turkish  right  in  a  movement 
which  developed  into  the  battle  of  Lull  Burgas,  the 
1st  Army  did  not  come  up  to  his  support  until  the 
last  of  the  three  days  of  hard  fighting. 

The  action  about  Luli  Burgas,  which  has  all  the 
attributes  of  a  real  battle,  covered  a  period  of  five 
days  (October  28th  to  November  1st,  inclusive)  which, 
with  the  development  of  the  positions  on  the  first 
day  and  the  retirement  of  the  Turks  on  the  last  day, 
left  three  days  of  the  severe  engagement.  The 
Turkish  army  made  its  stand  on  the  rampart-like 
slopes  of  the  eastern  bank  of  a  creek  (Karakatch-dere) 
which  flows  from  the  north  past  Luli  Burgas.  The 
front  of  twenty  to  twenty-five  miles'  length  extended 
between  the  only  two  roads  running  east  and  west 
through  Thrace;  one  on  the  south  through  and  from 
Luli  Burgas  towards  Constantinople,  and  the  other 
on  the  north  from  Kirk  Kilisse  to  Bunar  Hissar  and 
Visa.  These  two  roads  limited  the  operations  and 
extreme  flanks  of  both  armies.  Abdulla  Pasha,  the 
Turkish  commander  (October  30th,  at  Saskiskny), 
stood  on  a  prehistoric  mound,  rising  from  a  slightly 
predominating  ridge  four  or  five  miles  behind  the 
center  of  his  line,  where  other  commanders  in  the 
unnumbered  wars  in  Thrace  may  just  as  well  have 
stood,  and,  like  him,  they  might  have  viewed  the 
splendid  spectacle  of  an  army  in  desperate  action 
along  its  fifteen  to  twenty  miles'  front.  But  as  he 
was  more  of  a  privileged  observer  than  an  active 
commander,  all  day  long  on  the  hardest  fought  day 
of  the  battle,  and  on  the  day  following  as  well,  he 


—59— 

was  entirely  out  of  communication  with  his  right 
wing  and  only  the  coming  and  going  of  an  occasional 
orderly  and  a  few  staff  officers  gave  him  the  appear- 
ance of  directing  the  movements  of  the  left  wing. 
He  had  no  telegraphic  nor  telephonic  communication 
with  any  part  of  the  field,  and,  after  viewing  the 
tragic  spectacle  of  the  defeat  of  the  *' Grand  Armee'' 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  he  could  only  hasten  to  lead 
his  routed  legions  in  their  retreat.  Only  the  persist- 
ing patience  of  the  Turkish  soldier,  even  though  he 
found  himself  in  the  midst  of  disorder,  to  which  he 
is  so  thoroughly  accustomed,  could  have  endured  the 
hunger,  fatigue  and  fright  with  so  little  tendency  to 
those  excesses  which  make  such  situations  so  horrible. 
Only  the  Turkish  soldier  could  have  maintained  his 
tranquility  so  as  to  permit  himself  to  be  reformed 
into  a  new  army  behind  the  defenses  of  Chatalja. 

It  may  be  said  for  Abdulla  Pasha  that,  as  he 
realized  the  mobilization  of  his  army  to  be  incomplete, 
it  was  his  plan  to  stand  behind  the  upper  reaches  of 
the  river  Ergene,  where  the  railroad  would  have 
served  his  line  of  communications  better,  and  where 
he  might  have  gained  some  time  in  collecting  his 
forces.  Some  of  his  corps  commanders,  however, 
interceded  with  Nazim  Pasha,  the  Generalissimo, 
who  ordered  the  position  which  precipitated  the 
battle  of  Luli  Burgas.  In  the  battle  of  Luli  Burgas 
and  in  those  incidental  and  preliminary  engagements 
in  front  of  the  Adrianople— Kirk  Kilisse  Hne,  the 
Bulgarian  losses  were  about  20,000,  and  more  than 
90  per  cent  of  the  number  were  borne  by  the  3d 
Army, 

The  Turkish  losses  have  been  variously  reported, 
but  it  is  hardly  possible  that  the  actual  numbers 
can  ever  be  known,  no  matter  what  "official'' 
statistics  may  be  prepared  later;  a  fair  estimate 
seems  to  be  at  least  30,000.      With  about  140,000 


—60— 

Bulgarians  and  110,000  Turks  participating,  the 
losses  were  at  least  15  per  cent  and  25  per  cent, 
respectively. 

Just  a  year  later  I  made  a  little  journey  over  the 
Thracian  battlefields,  without  having  then  any  defi- 
nite knowledge  of  their  details  or  a  prearranged 
itinerary.  I  started  out  to  visit  the  more  important 
points  and  as  many  as  possible  of  the  towns  I  had 
heard  of,  in  the  course  of  the  local  gossip  of  the  war. 
I  had  learned  the  names  of  the  scenes  of  a  number 
of  engagements  from  my  hospital  patients.  I  went 
everywhere  that  ordinary  carriage  transportation 
and  other  facilities  permitted.  When  my  trip  was 
all  over  and  I  began  to  check  up,  I  was  surprised  to 
find  that  I  had  visited  every  scene  of  action  of  any 
importance,  except  that  of  the  1st  Bulgarian  Army, 
a  Httle  in  advance  of  the  line  between  Adrianople 
and  Kirk  Kilisse  (at  Seliolu).  I  have  since  thought 
that  this  coinidence  is  somewhat  suggestive,  as,  in 
the  movements  of  the  opposing  armies  and  my  subse- 
quent peregrination,  there  was  no  place  else  to  go, 
and  if  one  goes  anywhere  in  this  region  in  Thrace, 
unless  he  uses  an  aeroplane  or  resorts  to  sapping 
operations,  he  must  follow  very  closely  the  same 
route.  After  reaching  Luli  Burgas,  I  went  out  to 
the  villages  (Saskiskny  and  Ahmedbey),  five  and 
seven  miles  eastward,  where  Abdulla  Pasha  had 
spent  his  three  nights  and  where,  also,  he  had 
watchfully  waited  during  the  three  days  of  his  last 
battle.  From  a  little  ridge  between  these  villages, 
and  within  a  radius  of  fifteen  miles,  the  entire  field 
can  be  viewed  without  intervening  obstruction,  as 
one  can  readily  locate  the  horizon  positions  of  Luli 
Burgas,  Bunar  Hissar,  Visa,  and,  finally,  Tchorlu, 
the  railroad  station  where  Abdulla  entrained  and 
thus  formally  terminated  his  Thracian  campaign. 
The  country  at  this  time  could  be  traversed  in  almost 


—61— 

any  direction  by  a  carriage  and  going  was  generally 
better  across  country  than  on  any  of  the  wretched 
roads— as  we  have  known  it  in  Cuba  and  the  Philip- 
pines in  the  dry  season. 

During  the  campaign,  however,  the  rainy  season 
had   made   any  sort  of  going  anywhere  almost  im- 
possible, as  the  whole  country  was  then  virtually  a 
quagmire.      It  has  been  said— and  a  look  at  this 
region  surely  seems  to  support  the  statement— that 
had  the  weather  conditions  of  October,  1913,  pre- 
vailed   in    October,    1912,    the  Bulgarian    successes 
would  have  been  prompt  and  decisive.      The  rather 
frequent  streams  which  flow  into  the  Ergene  from 
the  north,  in  shallow  valleys  and  only  a  few  abrupt 
banks,  divide  the  surface   into   easy  going  swails 
and  low,  rolUng  hills,  over  which  any  sort  of  trans- 
portation can  be  taken  in  any  general  direction  when 
the  season  is  favorable.     After  the  abandonment  of 
the  field,  the  terminal  phase  of  the  campaign  was 
completed  by  the  defense  of  the  Chatalja  line,  which 
was  taken  in  a  natural  position   about  twenty-five 
miles  in  front  of  Constantinople  and  which  had  been 
further  prepared  years  before  for  just  such  an  event. 
The  peninsula  at  this  point,  about  twenty-five  miles 
in  width  from  the  Black  Sea  to  the  Sea  of  Marmora, 
takes  its  name  from  a  nearby  town.      It  is  further 
narrowed  by  two  bodies  of  water,  extending  in  from 
each  coast,  to  about  sixteen  miles.      A  broad  valley, 
running  north  and  south,  except  from  a  short  dis- 
tance towards  the  north,  separates  two  prominent 
ranges  of  hills  and  jutting-out  hogbacks.  The  Turkish 
position  was  on  the  east  of  this  valley  and  the  Bul- 
garians on  the  west.      The  two  weeks  following  the 
battle  of  Luli  Burgas,  before  the  Bulgarians  could 
prepare  their  attack  (November  17th-18th),  gave  the 
Turks  time  enough  to  dig  themselves  in  and  to  hold 
their  position.     A  short  time  after  what  is  known  as 


—62— 

the  battle  of  Chatalja,  as  it  was  apparent  to  the 
Turks  that  they  could  not  assume  the  offensive,  the 
Turkish  government  asked  for  intervention  which 
resulted  in  an  armistice  (December  3d.)  Hostilities 
were  again  resumed  and  again  suspended  by  another 
armistice.  (See  chronological  table  of  events,  Appen- 
dix.) During  this  latter  period  of  inactivity,  the 
Bulgarians  withdrew  their  right  wing  six  or  seven 
miles  along  the  coast  of  the  Marmora  to  simplify 
their  difficult  problem  of  supply,  as  a  glance  at  the 
map  will  indicate.  Shortly  afterwards,  the  Turks 
advanced  their  left  wing  across  the  bay  of  Bujuk 
Chelmudje,  under  the  pretense  of  doing  something 
in  a  military  way,  although  they  never  induced  the 
Bulgarians  to  change  their  lines  from  the  position  in 
which  they  were  reformed.  The  reorganized  Turkish 
10th  Army  Corps  which  formed  this  advanced  left 
flank  was  no  doubt  the  result  of  some  political  in- 
dication. 

When  I  accompanied  the  chief  surgeon  of  the 
Chatalja  army  on  a  special  sanitary  inspection,  he 
made  a  special  point  of  one  visit  to  the  10th  Army 
Corps  with  which  we  spent  a  night  at  Kalalratia. 
This  command  seemed  to  base  its  principal  claim  to 
distinction  on  the  presence  of  a  young  officer  who  was 
its  chief  of  staff,  as  he  was  none  other  than  the  then 
hero-worshipped  patriot  and  now  the  Ottoman  Em- 
pire's Man  on  Horseback.  Although  he  was  only  a 
lieutenant  colonel  and  the  chief  of  staff  of  a  pasha 
and  general  of  division,  commanding  the  10th  Army 
Corps,  the  entire  command  was  keenly  alert  in  the 
sense  of  appreciation  of  the  supreme  honor  of  Enver 
Bey's  presence.  Turkish  hospitality,  to  even  a 
stranger,  is  always  impressive,  not  only  in  form  but 
in  substance  as  well,  when  the  latter  observation  is 
economically  practicable.  The  chief  surgeon  of  the 
10th  Army   Corps  was    particularly   happy  in    his 


—63— 

opportunity  to  meet  the  special  indication  of  enter- 
taining his  dignified  chief,  Abdul  Selim  Pasha,  the 
chief  surgeon  of  the  army  and  the  latter's  honored 
guest,  as  the  chief  surgeon  could  support  the  form  of 
his  hospitality  with  the  real  substance  of  a  presenta- 
tation  to  Enver  Bey.  "You  have  heard  of  Enver 
Bey;  did  you  know  that  he  was  here— the  Chief  of 
Staff-and  that  you  can  see  him?'' was  almost  my  first 
word  of  greeting. 

The  evening  was  very  dull  because  this  alluring 
and  glittering  promise  could  not  be  fulfilled  as  it  was 
rather  reluctantly  revealed  to  me  that  ''Enver  Bey'' 
—the  name  spoken  almost  with  bated  breath— *' was 
fatigued  and  begged  to  be  excused."  But  the  new 
day  brought  its  sunshine  and  the  fulfillment  of  its 
promise  in  a  reception  for  which  the  corps  commander 
and  his  headquarters  was  used  as  a  setting,  as  Enver 
Bey  entered  at  just  that  time  which  the  rules  of  the 
drama  so  carefully  prescribe.  He  appeared  as  a 
young  man  of  pleasing  and  noticeable  appearance, 
carefully  dressed  and  faultlessly  groomed -even 
without  the  credits  of  the  discount  for  field  service 
conditions.  He  bore  himself  with  an  air  of  calm  but 
supreme  confidence,  which,  in  the  light  of  his  boldly 
romantic  career,  might  easily  be  attributed  to  a 
fanatical  inspiration.  His  manner  was  formal  and 
martially  precise,  and,  incidentally,  his  time  was 
short.  Later  in  the  day  as  we  were  leaving  the 
western  shore  of  Bujuk  Chekmudje  and  about  to 
cross  the  bridge,  we  encountered  the  Corps  Com- 
mander and  his  staff.  The  dignified  old  gentleman, 
riding  up  to  the  Sanitary  Pasha  and  myself,  greeted 
us  both  pleasantly,  thanked  us  for  the  honor  of  a 
distinguished  visit  and  confided  us,  hopefully,  to  the 
care  of  Allah.  Then  a  clatter  of  hoofs,  just  approach- 
ing, which  attracted  our  attention,  enabled  us  again 
to  gaze  upon  Enver  Bey  as  he  galloped  by,  stiffly 


—64— 

saluting,  with  an  escort  of  soldiers  vastly  more  pre- 
tentious than  that  of  the  pasha  whom  we  had  just 
left.  As  we  took  our  leave  of  the  escort  from  the 
10th  Army  Corps,  the  chief  surgeon  in  receiving  my 
thanks  and  appreciation  of  his  bountifully  generous 
hospitality,  found  his  greatest  comfort  in  my  ex- 
pression of  rapturous  satisfaction  in  having  seen 
Him— Enver  Bey.  There  can  be  doubt  that  Enver 
Pasha,  as  the  new  honors  of  Minister  of  War  and 
Generalissimo,  which  he  has  modestly  conceded  to 
himself  now  entitles  him  to  be  addressed,  is  a  man 
of  vision,  possessed  of  a  courage  and  a  nerve  com- 
bined with  ready  initiative  and  fanatical  determina- 
tions which,  now  that  he  is  actually  in  the  saddle 
instead  of  being  merely  master  of  the  ring,  will  very 
shortly  determine  the  destiny  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  the  second  war, 
after  the  Roumanians  had  crossed  the  Danube  and 
the  Bulgarians  had  been  several  weeks  away  from 
their  position  on  the  Chatalja  lines,  Enver  Bey,  in 
violation  of  the  orders  of  the  Generalissimo,  marched 
with  a  cavalry  column  to  the  ''capture''  of  defenseless 
Adrlanople,  and,  in  this  feat  of  recovering  the  first 
European  capital  of  the  Osmanli  Turks,  he  became 
once  more  the  nation's  hero  and  the  empire's  un- 
doubted Man  of  Destiny. 


Third     Lecture 


The  Second  Balkan  War 

^T^HE  Second  Balkan  War,  much  more  definitely 
^  than  the  first,  was  but  a  flash  of  the  steel  in  a 
minor  event  of  the  great  Slavo-Teutonic  contest. 
The  Balkan  States  were  only  playing  the  part  that 
fell  incidentally  to  their  unhappy  lot  in  holding  the 
bag  and  washing  the  dirty  linen  of  the  principal 
contestants. 

Just  a  reference  to  an  event  that  followed  the 
Berlin  Treaty  will  suffice  to  establish  this  relation  of 
the  greater  politics  of  Europe  to  the  Balkan  States. 
In  1881  and  1889  Austria-Hungary  formally  declared, 
in  secret  treaties  with  Servia,  that  she  **  would  sup- 
port Servia,  in  the  event  of  the  latter's  finding  a  way 
of  extending  her  southern  boundary,  the  exception 
being  made  of  the  Sanjak  of  Novi  Bazar,  and  that 
she  would  aid  in  the  extension  of  Servia  in  the 
direction  of  the  Vardar  Valley.''  The  perfidy  of  this 
platitude  is  evident  when  it  is  recalled  that  the 
Austrian  occupation  of  Bosnia  had  solidly  blocked 
Servians  natural  extention  into  that  Slav  territory, 
while  the  inviolability  of  the  sacred  Sanjak  of  Novi 
Bazar  had  made  hopeless  the  coalescence  of  Servia 
and  Montenegro.  Austrian  diplomacy  thus  turned 
Servian  ambition  for  extension  toward  Macedonia, 
whose  population,  up  to  1870,  the  Servians  had  un- 
questionably conceded  to  be  Bulgarian. 

The  organization  of  a  Bulgarian  National  Church 
in  1870,  which  gave  formal  character  to  the  Bulgarian 
65 


—6Q— 

communities  throughout  Macedonia,  stimulated  a 
Servian  national  movement  towards  the  south,  after 
the  Austrian  check  was  placed  on  extention  towards 
the  west.  In  1903  the  murder  of  King  Alexander, 
which  was  so  popularly  approved  in  Servia  though 
disapproved  elsewhere— especially  in  royal  circles- 
removed  a  dynasty,  and,  by  releasing  Servia  from 
the  influence  of  Austria,  gave  a  new  impetus  to  a 
Servian  national  spirit. 

A  Bulgarian  (Liouben  Karavelow)  wrote  in  1870: 

*'The  Greeks  show  no  interest  in  knowing  what  kind  of 
people  live  in  such  a  country  as  Macedonia.  It  is  true  that 
they  say  that  the  country  formerly  belonged  to  the  Greeks 
and  therefore  ought  to  belong  to  them  again.  *  *  *  But  we 
are  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  and  historical  and  canonical 
rights  have  lost  all  significance.  Every  people,  like  every 
individual,  ought  to  be  free,  and  every  nation  has  a  right  to 
live  for  itself.  Thrace  and  Macedonia  ought  then  to  be  Bul- 
garian since  the  people  who  live  there  are  Bulgarians." 

It  is  no  doubt  easy  for  the  Christian  world  to 
appreciate  the  traditional  emnity  that  existed  be- 
tween the  Bulgarians  and  Turks,  as  it  is  so  readily 
attributable  to  differences  in  religion,  but  there  has 
been  some  surprise  occasioned  by  the  bitterness  and 
ferocity  of  the  strife  that  so  soon  arose  between  the 
Christian  Bulgarians,  Servians  and  Greeks,  after 
their  common  enemy,  the  Turk,  had  been  eliminated. 
The  cause  of  the  differences  between  the  Bulgarians 
and  Servians  can  be  dismissed  in  a  word;  it  was  the 
result  of  extraneous  political  influences  which  set 
these  two  similar  and  almost  identical  people  against 
one  another  in  fratricidal  war.  But  the  Bulgar  and 
the  Greek  have  been  separated  by  a  breach  that 
began  to  widen  almost  with  the  dawn  of  history. 
The  Greeks  and  Bulgars  had  been  allies  for  only  a 
year,  and  when  their  common  enemy  had  been 
removed,  their  individual  differences  became  more 
acute  on  account  of  the  jealousies  aroused  by  the 


—67— 

conflict  of  their  respective  claims  to  territorial  ex- 
tensions in  Macedonia. 

The  soldiers  of  the  three  alhed  armies  — counting 
the  Servian  and  Montenegrin  as  one— had  together 
fought  the  first  war  to  a  successful  finish.  They  felt 
they  had  achieved  their  ends  and  the  second  war 
seemed  to  them  inexplicable.  If  the  Turks  had 
accepted  the  conditions  demanded  by  the  Allies,  in 
the  course  of  the  first  armistice,  and  if  the  first  war 
had  terminated,  as  it  would  have  done  in  January, 
1913,  —but  for  a  government  revolution  in  Constanti- 
nople,—it  is  most  probable  that  the  second  war  could 
not  have  been  fought,  as  none  of  the  armies— always 
excepting  the  Montenegrins— could  not  have  been 
induced  at  that  time  to  fight  again.  It  was  necessary 
for  the  Greek  press  to  inflame  their  people,  and  for 
the  Bulgars  to  learn  that  their  brother  Servians  were 
about  to  betray  them,  in  the  violation  of  a  sacred 
treaty.  The  Servians  had  absolutely  nothing  to  do 
but  stand  pat,  as  they  were  in  possession  of  and 
proposed  to  retain  that  portion  of  Macedonia  which, 
by  treaty,  they  had  conceded  to  Bulgaria.  This 
treaty  became  more  sacred  to  the  Bulgars  as  a 
**bond  of  peace''  and  grew  more  profane  to  the 
Serbs  as  a  ''scrap  of  paper,''  while  the  final  adjust- 
ment of  the  first  war  was  pending.  The  Greeks 
have  a  press,  but  the  Bulgars  have  not.  The  Greeks 
are  the  peddlers,  traders  and  advertisers  of  the 
East,  and  they  spent,  most  industriously,  the  first  six 
months  of  1913  in  proving  the  Bulgars  to  be  ruthless 
and  inhuman  savages,  and  inspiring  the  Greek  sol- 
dier with  his  mission  as  '*an  appointed  avenger  of 
civilization  against  a  race  which  stood  outside  the 
pale  of  civiHzation." 

With  the  exception  of  Bulgaria,  the  first  war  was 
practically  over,  so  far  as  the  AlHes  were  concerned, 
at  the  end  of  1912.     The  formal  termination  was 


—68— 

marked  by  the  treaty  of  peace,  signed  in  London, 
June  30,  1913.  In  this  interval  of  six  months  the 
Servians  and  Greeks  had  Httle  to  do,  except  to  ar- 
range themselves  in  their  conquered  territory  in 
Northern  and  Southern  Macedonia  respectively, 
while  the  Bulgarians,  from  January  to  June,  1913, 
bore  the  constant  burden  of  holding  the  Turk  in  his 
place  on  the  Chatalja  line. 

The  question  of  partition  of  the  territory  wrested 
from  the  Turk  was  a  matter  of  vital  concern, 
especially  to  Bulgaria,  because  her  allies  were  in 
actual  possession  of  a  part  of  Macedonia,  which 
Bulgaria  thought  she  had  just  right  to  claim.  Bul- 
garia's contention  was  based  upon  a  treaty,  duly  and 
solemnly  signed,  sealed  and  attested  by  both  Bul- 
garia and  Servia,  in  which  the  delimitation  of  the 
Servian  and  Bulgarian  portions  of  Macedonia  were 
specifically  defined. 

This  instrument,  popularly  known  as  the  ''Secret 
Treaty,"  was  signed  at  Sofia,  February  29,  1912,  or 
about  seven  months  before  the  declaration  of  the 
first  war,  but  it  was  given  to  the  public  by  a  news- 
paper in  Paris  in  the  spring  of  1913,  when  the  second 
war  was  brewing.  Besides  the  definite  meandering 
of  a  line  which  both  parties  agreed  would  separate 
the  new  Servian  from  the  new  Bulgarian  Macedonia, 
there  remained  another  area,  confessed  to  be  in 
dispute,  which  was  left  to  arbitration.  As  the  issues 
of  the  first  war  were  practically  settled,  Bulgaria 
asked  Servia  to  evacuate  that  portion  of  Macedonia 
which  the  secret  treaty  had  granted  to  Bulgaria,  but 
which  Servia  still  occupied.  Servia  proposed  arbitra- 
tion. Bulgaria  was  pleased  and  ready  to  arbitrate 
the  matter  left  for  arbitration  by  the  treaty.  Servia 
demanded  arbitration  of  the  entire  matter  of  the 
division  of  Macedonia,  which  was,  in  fact,  a  dis- 
regard for  the  the  terms  of  the  treaty  which  Bulgaria 


insisted  was  valid,  and  should  become  effective 
without  arbitation. 

Bulgaria  had  conducted  her  campaign  and  had  con- 
tributed much  the  strongest  force  in  the  war  against 
the  Turks,  in  confidence  that  the  treaty  would  secure 
her  rights  in  Macedonia,  although  she  knew  the 
fortunes  of  war  must  send  the  Servian  army  there 
to  take  it  away  from  the  Turk.  These,  then,  were 
definite  positions  in  the  controversy.  Both  parties 
were  perfectly  willing  to  submit  something  to  the 
arbitration  of  the  Russian  Czar,  but  they  could  not 
agree  upon  the  question  to  be  arbitrated.  It  was 
simply  a  little  matter  of  either  sacred  or  profane 
regard  for  a  treaty,  and,  at  that  time,  the  self-styled 
"civilized  world''  lost  patience  with  these  wild 
Balkan  people  for  fighting  over  as  sordid  thing  as  the 
spoils  of  the  first  war.  Maybe  some  ex  post  facto 
process  of  the  civilized  world's  international  courts 
will  some  day  restore  to  the  barbaric  Balkan  States 
the  good  character  of  which  they  were  despoiled  by 
the  self-righteous  judgment  of  a  '* higher  civiliza- 
tion." The  Russian  Czar  threatened  to  hold  **  re- 
sponsible "—whatever  he  meant  by  that— the  state 
which  started  a  fight,  and  for  that  reason  neither 
Servia  nor  Bulgaria  felt  privileged  to  strike  the  first 
blow.  Not  so,  however,  with  Greece,  for  she  was 
without  the  pale  of  Russian  influence  or  punishment, 
and  was  free  to  indulge  her  petulance. 

Servia  urged,  as  her  reason  for  not  respecting 
the  treaty,  that  the  conditions  at  that  time  differed 
from  what  they  were  when  the  treaty  was  signed,  as 
Austria,  through  her  insistence  on  the  autonomy  of 
Albania,  had  driven  her  back  from  the  Adriatic,  and 
had  robbed  Servia  of  that  which  she  coveted  most  — 
an  opening  to  the  eea. 

Austria  could  not  deprive  Servia  of  all  the  fruits 
of  her  victory.      The  Servian  occupation  of  the  San- 


—70— 

jak  of  Novi  Bazar,  in  conjunction  with  Montenegro, 
could  not  be  disputed  by  Austria,  in  addition  to 
Austria's  prevention  of  Servians  occupation  of  Albania. 
With  the  San  jak  of  Novi  Bazar  lost,  Austria  was  so 
determined  that  Servian  access  to  the  sea  should  be 
prevented  by  the  creation  of  an  autonomous  Albania, 
that  in  the  spring  of  1913  she  mobilized  in  Bosnia 
eight  to  ten  army  corps,  with  a  strength  of  about 
200,000  men  at  a  cost  of  $84,000,000.  As  about  one 
half  of  this  sum  was  expended  for  military  stores, 
which  might  be  used  again,  the  cost  of  the  mobiliza- 
tion was  really  about  40  to  50  million  dollars  — not  a 
trifling  amount  for  Austria  to  spend  in  merely 
** bluffing''  Russia.  Russia  was  not  ready,  and  the 
game  was  closed  for  the  while.  Austria's  hat  was 
in  the  ring,  but  Russia's  was  not  ready  to  be  tossed. 
While  this  little  incident  would  hardly  be  noticed  in 
America,  in  Europe  it  was  the  cause  of  great  con- 
cern, and  for  a  reason  more  apparent  to  us  now  than 
then. 

This  process  of  diplomatic  settlement  was  favor- 
able to  the  Teutonic  interests,  because  it  enabled 
Austria  to  take  even  a  better  strategical  position, 
from  which  to  execute  the  movement  assigned  to  her 
by  the  Germanic  Alliance,  which  was  the  ultimate 
advance  of  her  eastern  flank  to  Salonika,  and  the 
establishment  there  of  a  naval  base,  from  which  the 
^gean  might  be  controlled  and  the  Dardanelles 
guarded  against  the  emergence  of  the  Slav  into  the 
Mediterranean.  Austrian  interference  with  the 
territory  taken  from  the  Turks  by  the  Servians  is, 
no  doubt,  the  crux  of  the  situation  which  led  to  the 
second  war,  because,  if  Austria  had  not  blocked  so 
effectually  Servia's  advance  to  the  sea,  Servia  would 
have  been  so  pleased  with  this  realization  of  her 
fondest  hope  that  in  her  gratitude  she  would  certainly 
have  had  no  thought  of  disregarding  her  treaty,  and 


_71— 

she  also  might  have  conceded  to  Bulgaria  the  dis- 
puted Macedonian  area,  which  the  secret  treaty  had 
left  for  arbitration. 

The  long  delay  in  the  settlement  of  the  issues 
had  brought  Bulgaria  to  the  rather  urgent  necessity 
of  getting  some  action  at  once,  or  resigning  herself 
to  what  the  Servians  and  Greeks  saw  fit  to  offer  her. 
Her  army  was  exhausted,  and  the  peasant  soldiery, 
believing  that  they  had  won  what  they  had  been 
fighting  for,  were  feeling  the  call  to  their  fields,  in 
the  time  of  the  approaching  harvest. 

The  second  war  was  one  of  most  informal  begin- 
ning, although  its  course  was  one  of  great  intensity. 
There  was  no  formal  declaration,  and  as  the  first 
war  ended  formally  June  30th,  after  a  long  delay 
following  the  actual  cessation  of  actual  hostilities, 
the  Allies  had  had  time  to  array  themselves  in  de- 
fense of  their  respective  interests.  In  order  to  make 
history  easy,  it  may  be  said  that  the  second  war 
began  July  1st,  the  day  after  the  first  war  ended. 

On  June  21,  1913,  General  Savoff ,  the  Bulgarian 
generalissimo,  sent  the  following  telegram  to  the 
commander  of  the  4th  Bulgarian  Army,  who  was  at 
Seres: 

"I. — There  is  an  alliance  between  the  Servians  and  the 
Greeks,  whose  object  is  to  hold  and  divide  the  whole  territory 
of  Macedonia  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Vardar  ....  for 
the  Servians;  Salonica  and  the  regions  of  Pravishta  and 
Nigrita  for  the  Greeks. 

*'II. — The  Servians  do  not  recognize  the  treaty  and  do 
not  admit  arbitration  within  the  limits  of  the  treaty. 

"III. — We  insist  that  the  arbitators  start  from  the  basis 
laid  down  in  the  treaty,  i.e.,  concern  themselves  solely  with 
the  contested  zone.  Since  the  non-contested  territory  belongs 
to  us  according  to  the  treaty,  we  desire  that  it  should  be 
evacuated  by  the  Servians  or,  at  least,  occupied  by  mixed 
armies  for  such  time  as  the  pourparlers  are  going  on.  We 
make  the  same  proposition  to  the  Greeks. 

"IV. — These  questions  must  be  settled  within  ten  days 
and  in  our  sense,  or  war  is  inevitable.      Thus  within  ten  days 


—72— 

we  shall  have  either  war  or  demobilization,  according  as  the 
government's  demands  are  accepted  or  refused. 

"V. — If  we  demobilize  now,  the  territories  mentioned 
will  remain  in  the  hands  of  the  Greeks  and  the  Servians,  since 
it  is  difficult  to  suppose  that  they  will  be  peacefully  handed 
over  to  us. 

"VI. — The  discontent  which  has  recently  manifested 
itself  in  certain  parts  of  the  army  gives  ground  for  supposing 
that  there  is  a  serious  agitation  against  war.  The  attention 
of  intelligent  soldiers  must  be  directed  to  the  fact  that  should 
the  army  become  disorganized  and  incapable  of  action,  the 
result  will  be  as  described  in  paragraph  V.  Reply  with  least 
possible  delay  whether  the  state  of  the  army  is  such  that  it 
can  be  counted  on  for  successful  operations." 

The  Bulgarian  premier  told  the  cabinet  that  the 
Servians  would  more  than  likely  make  war  on  them 
after  any  arbitration  which  would  give  Bulgaria  her 
claimed  advantages,  and  that  he  thought  it  better  to 
fight  it  out  then. 

Servia  consented  unreservedly  to  arbitration. 
The  sentiment  of  the  Bulgarian  cabinet  was  not  in 
favor  of  war,  but  it  is  now  certain  that  public  opinion 
and  General  Savoff,  whose  military  glory  had  ex- 
tended his  influence  into  politics,  were  for  war. 

On  June  28th,  General  Savoff  sent  another  tele- 
gram to  the  commander  of  the  4th  Army: 

"In  order  that  our  silence  under  Servian  attacks  may 
not  produce  a  bad  effect  on  the  state  of  mind  of  the  army,  and 
on  the  other  hand  to  avoid  encouraging  the  enemy,  I  order 
you  to  attack  the  enemy  all  along  the  line  as  energetically  as 
possible,  without  deploying  all  your  forces  or  producing  a 
prolonged  engagement.  Try  to  establish  a  firm  footing  on 
Krivolak  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Bregalnitca.  It  is  prefera- 
ble that  you  undertake  a  fusillade  in  the  evening  and  make 
an  impetuous  attack  on  the  whole  line  during  the  night  and 
at  daybreak.  The  operation  is  to  be  undertaken  tomorrow, 
June  29th,  in  the  evening." 

General  Savoff  also  sent  a  letter  of  instructions 
to  the  5th  and  6th  Armies,  outlining  several  details 
of  his  conception  of  the  political  situations,  in  which 
he  said:      "Since  our  enemies  are  in  occupation  of 


—73— 

territories  which  belong  to  us,  let  us  try  by  our  arms 
to  seize  new  territory  until  European  powers  inter- 
vene to  stop  our  military  action/' 

It  is  imputed  that  the  King  gave  Savoff  his  in- 
structions, but  the  General  remains  silent  on  the 
subject.  At  any  rate,  consequent  unhappy  results 
of  Savoff' s  actions  demanded  some  sort  of  an  ex- 
planation, as  an  order  of  a  regimental  commander 
directing  a  part  of  the  attack  on  the  Servian  lines 
soon  became  pubhc.  Savoff  was  made  the  diplomatic 
and  official  **goaf  by  his  relief  from  the  command 
of  the  army  without  any  other  official  assignment. 
The  official  reports  of  the  junction  of  the  2d  and  4th 
Armies  in  the  last  days  of  the  Macedonian  Campaign 
state  that  these  armies,  on  account  of  the  common 
task  assigned  to  them,  were  placed  under  one  com- 
mander whose  name  is  not  given.  This  man  was 
Savoff,  as  I  believe  I  know  from  my  personal  rela- 
tions, to  the  situation  at  Kustendil  where  I  saw 
General  Savoff. 

Bulgaria  suffered  sorely  from  the  disadvantage 
of  her  position,  as  she  was  compelled  to  keep  her 
main  army  at  Chatalja  until  the  terms  of  peace  were 
signed.  The  other  Allies  had  months  to  entrench 
themselves  in  their  positions  where  the  Bulgarsmust 
meet  them.  Bulgaria  had,  at  the  very  first,  to 
abandon  the  Chatalja  Hnes,  with  the  Turkish  Army 
still  on  her  newly  guaranteed  frontier,  and  to  con- 
centrate all  her  forces  on  her  west  and  southwest 
borders. 

The  Greeks  with  their  main  army  in  Salonika, 
started  their  part  of  it  by  an  attack  on  the  battalion 
that  the  Bulgars  had  maintained  at  that  point.  The 
Bulgars  nudged  the  Servians  in  Macedonia,  but  the 
latter  said  they  were  not  fighting.  It  was  claimed 
to  be  an  outpost  contact.  The  Bulgars  defended 
their  western  frontier  against  the  Serbs,  and  met  the 


—74— 

Serbs,  Montenegrins  and  Greeks  in  Macedonia  south 
of  Western  Bulgaria.  There  in  Macedonia,  in  the  val- 
leys of  the  Bregalnitca  and  the  Struma,  the  campaign 
continued  through  the  month  of  July,  while  the  wily 
Turks  slipped  back  into  Adrianople,  and  the  Rouman- 
ians crossed  the  Danube  on  their  way  to  Sofia.  With 
this  new  enemy  within  a  few  days'  march  of  her  de- 
fenseless capital,  Bulgaria  was  compelled  to  sue  for 
peace.  An  armistice  was  declared  August  1,  1913, 
and  the  treaty  of  Bucharest  followed.  This  instru- 
ment not  only  gave  to  her  former  allies  all  that  was 
in  dispute,  but  it  took  from  Bulgaria  some  of  the  ter- 
ritory she  had  won  from  the  Turks,  and  dehvered 
'*the  most  unkindest  cut  of  alP'  by  robbing  her  of  an 
intergral  part  of  her  original  domain.  So  the  Second 
War  ended  in  a  state  of  local  tension  greater  than 
that  with  which  the  first  began.  There  has  been 
left  among  Christians  animosities  and  hatreds  more 
bitter  than  had  existed  between  Christian  and  Mos- 
lem, and  all  factions  only  wait  for  a  favorable  op- 
portunity to  resort  again  to  arms. 

Bulgaria,  today,  by  reason  of  the  advantage 
taken  of  her  in  the  treaty  of  Bucharest,  in  August, 
1913,  cherishes  a  most  bitter  resentment  for  the 
parties  to  the  ''hold  up,''  namely,  Roumania,  Greece 
and  Servia,  which  she  will  exhibit  in  arms  when  her 
first  opportunity  arrives.  This,  too,  will  not  be  an 
action  of  the  government  in  pursuit  of  a  diplomatic 
policy;  it  will  be  an  expression  of  a  deep  and  enduring 
sentiment  of  her  people.  Under  present  conditions 
Servia,  Greece  and  Roumania  are  not  free  to  assume 
any  other  mihtary  burdens,  and  Bulgaria,  therefore, 
holds  the  * 'balance  of  peace"  in  the  Balkans,  though 
not  for  her  inherent  interest  in  the  abstract  prin- 
ciples of  peace. 

With  the  neutrality  of  Bulgaria  assured  and 
guaranteed,    which  is  manifestly  impossible  under 


—76-- 

present  conditions,  it  is  probable  that  both  Roumania 
and  Greece  by  this  time  would  have  allied  themselves 
with  one  of  the  sides  in  the  European  War.  Roumania 
must  make  the  first  move  in  placating  Bulgaria  by 
the  restoration  of  the  stolen  province  of  the  Dobrudza. 
Such  action  will  leave  Bulgaria  free  to  turn  her  front 
towards  Servia  and  Greece.  Servia,  being  sufficiently 
occupied  at  present,  Greece  alone  remains  to  restrain 
Bulgaria's  pressure.  As  Greece  has  ambitions  in  the 
JEgesLii  and  Albania,  which  could  be  better  pursued 
after  securing  Bulgarian  neutrality,  she  might  see 
her  way  clear  to  return  to  Bulgaria  her  (Greece's) 
portion  of  the  loot  of  Bucharest.  After  that,  Bulgaria's 
enforcement  of  her  secret  treaty  with  Servia,  which 
caused  the  Second  Balkan  War,  would  be  a  matter  of 
simple  military  migration  into  Servian  Macedonia, 
which  the  treaty  gave  to  Bulgaria.  Then  all  the 
Balkan  States  would  be  free  to  make  their  align- 
ments in  the  great  war  and  Bulgaria's  position  would 
be  determined  to  the  extent  of  enforcing  the  terms 
of  the  Treaty  of  London,  which  gave  her  the  Enos- 
Media  line  as  her  frontier  with  Turkey,  but  which 
the  Turks  violated  by  their  return  to  Adrianople 
after  the  Bulgarian  army  was  withdrawn  from 
Chatalja,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Second  War. 

This  movement  for  Bulgaria  would  not  heavily 
tax  her  resources,  as  the  Turks  are  now  engaged  in 
other  military  adventures  so  critically  affecting  their 
destiny  as  to  make  the  defense  of  Thrace  a  mere  in- 
cident. With  the  recovery  of  the  province  of 
Dobrudza,  and  the  undisputed  occupation  of  Mace- 
donia and  Thrace,  Bulgaria's  ambitions  would  be  so 
wholly  realized  that  her  consequent  desire  to  enjoy 
the  blessings  of  peace  might  permit  the  Balkan 
States,  as  far  as  they,  themselves,  are  concerned,  to 
live  happily  ever  after. 

It  is  my  purpose  to  attempt  to  describe  with  the 


—76- 

aid  of  a  campaign  chart  the  general  movements  of 
the  Bulgarian  armies  in  the  Second  War.  But  to 
safeguard  you  against  the  dangers  of  accumulating 
misinformation  I  will  quote  a  warning  given  by  one 
of  the  most  careful  and  experienced  students  of 
Balkan  affairs,  who  has  written  several  books  on 
subjects  pertaining  to  the  Near  East,  and  who  says: 

*'I  have  seen  enough  of  Eastern  countries  to  entertain  the 
utmost  distrust  of  any  specific  statement  of  fact,  with  regard 
to  occurrences  which  are  alleged  to  have  taken  place  there, 
no  matter  on  what  authority  the  statement  is  based." 


—77— 

The  Campaign 

Although  in  the  tactical  operations  of  the  Second 
Balkan  War,  the  Bulgarian  Army  seemed  almost  to 
run  the  gamut  of  misadventure  and  misfortune, 
which  began  with  the  inherent  difficulties  of  her  po- 
litical situation  and  ended  in  her  humihation  and  dis- 
aster, these  unhappy  results  were  brought  about  not 
by  her  former  Allies  alone  but  through  foreign  politi- 
cal influence  and  by  the  intervention  of  another 
enemy.  I  believe  that  there  is  enough  evidence  at 
hand  to  show  that  Bulgaria  was  about  to  extricate 
herself  from  her  generally  considered  insuperable 
difficulties  with  the  Servians  and  Greeks,  when 
Roumania  intervened  and  prevented  the  successes 
which  she  was  about  to  achieve  and  which  would 
have  won  her  certainly  more  favorable  terms  in  set- 
tlement with  the  allies  if  not  a  complete  victory. 

The  sketch  (Page  76)  which  shows  the  territory, 
lost  by  the  Turks,  as  it  was  occupied  by  the  several 
allies  on  July  30th,  at  the  time  the  Second  War  be- 
gan, will  readily  reveal  the  difficulties  encountered 
by  Bulgaria  in  making  her  military  distribution  with- 
out indicating  a  preparation  for  war.  On  the  other 
hand  Servia  and  Greece  enjoyed  the  great  advantage 
of  the  six  months  of  military  preparation,  quietly 
though  energetically  made  during  the  time  that 
Bulgaria  was  detained  in  Thrace  pending  her  set- 
tlement with  the  Turks. 

General  Savoff  was  Commander-in-Chief  when 
hostilities  began  as  the  result  of  Bulgaria's  political 
blunder  which  was  rather  too  highly  seasoned  with 
military  adventure,  for  an  event  not  accompanied  by 
a  declaration  of  war.  This  mistake  was  almost  im- 
mediately realized,  but  the  attempt  to  correct  it,  by 
stopping  the  aggressive,  which  was  only  meant  to  be 
a  demonstration,  proved  futile  because  the  Allies  in 


—78— 

their  turn  assumed  the  offensive  and  thus  compelled 
Bulgaria  to  continue  the  war. 

In  an  attempt  to  describe  the  general  features 
of  this  campaign,  it  is  not  without  profound  regret 
that  we  approach  the  disquieting  indication  for  the 
employment  of  the  so-called  ''names''  of  places  and 
even  of  persons  (not  to  be  mistaken  for  harsh 
epithets),  which  are  portrayed  by  groups  of  phonetic 
symbols,  so  vicious  in  assortment  and  vile  in  arrange- 
ment that  they  suggest  to  the  Christian  eye  some 
heathen  blasphemy,  or,  more  happily  perhaps,  only 
unutterable  sounds.  But  as  the  accompanying  map 
bears  the  names  of  all  the  places  mentioned,  it  is 
hoped  that  this  unhappy  situation,  resulting  from  too 
many  centuries  of  philological  carelessness  and  con- 
fusion to  be  corrected  at  this  time  may  outrage  no 
more  than  the  eye  and  that  the  tongue  at  least  may 
remain  pure. 

General  Savoff 's  strategic  plan  for  the  conduct 
of  the  war  provided  for  an  immediate  invasion  of 
Old  Servia,  with  an  interruption  of  the  line  of  com- 
munications of  the  Servian  army  in  Macedonia,  which 
would  at  once  place  it  in  an  untenable  situation  and 
leave  a  sufficiently  large  Bulgarian  army  to  conquer 
the  Greeks.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was  the  plan  of 
the  Allies  for  the  Servians  to  advance  slowly,  while 
the  Greeks  pushed  back  the  Bulgarians  as.  speedily 
as  possible,  thus  bringing  about  the  contact  of  the 
Servian  right  with  the  Greek  left  for  a  final  effort 
that  would  either  crush  or  envelop  the  Bulgarians. 

Five  Bulgarian  armies  were  distributed  for  the 
tactical  execution  of  this  strategy  as  follows:  The 
1st  Army  of  forty  battalions  was  concentrated  on 
the  Servian  frontier  south  of  the  railroad  in  the 
Pirot  district,  opposed  to  sixteen  Servian  battalions. 
The  3d  Army  of  forty  battaHons  was  placed  at 
Vlassina,  near  the  pass  south  of  that  occupied  by  the 


—79— 

railroad,  for  an  attack  on  sixteen  Servian  battalions 
at  Surdulica.  The  5th  Army  of  forty  battalions 
was  on  the  Macedonian  frontier  beyond  Kustendil  in 
front  of  Egri  Palanka.  The  4th  Army  was  on  the 
line  from  the  Valley  of  the  Strumica  to  Istip  and 
Kochina  in  the  Valley  of  Bregalnitca  with  reinforce- 
ments available  to  place  ninety-six  battalions  in  this 
section.  The  main  Servian  army,  in  front  of  the 
4th  Army,  consisted  of  about  eighty  battalions 
in  five  divisions,  placed  on  the  line  from  Egri  Palanka 
(near  the  Bulgarian  frontier),  along  the  western 
slopes  of  the  Valleys  of  the  Zletovska  and  the  Bregal- 
nitca and  then  down  the  Valley  of  the  Vardar  to 
Lake  Do j ran.  The  2d  Army  was  distributed 
from  Kukus  to  Kavala,  so  as  to  contain  the  Greek 
army,  but  without  any  real  concentration.-  While  its 
organization  consisted  of  two  divisions  of  fifty-seven 
battalions,  including  six  battalions  of  railroad  guards, 
it  had  an  actual  strength  of  only  35,000  men.  The 
entire  Greek  army  concentrated  about  Salonika  num- 
bered about  120,000. 

The  combined  Bulgarian  armies  had  a  strength 
of  about  220,000,  to  which  was  opposed  about  115,000 
Servians  and  120,000  Greeks,  or  an  allied  army  of 
235,000.  The  Bulgarian  concentration  had  been 
started  a  month  before  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
but  all  of  the  divisions  of  the  4th  Army  were  not 
in  position  on  July  29th.  The  Bulgarian  disadvantage 
in  this  situation  may  be  appreciated  when  it  is 
remembered  that  the  entire  Servian  and  Greek 
armies  had  held  their  positions  for  six  months  with 
nothing  to  divert  their  attention  from  constructing 
defenses  and  making  other  arrangements  for  the 
campaign. 

The  left  wing  of  the  5th  Bulgarian  Army  rested 
on  Rujen,  a  mountain  2,235  meters  high,  on  the 
southwest  frontier,  which  was  connected  by  a  broad 


—80— 

saddle,  fit  to  be  called  a  causeway,  to  an  adjacent 
Macedonian  mountain,  Car-Vrh  (Sultan  Tepe),  2,104 
meters  high.  On  the  latter,  the  Servians  mounted 
heavy  guns  and  built  an  automobile  road  for  fifteen 
or  twenty  miles  from  Egri  Palanka  towards  Kochina 
in  the  Bregalnitca  Valley.  I  have  been  over  this 
terrain  from  Komonovo  to  Egri  Palanka  and  Kochina, 
where  every  position  had  been  most  elaborately 
prepared  by  the  Serbs  against  Bulgarian  attack  and 
for  their  own  retreat.  There  were  miles  of  trenches 
that  were,  never  occupied.  As  the  Bulgars  had  no 
road  to  Rujen,  and  so  could  not  avail  themselves  of 
its  superior  tactical  advantage,  they  were  unable  on 
this  terrain  to  make  any  advance  and  could  only 
conduct  a  guerre  in  place. 

The  political  complications  with  which  the  cam- 
paign began  so  muddled  up  the  military  arrange- 
ments that  it  was  not  possible  for  the  Bulgarian 
strategy  to  realize  any  of  its  inherent  advantages. 
General  Savoff  was  relieved  from  command  on  July 
3d,  the  fourth  day  of  the  war,  with  some  political 
fan-fare  and  a  telegram  to  St.  Petersburg,  it  is  said, 
announcing  the  summary  dismissal  from  office  of  the 
culprit  who,  without  authority,  had  started  the  war. 
In  the  second  week  of  the  war  it  was  rumored  in 
Sofia  that  General  Savoff  was  in  disgrace  and  had 
been  dismissed  from  the  army.  Sometime  later  he 
was  really,  though  informally  and  almost  sur- 
reptitiously, sent  to  command  the  4th  and  5th 
Armies  at  Kustendil,  where  I  saw  him  in  the  third 
week  of  the  war. 

General  Dimitrieff  became  commander-in-chief, 
and,  whatever  may  have  been  his  virtues  and  abilities, 
the  venerable  though  disaster-inviting  process  of 
swapping  horses  while  crossing  a  stream,  which 
permits  a  new  commander  to  execute  or  muss  up  the 
plans  of  his  predecessor,  already  in  operation,  was 


-81— 

bound  to  work  to  the  great  disadvantage  of  the 
Bulgarian  army.  It  seems  that  everything  went 
amiss  from  the  very  first.  The  1st  and  3d  Armies 
moved  into  Servia  on  July  6th,  to  be  recalled  on 
July  9th,  and  instead  of  cutting  the  Servian  army 
off  from  its  base,  while  the  4th  Army  immobilized 
it  in  its  front,  the  Servian  army  was  left  free  to 
attack  the  4th  Army  in  superior  numbers  from  a 
most  favorable  position. 

This  surprising  and  disrupting  change  in  strategy 
is  attributed  to  the  Russian  demand  upon  Bulgaria 
to  confine  the  conflict  to  the  disputed  zone  and  not 
to  muss  up  any  new  territory.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  that  abrupt  change  was  made  only  on  some 
demand  or  threat  from  a  foreign  source,  for  which 
Bulgarian  commanders  were  not  responsible.  The 
same  restraint  being  imposed  upon  Servia,  the  entire 
theater  of  operations  was  then  confined  to  Bulgaria's 
Macedonian  frontier.  The  1st  Army  was  then 
broken  up  and  distributed  to  the  4th  and  5th 
Armies  as  the  progress  of  the  campaign  indicated, 
and,  more  particularly,  as  the  greater  difficulties  of 
transportation  permitted.  The  impetuosity  with 
which  these  movements  were  made  was  revealed  in 
the  unintentional  separation  of  battahons  from  their 
regiments  and  companies  from  their  battalions,  as  I 
certainly  know  from  personal  observation. 

After  the  first  week  of  the  war,  as  there  was  no 
important  change  in  the  position  of  the  5th  Army  or 
of  the  Servian  Army  concentrated  against  it,  the 
principal  interests  in  the  campaign  lies  in  the  theater 
occupying  the  valleys  of  the  Bregalnitca,  Strumitca 
and  Struma,  where  the  Bulgarian  2d  and  4th  Armies 
met  their  first  reverses  against  the  Greeks  and  Ser- 
vians. 


—82— 
Position  In  the  Servian  Theater 

In  the  evening  of  June  29th,  the  4th  Army  made 
its  unexpected,  though  unfortunate,  attack  upon  the 
Servian  Division  on  the  western  slopes  of  theZletov- 
ska  valley,  which  was  renewed  from  the  positions 
thus  gained  on  the  morning  of  July  30th.  The  Com- 
manding Officer  of  the  4th  Army  then  received  an 
order  to  discontinue  hostilities  and  to  open  negotia- 
tions with  the  Servians  for  an  armistice.  The  brigade 
commanders  received  their  orders  about  noon  and  at 
once  suspended  the  action.  The  men,  believing  the 
fighting  over,  left  their  positions  and  were  separated 
from  their  arms.  The  Serbs  did  not  receive  the  par- 
limentaires  but  made  an  unexpected  attack  which 
routed  the  Bulgarians  with  great  losses.  Following 
this  advantage  the  Serbs  occupied  a  position  which 
commanded  Istip,  from  which,  in  a  few  days,  the  4th 
Army  was  compelled  to  retire,  with  the  right  wing 
passing  up  the  valley  of  the  Bregalnitca  to  Kochina 
and  the  left  wing  into  the  valley  of  the  Strumitca. 
As  the  line  of  supply  of  both  the  1st  and  4th  Armies, 
which  had  been  maintained  by  rail  from  Adrianople 
through  Drama  and  Seres,  would  be  interrupted  and, 
as  both  armies  would  then  be  based  on  Sofia  through 
the  valley  of  the  Struma,  it  became  necessary  to  pro- 
tect the  new  line  of  communications. 

As  the  Commanding  Officer  of  the  4th  Army  re- 
ceived orders  to  retire  and  to  protect  the  right  flank 
of  the  2d  Army,  on  July  7th,  he  sent  the  artillery 
and  wagon  trains  of  his  left  wing  through  the  valley 
of  the  Strumitca  to  enter  the  valley  of  the  Struma  at 
Petric,  in  withdrawal  towards  the  Bulgarian  frontier. 

Position  on  the  Greek  Theater 

The  battalion  of  1,000  men  is  the  conventional 
unit  of  measure  of  strength  in  the  Balkan   armies, 


-83— 

although  the  division  unit  is  used  in  a  more  technical 
sense.  The  Bulgarian  division,  however,  is  much 
larger  than  the  Servian  or  Greek  divisions,  as  the 
former  consists  of  three  brigades  of  two  regiments 
each  and  the  latter  do  not  use  brigades  but  assign  four 
regiments  to  a  division.  As  four  battalions  form  a 
regiment,  in  all  of  these  armies,  the  normal  composi- 
tion of  a  Bulgarian  division  is  twenty-four  battalions 
while  that  of  the  Greek  or  Servian  is  sixteen  battalions. 

In  the  2d  Bulgarian  Army,  all  of  the  organiza- 
tions were  so  depleted  that  with  fifty-seven  battalions, 
thirty-five  batteries  and  ten  escadrons  (one  fourth 
mounted)  the  total  strength  was  only  35,000  men.  In 
the  entire  Greek  Army,  which  opposed  the  2d  Bul- 
garian Army,  all  of  the  organizations  were  at  full 
strength,  as  it  had  taken  a  very  subordinate  part  in 
the  war  against  Turkey  and  it  had  had  sufficient 
opportunity  after  that  time  to  complete  the  cadres,  so 
that  the  ninety  battalions  with  about  1,200  men  each, 
eighty-four  batteries  and  ten  escadrons  made  a  force 
of  about  120,000  men.  The  Bulgarian  organization  as 
it  is  here  given  is  taken  from  Bulgarian  reports,  which 
also  estimates  the  Greek  army  as  a  little  more  than 
twice  the  Bulgarian  strength ;  but  from  Greek  sources 
I  have  the  Greek  strength  as  120,000.  The  Greeks 
had  a  greatly  superior  advantage  in  artillery  suit- 
able for  the  mountainous  terrain  of  the  campaign, 
in  that  they  had  sixty  mountain  guns  while  the 
Bulgars  had  only  twelve. 

For  the  graphic  description  of  the  general  tacti- 
cal features  of  the  campaign,  the  2d  Bulgarian  Army 
may  be  fairly  represented  by  six  brigades  of  6,000 
men  and  the  whole  Greek  Army  by  ten  divisions  of 
12,000  men  each. 

Positions 

The  Bulgarian  2d  Army  was  distributed  along 


—84— 

a  front  of  130-140  km.  (80-85  miles)  in  length  extend- 
ing from  the  left  (east)  bank  of  the  Vardar  at 
Guevgueli  to  Kavala. 

The  Greek  Army  was  concentrated  in  three  main 
groups  from  the  right  (west)  bank  of  the  Vardar  to 
Lake  Tashino,  and  beyond,  along  the  coast  to  the 
Bay  of  Leftero. 

Greek  Offense 

The  plans  were:  (1)  To  drive  the  Bulgars  away 
from  the  left  bank  of  the  mouth  of  the  Struma  and 
out  of  the  Pravisteh  district;  to  cut  the  railway  from 
Drama  to  Seres,  which  supplied  the  2d  and  4th 
Armies,  and  also  to  isolate  the  Bulgarian  left  wing. 
(2)  To  advance  their  left  wing  from  Guevgueli  toward 
Lake  Dojran;  to  cut  the  pass  leading  from  Dojran  to 
Strumitca,  and  thus  to  interrupt  communications 
between  the  2d  and  4th  Bulgarian  Armies. 

Bulgarian  Defense 

The  Belasica  Mountains,  lying  north  of  the  lower 
valleys  of  the  Vardar  and  Struma,  which  separate 
this  theater  from  the  valley  of  the  Strumitca,  can 
only  be  crossed  by  two  passes;  one  north  of  Lake 
Dojran  and  the  other  at  Rupel,  where  the  Struma 
emerges  from  the  most  wretchedly  mountainous 
country  in  Macedonia.  The  only  possible  retreat  to- 
wards the  Bulgarian  frontier  for  the  2d  Army  and 
for  the  left  wing  of  the  4th  Army,  which  had  fallen 
back  into  the  valley  of  the  Strumitca,  as  well  as  the 
only  line  of  supply  for  these  forces,  was  through 
Rupel  pass  and  the  valley  of  the  Struma.  The  pos- 
session of  both  these  passes  were  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  the  Bulgars  in  case  of  either  fight  or  flight. 

General  Ivanoff,  commanding  the  2d  Army 
published  the  Bulgarian  plan  in  the  following  order: 

1.     The  left  wing  will  advance,  drive  the  Greeks 


—86— 

to  the  right  (west)  bank  of  the  mouth  of  the  Struma 
and  take  position  with  shortened  front  and  holding 
the  left  (east)  bank  at  the  mouth  of  the  Struma,  in 
order  to  protect  the  railroad. 

2.  The  right  wing  will  cross  the  Vardar  at 
Guevgueli,  establish  a  bridgehead  on  the  west  (right) 
bank  and  if  compelled  to  retire  will  destroy  the 
bridge. 

These  movements  were  executed  and  a  brigade 
from  the  Pravistha  district  was  sent  by  rail  to  rein- 
force the  force  at  Kukus. 

The  Bulgarian  battalion,  which  had  remained  in 
Salonica  since  the  surrender  of  the  Turks,  was 
crushed  by  the  Greeks. 

Then  on  July  3d,  the  commander  of  the  2d 
Army  wired  to  the  Commander-in-Chief:  "If  we 
are  forced  to  retreat,  shall  we  retire  into  the  valley 
of  the  Struma  or  from  Drama?''  He  was  answered: 
''The  task  of  your  army  is  to  secure  the  flank  and 
the  rear  of  the  4th  and  5th  Armies;  in  case  of  re- 
treat, retire  slowly,  keeping  up  energetic  resistance, 
into  the  valleys  of  the  Struma  and  the  Vardar/' 
There  is  certainly  some  evidence  in  this  order  to 
support  the  contention  that  the  Commander-in-chief 
did  not  fully  and  clearly  understand  the  position  of 
either  the  2d  or  the  4th  Army,  for  there  was  no 
chance  of  escape  for  either  army  in  the  valley  of  the 
Vardar  and  only  the  2d  Army  could  have  retired 
from  Drama.  The  assignment  to  cooperation  with 
the  4th  Army,  however,  determined  the  valley  of  the 
Struma  as  the  line  of  retreat. 

On  the  following  day  the  Greeks  attacked  all 
along  the  line.  On  the  Bulgarian  left,  a  futile  at- 
tempt was  made  to  land  at  Tusla  under  the  protec- 
tion of  gunboats.  On  the  center  the  Bulgarians 
were  driven  back  toward  the  Belasica  Mountains, 
the  left  center  resting  on  Seres.     On  the  Bulgarian 


—86— 

right,  the  force  holding  the  Guevgueli  bridgehead 
was  driven  back  and  in  its  hasty  retirement  the 
bridge  was  not  destroyed.  This  force,  however,  re- 
tired in  good  order  and  took  up  a  position  covering 
the  pass  leading  from  Dojran  to  Strumitca.  As  an 
incident  illustrating  the  determined  defense  of  the 
Bulgarians  against  overwhelming  forces,  it  may  be 
mentioned  that  five  Greek  divisions  attacked  Colonel 
Rebavoff 's  Brigade  near  Kukus  inflicting  a  loss  of 
seven  officers  and  500  men.  Protecting  the  retire- 
ment of  this  defeated  force,  the  machine  gun  de- 
tachment of  the  32d  Nova  Zagora  Regiment  remained 
in  position  until  all  its  officers  and  men  were  either 
killed  or  wounded. 

On  July  the  7th,  the  Greeks  renewed  the  attack 
on  the  Bulgarian  right  and  left,  with  their  original 
purpose  of  preventing  their  enemy's  retreat  into  the 
valleys  of  the  Strumitca  or  the  Struma.  They  suc- 
ceeded, on  the  right,  in  crossing  to  the  east  bank  of 
the  Struma  at  Seres  and  interrupting  the  railroad, 
but  only  after  all  of  the  wagon  trains  and  artillery 
of  the  Bulgarian  left  wing  had  been  withdrawn 
towards  Rupel  Pass.  The  infantry  of  the  left  wing 
concentrated  at  Drama  and  retired  into  the  valley 
leading  to  Nevikop.  The  center  withdrew,  unmo- 
lested, from  the  Belasica  Mountains  towards  Rupel 
Pass.  The  right  wing  retired  toward  Strumitca 
while  the  brigade  of  Colonel  Kavarvalijev  held  the 
pass  at  Dojran  during  the  day  and  night  with  almost 
a  disastrous  loss  and  the  death  of  the  commander. 
The  artillery  and  wagon  trains  of  this  right  wing 
were  hurried  from  Strumitca  toward  Petric,  while 
the  brigade  ^as  holding  its  position. 

At  this  same  time,  the  4th  Army  had  met  with 
serious  reverses  which  forced  it  back  with  a  separa- 
tion of  the  right  from  the  left  wing  at  Istip.  The 
two  divisions  of  the  right  wing  had  already  retired 


—87— 

with  their  trains  and  artillery  along  the  Bregalnitca 
to  Kochina  and  the  other  two  divisions  forming  the 
left  wing  were  withdrawn  towards  Strumitca,  from 
where  the  infantry  could  and  did  later  retire  over 
the  mountains  in  a  northeast  direction  towards 
Pechova,  although  the  artillery  and  trains  could  only 
escape  by  a  flank  march  through  the  valley  of  the 
Strumitca,  towards  Petric,  and  thence  to  the  valley 
of  the  Struma.  General  Kovatcheff,  (Commanding 
the  4th  Army)  at  this  time  so  feared  a  catastrophe 
that  he  telegraphed  General  Headquarters  urgently 
recommending  intervention,  as  a  means  to  suspend 
hostilities  * 'before  the  fatal  hour  arrives.''  He  re- 
ceived a  very  elaborate  order  directing  a  movement 
against  the  Servians,  which  had  already  been  at- 
tempted with  such  disastrous  results  that  two  of  his 
divisions  had  sustained  a  loss  of  30  per  cent. 

The  heroic  temper  of  the  Commander-in-chief 
rose  sublimely  above  his  appreciation  of  the  situation 
in  the  reply  to  the  Commanding  Officer  of  the  4th 
Army,  in  which  he  instructed  the  latter  to  place  no 
confidence  in  intervention  but  to  trust  only  to  the 
force  of  arms  and  *  *to  attack  the  Greeks  energetically 
and  roll  up  their  left  wing— or  else  die  in  honorable 
battle.  In  so  sacrificing  yourself  you  will  save  the 
2d  Army.''  General  Kovatcheff,  (Commanding  4th 
Army)  thought  "the  idea  superb  but  inopportune"  as 
the  infantry  on  his  left  wing  was  then  on  the  way  to 
the  upper  Bregalnitca,  near  Pechovo  and  Carevocelo, 
and  its  artillery,  except  a  battalion  with  the  rear 
guard,  and  all  the  wagon  trains  had  gone  to  the  val- 
ley of  the  Struma. 

On  July  9th,  the  rear  guard  brigade,  with  its 
artillery  and  train,  as  it  was  in  a  critical  position  in 
the  valley  of  the  Strumitca,  with  the  Greeks  press- 
ing on  the  Belasica  Mountains,  was  ordered  to  march 
without  halting  to  Petric,  in  order    to  reach    the 


-88- 

Struma  valley  road.  This  order  was  given,  notwith- 
standing the  request  of  the  brigade  commander  for 
delay  on  account  of  the  greatly  fatigued  condition  of 
his  men,  who  had  been  in  continuous  operations  for 
two  frightfully  hot  days,  clad  in  winter  clothing.  In 
spite  of  these  orders  the  column  halted  for  the  night, 
but  the  2d  Army  fell  back  during  the  night  from 
Belasica  Mountain  and  in  the  morning,  as  the  march 
of  the  brigade  was  resumed,  the  Greeks  attacked 
them  in  flank  in  superior  force  and  the  artillerymen 
unhooked  the  horses  and  abandoned  their  guns.  The 
infantry  retired  to  the  north  over  the  mountains. 

Two  days  later,  when  General  Kovatcheff  reached 
Pechora,  he  was  relieved  of  his  command  by  the 
King  because  he  had  "lost  faith  in  his  army  and 
himself. '' 

In  this  way  both  the  2d  and  4th  Armies  were 
extricated  from  a  most  diflficult  position.  With 
the  exception  of  the  lost  battalion  of  artillery,  the 
trains  of  both  armies  had  been  collected  from  a  wide 
front  and  sent  over  the  most  available  road  for  their 
escape  from  lower  Macedonia. 

When  the  flank  march  through  the  Valley  of  the 
Strumitca  began,  the  hospitals  at  Radovista  and 
Strumitca  contained  2,500  sick  and  wounded  of  the 
Fourth  Army  whose  transportation  added  much  to 
the  burden  of  the  retreat.  The  early  interruption  of 
the  line  of  communications  by  rail,  before  the  more 
difficult  and  more  tedious  route  by  road  was  estab- 
lished, left  the  army  with  a  ration  reduced  to  one 
half  a  loaf  or  one  pound  of  bread. 

The  Fourth  Army  was  reformed  on  the  Bregal- 
nitca,  in  front  of  Caravocelo,  with  its  left  flank  in 
contact  with  the  right  flank  of  the  2d  Army, 
which  had  fallen  back  through  Kresna  Pass.  This 
Bulgarian  movement  prevented  a  junction  of  the 
Servian  and  Greek  armies,  as  the  former  was  then  in 


—89— 

the  lower  Bregalnitca  and  the  latter  in  the  Struma 
Valley. 

Then,  on  July  15th,  the  last  straw  was  added  to 
the  almost  crushing  weight  of  Bulgarian  disaster, 
when  the  Roumanian  army  crossed  the  Danube  and 
began  its  march  on  Sofia,  which,  under  the  existing 
conditions,  could  be  met  only  by  a  decision  to  make 
no  resistance  to  this  advance. 

As  the  Greeks  were  not  moving  energetically 
into  the  Valley  of  the  Struma,  General  Ivanhoff 
prepared  for  an  advance  of  the  2d  Army,  even 
though  another  menace  then  confronted  the  Bul- 
garians, when  one  regiment  of  his  right  wing  was 
reported  to  have  three  fourths  of  its  strength 
disabled  by  ''gastro-enteritis,''  which  most  probably 
was  cholera,  as  10,000  cholera  cases  were  later  re- 
ceived in  evacuation  hospitals  of  the  2d  and  4th 
Armies.  General  Ivanhoff  was  not  permitted  to 
advance  because  he  was  informed  the  political  con- 
ditions indicated  the  continuation  of  the  defensive. 

The  events  of  July  24th  probably  mark  the 
critical  stage  and  the  turn  of  fortune  in  the  Bul- 
garian campaign,  as  on  this  day  the  Servians  made 
a  determined  attack  and  were  defeated  with  great 
loss  (at  Banjatchuka,  Povijen  and  Calimanovi) 
and  the  2d  Army  received  strong  reenforcements. 
After  this  encouragement  a  strategic  retirement  of 
the  2d  Army  was  ordered,  with  the  purpose  of 
drawing  the  Greeks  out  of  the  mountains  and  into 
the  upper  Valley  of  the  Struma  beyond  Kresna  Pass, 
where  the  Bulgarians  hoped  to  used  their  field  ar- 
tillery to  better  advantage  than  in  the  mountains, 
where  the  preponderance  of  Greek  mountain  guns 
had  given  the  latter  a  great  advantage  in  the  earlier 
stages  of  the  campaign.  Positions  were  taken  in 
front  of  Dzuemaja  on  both  banks  of  the  Struma  and 


—go- 
frantic  entrenching  efforts  were  exhibited   to  the 
Greeks  which  induced  them  to  advance. 

On  July  27th  the  2d  Army  was  given  to 
General  Savoff,  who  was  already  in  command  of 
the  4th  and  5th  Armies,  and  he  directed  the  com- 
bined operations  against  both  the  Servians  and  the 
Greeks.  The  Bulgarian  left  wing  was  then  reenf orced 
by  the  column  which  came  from  Sofia  by  way  of 
Samakov.  The  left  wing  of  the  4th  Army  was 
included  in  the  movement  so  to  form  the  right  wing 
in  the  attack  which  was  made  against  both  Greek 
wings,  with  the  object  of  enveloping  them  and  the 
cutting  off  their  retreat.  The  Greek  right  was 
struck  in  the  Valley  of  the  Metza  (at  Dobninishteh), 
driven  both  north  (from  Nehomija)  into  Predel  Pass 
and  south  towards  Novokop,  with  the  loss  of  two 
guns  and  the  wagon  trains  which  carried  the  bag- 
gage of  the  officers  and  the  outgoing  mail  bags  of 
the  7th  Greek  Division. 

This  incident  may  be  worthy  of  passing  notice, 
as  some  of  the  letters  of  the  Greek  soldiers,  which 
have  been  published  in  fac  simile  by  the  Bulgarian 
governnient,  are  printed  in  translation  in  the  report 
of  the  Carnegie  "International  Commission  for  the 
Investigation  of  the  Balkan  Wars,''  as  the  expressions 
of  Greek  soldiers  seem  to  show  the  manner  in  which 
their  campaign  was  conducted. 


-91- 


31111  I 

j2  o  -I-  ■•-  •«- 

^  <    (S  ID  iS 


The  Greek  left  was  attacked  with  equal  success 
from  the  Valley  of  Zlenitca. 

On  July  30th,  when  the  armistice  was  announced 
and  the  order  for  cessation  of  hostilities  was  most 
reluctantly  given,  the  Bulgarian  line  lay  in  the  form 
of  a  horseshoe  with  its  center  massed  at  the  *'toe'' 
(in  front  of  Djumica),  the  right  wing  at  one  "heeF' 
(near  Nevokop)  and  the  left  wing  at  the  other 
"heer*  (at  Pechovo).  The  main  body  of  the  Greek 
army  faced  directly  against  the  inside  of  the  *'toe/' 


—92— 

The  Greeks  in  their  retreat,  with  the  center  of  the 
2d  Army  in  pursuit,  would  have  had  to  have  made  a 
longer  march  than  that  of  the  Bulgarian  wings  in 
closing  in  on  the  only  road  by  which  the  Greeks  could 
escape. 

While  this  report  is  taken  largely  from  Bulgarian 
official  reports,  I  have  the  personal  accounts  of  Bul- 
garian officers  and  of  most  creditable  observers  in 
the  person  of  two  German  doctors  who  were  battalion 
surgeons  with  the  troops  engaged,  and  all  corroborate 
some  of  the  related  incidents.  As  it  is  quite  probable 
that  the  submerging  levels  of  the  "hydrostatic  para- 
dox of  controversy''  may  long  obscure  the  historic 
surface  of  these  events,  which  have  already  sunk 
into  insignificance  in  comparison  with  the  vastly 
more  important  military  history  that  is  now  in  mak- 
ing, and  as  any  evidence  that  may  support  the  Bul- 
garian account  of  their  own  operations  may  not  be 
out  of  place,  I  feel  able  myself  to  verify  in  a  general 
way,  at  least,  some  of  these  incidents,  because  I 
arrived  on  July  24th  at  Kustendil,  the  headquarters 
of  General  Savoff  and  of  General  Tocheff,  command- 
ing the  5th  Army,  just  at  that  time  when  fortune 
first  seemed  to  favor  Bulgarian  arms. 

Concerning  this  day,  it  may  be  remembered, 
two  critical  events  are  recorded:  one  was  what  the  Bul- 
garians called  their  "success  against  the  Servians,'' 
and  the  other  was  the  timely  reenforcement  of 
the  2d  Army.  The  effect  of  these  two  fortunate 
incidents  had  not  then  been  felt  at  Kustendil,  On 
that  same  day  the  order  of  the  day  before  for  the 
evacuation  of  the  hospitals  was  then  being  executed 
as  the  preliminary  step  to  the  evacuation  of  the 
town,  the  Valley  of  the  Struma  and  the  withdrawal 
of  the  5th  Army  from  the  frontier  to  the  defile 
through  which  the  river  emerges,  a  few  miles  east 
of  town,   in  its  course  from  Sofia.      The  daily  in- 


—OS- 
creasing  number  of  trench-line  scars  could  be  seen 
on  the  mountain  sides.  The  whole  situation  was  one 
of  military  activity  under  the  strain  of  a  stern 
resignation,  moaning  laments  and  bitter  accusations 
of  responsibility  for  the  ''ruin  of  Bulgaria.''  Un- 
broken lines  of  bullock  wagons  were  creaking  night 
and  day  on  the  road  to  Carovocelo  and  to  the  4th 
Army  with  ammunition  and  supplies.  They  were 
returning  as  regularly  with  wounded— a  thousand  in 
the  first  day  of  my  service  and  from  three  to  five 
hundred  daily  for  several  days  after. 

The   2d   Army   was    based   on   Dubnitca— Sofia 
and  I  knew  nothing  personally  of  that  line. 

Regiments  marched  through  the  town  at  night, 
but  in  what  numbers  I  did  not  know.     Artillery  was 
detrained  and  rattled  off  to  Carovocelo.      I  saw  as 
many  as   a   dozen   guns   on  the  way.      Cafes  were 
closed,  and  gendarmes,  such  as  there  were  -  grizzled 
and  stooped  old  men  in   sheepskin   coats   carrying 
obsolete  arms -ordered  the  dispersion  of  the  groups 
that  gathered  in  the  streets  to  talk  with  great  in- 
terest labout  something.      The  next  day  the  coffee- 
houses were  opened;   the  following  day  they  were 
closed   again,   and   I  then   learned  that  the   coffee- 
house was  the  barometer  of  public  tension,  as  the 
commanding  general  ordered  them  closed  when  there 
was  any  unhappy  or  disquieting  rumors  in  circulation, 
and  then  ' 'lifted  the  lid''  when  the  news  was  good. 
On   the   second  day  before    the  armistice   the 
barometer  was  away  up;  the  "lid  was  off;"  the  coffee- 
houses were  open  and  almost  everybody  was  reck- 
lessly ordering  the  second  and  even  third  cup  of 
coffee  at  one  sitting.      My  colleague  let  me  into  the 
secret;  he  told  me  of  the  "great  success"  that  the 
Bulgars  were  about  to  attain  in  the  capture  of  the 
Greek  army,  as  it  was  then  almost  surrounded  and 


—94— 

there  were  sufficient  troops  available  to  complete  the 
movement. 

Then  I  saw  the  outbursts  of  indignation  and 
heard  the  protests  of  injustice  and  wails  of  despair 
when  the  announcement  of  the  armistice  cut  short 
the  campaign  and  denied  to  the  Bulgars  the  few 
days  necessary  to  their  confidently  expected  achieve- 
ment. I  heard  the  commanding  general  of  an  army 
utter  his  '' miser ahles''  and  other  more  impressive 
though  less  intelligible  expressions  which  must  have 
done  him  a  great  deal  more  good.  There  could  have 
been  no  doubt  to  any  one  there  in  Kustendil  that  the 
Bulgars  on  the  24th  day  of  July  feared  they  had  lost 
their  campaign  and  that  on  July  30th  they  were 
wholly  confident  that  they  had  won  it.  Besides, 
there  is  at  least  one  historical  fact  which  supports 
their  position.  The  King  of  Greece  did  telegraph 
the  King  of  Roumania  on  July  30th  demanding  an 
"  immediate '^  armistice,  and  the  King  of  Roumania, 
with  his  army  then  within  a  few  miles  of  Sofia,  did 
enforce  the  Greek  demand  upon  Bulgaria  and  com- 
pelled her  to  accept  the  armistice  just  as  she  was 
about  to  capture  the  Greek  army. 

Three  commanders  of  this  war,  Generals  Savoff, 
Ivanhoff  and  Dimitrieff,  have  been  variously  and 
vigorously  traduced  for  the  disaster  they  are  said  to 
have  brought  to  Bulgarian  arms,  although  it  does 
seem  that  each  one  of  them  has  escaped  with  a  few 
shreds  of  reputation,  because  General  Savoff  was 
sent  as  the  Bulgarian  plenipotentiary  to  negotiate 
the  treaty  with  Turkey,  General  Ivanhoff  was  deco- 
rated by  the  King  with  an  order  so  high  that  the 
King  himself  was  the  only  other  member,  and  General 
Dimitrieff  has  gone  to  command  a  Russian  division  in 
a  greater  war. 

But  in  the  advantages  she  has  taken  of  the 
possibilities  for  controversy  in  placing  the  responsi- 


96- 


bility  for  her  defeat,  Bulgaria  has  shown  to  the 
world  an  appreciation  as  keen  as  that  of  other  en- 
lightened nations  for  making  the  most  of  these  rich 
opportunities  for  excitement  which  come  as  the 
aftermath  of  war. 


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Map  Of 
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1914 

Army  Service  Schools. 

ourth     Lecture 


NOTES  ON  THE  BALKAN  AND 
TURKISH  ARMIES 


Strength 


T^HE  population  of  Bulgaria  is  about  four  and  one- 
-■-  fourth  million.  The  peace  footing  of  the  army 
is  about  60,000  which  is  raised  to  war  strength  by 
the  addition  of  trained  reserves,  provided  for  in 
cadres  of  200,000,  which  are  increased  by  additional 
calls  to  300,000,  or  an  extreme  limit  of  400,000,  so 
that  one- tenth  of  the  population  is  normally  available 
for  military  service,  as  more  than  this  number  were 
under  arms  during  the  last  war. 

The  population  of  Servia  is  about  three  million. 
The  peace  strength  of  the  army  is  about  30,000,  with 
a  provision  for  war  strength  of  200,000. 

Montenegro,  with  a  population  of  only  250,000, 
exacts  military  service  from  every  male,  who  is  big 
enough  to  carry  a  gun  and  not  too  old  to  climb  a 
mountain.  They  had  under  arms  from  45,000  to 
50,000  in  the  last  war  which  shows  that  they  con- 
tributed one  fifth  of  their  population,  which  is,  no 
doubt,  the  factor  of  extreme  limit  in  the  military 
strength  of  any  people. 

The  population  of  Turkey  is  at  present,  and 
always  has  been  unknown.  It  has  been  given  as  about 
twenty- four  million.  Foreign  officials  living  in  Turkey 
have  not  been  able  to  make  the  estimate  so  high.  I 
have  been  told  by  those  in  a  position  to  know,  in 
Constantinople,  that,  considering  the  territorial  losses 

96 


—97— 

Turkey  has  sustained  in  the  last  few  years,  the  popu- 
lation at  present  is  about  fourteen  million.  Before 
the  first  war  Turkey  had  under  arms  300,000  men, 
which  represented  her  standing  army,  but  they  were 
standing  around  over  such  a  widely  dispersed  area 
that  she  did  not  have  at  the  beginning  of  the  war 
that  many  regular  troops  in  action.  The  practical 
limit  of  her  effective  military  strength  is  probably 
about  500,000.  Prior  to  1909  only  Moslems  were 
eligible  for  military  service,  but  after  that  time  all 
Ottoman  subjects  became  amenable  to  conscription. 
The  Christian  contingent  was  not  added  to  the  army 
at  once,  but  25%  was  taken  each  year,  and  the  pre- 
caution was  invariably  observed  to  send  the  Christian 
recruits  to  stations  farthest  from  their  homes. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Balkan  Wars  the  allied 
armies  at  first  numbered  about  625,000.  The  Turk- 
ish Nizam  and  Redifs  together  numbered  300,000. 
During  the  course  of  the  war  the  allies  had  under 
arms  about  800,000  and  the  Turks  600,000. 

Organization 

In  the  Balkan  and  Turkish  armies  the  military 
unit  of  strength  is  the  battalion,  and  in  all  except 
the  Turkish  armies  the  normal  strength  of  the  bat- 
talion is  1,000  rifles.  The  larger  Bulgarian  units 
were  brigades,  divisions  and  armies.  The  Serbs  did 
not  employ  the  brigade,  while  the  Turks  divided 
their  armies  into  corps  and  divisions  without  brigades. 
The  Bulgarian  infantry  regiment  consisted  of  four 
battalions  of  four  companies  of  250  rifles  each  an d^  a 
few  unarmed  men,  and  the  regiment  was  considered 
as  carrying  4,000  rifles,  and  drawing  5,000  rations. 
Two  regiments  comprised  the  brigade,  and  three 
brigades  the  division,  or  twenty-four  battalions. 
The  Bulgarian  cavalry  did  not  seem  to  be  of  much 
efficiency  or  very   well   trained  and  it  was  poorly 


—OS- 
mounted.  The  squadron  consisted  of  about  200  men, 
and  there  were  four  of  them  to  the  regiment,  and 
ten  regiments  in  the  army.  The  artillery  was  of 
two  classes,  the  modern  Schneider-Cruesot  quick 
firing  guns  of  7.5  cm.,  with  three  battalions  of  three 
batteries  of  four  guns  each,  or  36  guns.  The  older 
materiel  was  the  Krupp  7.5  and  8.7  cm.  non-quick 
firing  guns,  formed  in  two  battalions  of  three  bat- 
teries of  four  guns  each,  or  twenty-four  guns. 

The  Servian  infantry  units  were  the  same  as  the 
Bulgarian,  but  their  companies  were  divided  into 
tenths.  They  did  not  employ  the  brigade  formation 
but  their  division  consisted  of  four  regiments,  or 
sixteen  battalions.  Their  cavalry  was  organized  like 
the  Bulgarian,  and  they  had  the  same  number,  ten 
regiments.  The  peace  footing  was  only  five  regi- 
ments, but  soldiers  taken  from  the  reserves  who 
'*loved  horses''  made  up  the  extra  units.  The 
Servian  artillery  was  of  modern  Schneider-Cruesot 
7.5,  8,  12  and  15  cm.  The  field  regiments  consisted 
of  three  battalions  of  three  batteries,  of  four  guns 
each. 

The  Montenegrin  infantry  was  about  the  same  as 
the  Servian,  but  the  artillery  was  made  up  of  rich 
and  rare  varieties  of  ordnance,  as  the  most  of 
their  pieces  had  been  presented  to  the  King. 

The  Turkish  infantry  regiments  consisted  of 
three  battalions  of  three  companies,  500  men  to  the 
battalion,  or  1,500  to  the  regiment.  The  cavalry 
organization  consisted  of  four  squadrons  of  100  to 
125  men  each,  approximately  500  men  to  the  regi- 
ment. This  arm  was  poorly  organized  and  trained 
and  was  badly  mounted.  It  was  largely  used  as  a 
remount  service  for  mounted  officers  who  were  un- 
able to  provide  their  own  horses,  and  the  most  of  the 
officers  seem  to  have  been  mounted  in  this  way.  The 
German  instructors  had  tried  to  introduce  into  the 


—go- 
cavalry  organization  that  superior  social  caste  that  it 
found  in  some  of  the  crack  cavalry  organizations  in 
Western  Europe. 

An  example  of  this  spirit  may  be  found  in  a  regi- 
ment of  lancers  that  had  permanent  station  at  Con- 
stantinople, and  was  commanded  by  a  German  cavalry 
officer  of  great  energy,  who  devoted  his  efforts 
largely  to  establish  the  social  caste  of  this  organiza- 
tion, in  teaching  the  officers  the  graceful  and  easy 
manners  of  the  Cafe  habitue'  and  fox  hunter.  He 
met  with  some  difficulty  as  the  social  system  of  the 
country  did  not  make  it  easy  for  the  Turkish  officers 
to  take  their  proper  place  among  the  membership  of 
the  hunting  clubs.  However,  the  unhappy  day  came 
when  this  regiment  went  to  war.  Some  months  after 
when  a  lady  in  diplomatic  circles  asked  this  German 
commander  of  the  1st  Constantinople  Lancers  what 
had  become  of  his  regiment  and  how  he  was  then 
occupying  his  time,  he  replied  that  his  regiment  was 
engaged  at  the  battle  of  Luli  Burgas  where  he  had 
hoped  they  might  render  some  service  to  the  cause 
of  the  Sultan,  but  something  had  happened  that  not 
only  led  to  its  disorganization  but  to  its  complete  dis- 
appearance. 

The  Turkish  artillery,  of  Krupp  material  and 
about  one-half  modern,  was  poorly  handled  and  ren- 
dered i  nefficient  service.  The  difficulty  of  developing 
an  efficient  artillery  service  in  the  Turkish  army  is 
almost  insurmountable,  owing  to  the  scarcity  of  sol- 
diers who  have  enough  elementary  education  and 
mechanical  competency  to  enable  them  to  be  trained 
into  gunners.  Some  of  their  batteries  show  rather 
good  form  in  the  way  of  superficial  manifestation  at 
drill  and  maneuvers,  but  the  more  technical  accom- 
plishments seem  to  be  quite  lacking. 


—100— 
Mobilization 

The  mobilization  of  the  allied  armies  was  carried 
out  promptly  and  effectively  and  all  the  cadres  were 
regularly  filled  at  the  time  the  war  began. 

The  Turkish  Army,  however,  was  mobilized  in 
disorder  and  confusion.  In  the  effort  to  increase  the 
strength  of  regular  organizations  by  their  reserves, 
some  of  the  Nizam,  or  regular  regiments,  were  filled 
with  more  reserves,  or  untrained  recruits,  than  regu- 
lars. There  were  no  reserve  lists  prepared,  and 
when  mobilization  was  ordered  and  reserves  called 
out,  these  reservists  were  assembled  with  recruits 
without  classification.  The  military  authorities  sent 
requisitions  to  certain  villages  for  their  contributions 
of  men  and  the  gendarmerie  rounded  up  in  various 
communities  the  numbers  that  the  head  man  was 
ordered  to  supply.  There  was  very  little,  if  any, 
efficient  physical  examination  and  the  results  of  this 
omission  were  very  evident  in  the  hospital  service  at 
Constantinople,  where  all  sorts  of  physical  defects 
were  gathered  for  ultimate  elimination.  I  terminat- 
ed my  medical  service  there  with  a  series  of  opera- 
tions for  hernia  which  ranged  in  size  from  oranges 
to  watermelons.  The  reservists  and  recruits,  gathered 
at  concentration  centers,  were  subjected  to  most  try- 
ing forms  of  neglect.  They  were  oftimes  provided 
with  no  shelter,  and  remained  literally  out  in  the 
rain  for  days,  and  in  some  instances  were  partly  if 
not  wholly  starvedbefore  joining  their  organizations. 

The    Bulgarian     and    Turkish 
Soldier 

Citizenry 

As  the  qualities  of  the  soldier  depend  to  such  a 
great  extent  upon  his  condition  as  a  citizen,  the  ma- 


terial  that  Bulgaria  found  in  her  citizenry  to  form 
her  army,  may  be  best  presented  by  a  few  quotations 
from  a  description  of  the  Bulgarian  people,  written 
some  years  ago  by  an  author  well  qualified  to  discuss 
the  subjects,  under  the  title  of  '^Bulgaria:  The  Pea- 
sant State.'* 

"The  Bulgarians  are  not  an  engaging  or  attractive  people; 
they  have  no  literature,  no  artistic  taste,  no  intellectual  cul- 
ture, and  no  dramatic  qualities;  they  are  simply  a  race  of 
peasants  with  all  the  peasant's  meanness,  but  with  also  all  the 
peasant's  virtues  of  industry  and  frugality.  They  live  roughly, 
thriftily,  and  one  might  say  sordidly,  but  they  have  suflacient 
to  eat;  they  are  warmly  if  coarsely  clothed,  and  they  enjoy  a 
certain  amount  of  rude  comfort.  They  work  hard  but  they 
work  for  themselves.  Poverty  in  our  sense  does  not  exist. 
There  are  no  labor  troubles  and  no  strikes,  no  conflicting  in- 
terests of  workmen  and  employers— thanks  to  themselves. 
If  you  want  work  done  in  Bulgaria  you  can  get  it  done  more 
cheaply  if  you  employ  Bulgarian  workmen  by  the  day  rather 
than  for  the  job  or  by  piece  work.  Under  the  exterior  of  the 
peasant,  cunning  and  superstitious,  in  accordance  with  peasant 
nature,  the  common  Bulgarian  conceals  a  shrewd  and  observ- 
ant mind." 

Every  Bulgarian  has  two  passions;  that  of  sex 
and  that  for  land.  No  Bulgarian  swain  has  the 
effrontery  to  ask  the  father  for  the  hand  of  his  daugh- 
ter if  he  cannot  base  his  claim  upon  possession  of 
some  property.  It  is  his  ambition  to  own  a  farm. 
It  is  a  greater  offense  to  the  Bulgarian  peasant  to 
trespass  upon  his  land  than  on  his  person. 

The  Turk,  on  the  other  hand,  exhibits  a  different 
social  system.  He  has  two  extreme  classes— the 
Pashas  and  the  peasants.  There  is  no  middle  class, 
but  its  void  is  filled  by  functionaries,  or  office-holders, 
as  almost  every  public  office  in  the  Ottoman  Empire 
is  held  by  a  Turk.  The  administration  of  the  govern- 
ment is  based  largely  upon  the  principle  of  creating 
sufficient  public  places  to  employ  the  Turkish  civil 
army  of  occupation.     The  Pashas  are  the  administra- 


tors  or  gentlemen  pensioners  living  in  some  way  on 
the  revenues  of  the  government.  The  peasants  are 
the  lowliest  social  order  and  exist  in  a  primitive  state 
of  poverty  and  abject  humility.  They  seldom  own 
property  and  are  almost  always  tenants  of  the  land 
they  till.  They  feel  that  they  exist  by  sufferance  of 
some  illustrious  person  who  holds  their  lives  in  his 
hands.  But  few  of  them  can  read  and  they  show  no 
other  disposition  than  that  humble  desire  of  being 
simply  permitted  to  live.  They  seldom  go  far  from 
their  villages  and  the  recruits  presented  a  pathetic 
aspect  as  they  entered  Constantinople  in  droves, 
timidly  holding  each  others  hands,  but  wholly  re- 
signed to  their  unknown  fate. 

Military  Training 

The  Turk  serves  nominally  three  years  with  the 
colors,  but  virtually  they  are  dismissed  when  the 
military  authorities  find  it  convenient,  and  many  of 
them  serve  much  longer.  Much  of  their  service  is 
garrison  duty  where  they  are  stationed  to  preserve 
the  authority  of  the  empire.  In  late  years,  under 
German  instruction,  there  has  been  all  sorts  of  educa- 
tional schemes  devised  for  the  benefit  of  both  officers 
and  soldiers,  but  the  method  has  been  better  suited 
to  German  society,  as  it  has  developed  a  sense  of  su- 
periority on  the  part  of  the  oflficer,  which  has  led  him 
to  keep  aloof  from  the  men,  to  the  extent  of  taking 
no  part  in  their  instruction,  which  is  done  entirely 
by  non-commissioned  officers.  The  organization  of 
the  army  under  German  instruction  has  taken  away 
that  class  of  company  officers  who  used  to  control  the 
company  as  a  head  man  rules  his  village,  but  the  new 
system  has  not  developed  a  satisfactory  substitute 
for  what  it  removed. 

The  Bulgar,  on  the  other  hand,   has  taken   his 


—103— 
military  training  very  seriously  and  always  with  a 
deep  personal  interest.  The  two  years  he  spends 
with  the  colors  in  the  infantry,  and  the  three  years 
in  mounted  and  other  services,  together  with  subse- 
quent periods  of  instruction,  makes  him  a  competent 
soldier.  By  attaining  certain  merit  in  his  course  of 
instruction  he  may  shorten  the  period  of  two  years 
to  eighteen  months,  and  that  of  three  years  to  thirty 
months. 

Endurance 

The  endurance  of  the  Eastern  soldier  is  his 
greatest  characteristic,  both  as  regards  hardships 
and  patience.  The  Turkish  soldier  is  a  particularly 
patient  creature,  and  one  should  never  do  him  the 
injustice  to  even  think  of  him  as  ''terrible.''  His 
waiting  capacity  is  admirable,  as  while  he  waits 
he  does  not  have  to  be  watched.  He  will  wait 
in  the  rain,  in  the  cold,  without  food,  and  without 
question— after  he  has  been  told  to  do  so.  I  have  seen 
hundreds  of  them  in  the  public  square  and  streets  of 
the  village,  which  was  the  cholera  camp,  where  the 
houses  had  been  vacated  by  their  tennants  who  fled 
in  terror.  These  soldiers  were  forbidden  to  trespass 
upon  the  property  of  the  village,  and  many  of  them 
died  from  the  mere  want  of  shelter  without  breaking 
a  window  pane.  In  one  dooryard,  in  which  there 
was  a  well,  I  saw  a  group  of  plainly  sick  soldiers 
struggling  for  water,  but  they  had  been  driven  to 
this  infraction  of  discipline  by  abnormal  thirst.  One 
half-delirious  soldier  did  threaten  an  attack  on  a 
front  gate,  but  a  non-commissioned  officer  drew  a 
pistol  and  he  staggered  back  to  the  gutter. 

When  the  Bulgarian  soldier  waits  he  must  be 
watched,  for  he  wants  to  know  what  it  is  all  about— 
what  he  is  waiting  for,  and,  most  probably,  what  he 
is  going  to  do  next;  but  when  it  comes  to  sheer 


physical  exertion,  his  qualities  are  not  much  less  than 
superb,  and  his  superior  is  hard  to  find. 

I  have  a  story  of  a  Bulgarian  march  that  may 
furnish  an  illustration,  as  it  was  told  by  the  regi- 
mental apothecary,  who  accompanied  the  column  on 
foot  throughout  the  march.  A  regiment  of  about 
5,000  men  had  fought  three  days  at  Adrianople,  with 
a  loss  of  killed  and  wounded  of  302,  when  it  was 
ordered,  with  a  battery  of  artillery,  to  proceed  in  all 
haste  to  the  Chatalja  line,  some  150  miles  distant. 
The  march  was  begun  immediately,  and  continued 
literally  night  and  day  for  eleven  days;  the  men 
slept  at  night  only  when  the  pioneers  were  making 
roads  for  the  artillery.  Each  day  the  progress  was 
from  twelve  to  twenty  miles,  though  one  day  on 
good  roads  a  march  of  twenty-five  miles  was  made. 
The  average  night's  march  was  from  a  mile  to  a 
mile  and  a  half.  The  column  arrived  four  days 
in  advance  of  the  wagon  train,  during  which  time 
the  men  were  issued  no  rations,  and  their  only  sub- 
sistence, during  these  four  days,  was  the  uncooked 
wheat  or  corn  which  they  found  in  the  villages. 
Two  days  after  the  arrival  of  the  wagon  train,  the 
first  fresh  meat  was  received,  in  the  form  of  goats, 
which  could  be  driven  faster  than  sheep,  and  thus 
was  made  to  form  the  component  of  an  emergency 
ration,  which  in  this  instance  at  least  put  the  despised 
and  usually  delinquent  goat  in  the  first  place.  The 
apothecary  said  that  everything  went  well,  except 
for  one  terrible  infraction  upon  discipline,  which 
occasioned  the  loss  of  three  loaves  of  bread  which  he 
and  the  doctor  had  sequestered  in  the  ambulance 
cart. 

Incidentally,  cholera  began  its  invasion  about 
this  time,  as  all  the  Bulgarian  troops  in  that  position 
suffered  from  lack  of  commissary  supplies.  Eight 
thousand  deaths  in  the  Bulgarian  troops  followed  in 


—105— 

the  ensuing  weeks.  This  epidemic  was  a  considerr 
able  factor  in  preventing  the  success  of  the  Bul- 
garian attack,  which  was  made  about  two  weeks 
after  this  time. 

The  Officers'  Corps— Proportion  to  Soldiers 

In  the  Bulgarian  permanent  establishment  there 
were  2,670  officers  and  60,000  enlisted  men.  As  the 
army  was  to  be  increased  in  time  of  war  to  300,000,  a 
provision  was  made  for  the  production  of  reserve 
officers  by  establishing  an  academy  for  reserve 
cadets  in  Sofia.  As  conscription  is  universal,  an 
option  on  taking  this  course  is  given  to  men  of 
certain  educational  qualifications,  who  can  pass  an 
examination  in  one  year.  Upon  passing  a  final  ex- 
amination, the  cadet  attains  the  status  of  a  reserve 
officer  of  a  certain  grade,  but  if  he  fails  he  has  to 
complete  his  military  service  in  the  ordinary  way. 
The  training  of  reserve  officers  in  this  way  has  been 
most  highly  commended  by  military  observers. 

In  the  Servian  army  there  are  2,050  officers  and 
30,000  men  in  the  regular  establishment,  which 
makes  about  the  same  number  of  officers  to  about 
half  the  number  of  men  as  in  the  Bulgarian  army. 
The  Servians  had  no  academy  for  reserve  cadets,  but 
produced  their  reserve  officers  by  promotion  of  non- 
commissioned officers  from  the  regular  service. 

The  Turks  had  no  system  of  providing  reserve 
officers,  and  the  result  was  an  awful  shortage  of 
officers  in  all  their  organizations,  after  their  army 
was  mobilized. 

Physique 

Physically  the  Bulgarian  officer  is  a  pretty  good 
hardy  specimen,  the  most  of  them  rather  short,  stocky 
and  dark,  but  a  number  are  of  the  Russian  type, 
rather  tall,  robust  and  blond.    The  Turkish  officers  as 


—106— 

a  class  are  certainly  physically  inferior  to  the  Bul- 
garian. While  their  physical  proportions  in  many 
instances  are  superb,  they  are  generally  anaemic, 
and  looked  as  though  they  had  been  accustomed  to 
indoor  rather  than  outdoor  life. 

Education  and  Training 

The  Bulgarian  officers  are  home-made  at  their 
military  academy  in  Sofia  by  a  course  of  two  years, 
which  is  followed  by  six  months  service  before  they 
are  commissioned.  They  are  eligible  for  admission 
to  the  academy  between  the  ages  of  16  and  21.  There 
is  a  system  of  honors  and  distinctions  to  be  attained 
in  the  course,  upon  which  is  based  certain  subsequent 
educational  opportunities  at  home  and  abroad.  Quite 
a  number  of  them  are  sent  each  year  to  take  military 
courses  in  Russia,  Italy  and  France,  and  such  officers 
as  successfully  complete  their  studies  abroad  en- 
ter a  preferred  class  to  which  advancement  comes 
more  readily  than  to  others,  and  they  wear  always 
as  part  of  their  uniform  a  distinctive  badge,  which 
indicates  the  character  of  their  foreign  military  educa- 
tion. 

The  Turks  have  a  military  academy  in  Constan- 
tinople, but  the  cadet's  course  was  affected  by  so 
many  elements  of  political  and  social  favoritism,  that 
no  military  educational  system  of  any  real  worth  ex- 
isted. Many  young  officers  are  sent  abroad,  but 
they  are  usually  selected  on  political  or  family  grounds, 
and  when  they  return  to  their  own  service,  their 
subsequent  military  careers  are  largely  affected  by 
the  same  factors. 

Relation  to  Soldiers 

The  relation  of  the  Bulgarian  officer  to  the  sol- 
dier, is  based  upon  the  principles  of  stern  discipline, 
but  bears  no  evidence  of  assumption  of  personal   su- 


—107— 

periority,  and  shows  no  glaring  mark  of  class  distinc- 
tion. Soldiers  are  particularly  respectful  and  readily 
obedient  in  the  discharge  of  their  duties  and  in  the 
endurance  of  hardships,  but  they  seem  to  bear  no 
pious  regard  for  the  sacred  personality  of  the  officer. 
During  the  progress  of  the  Second  War,  I  was  riding  on 
a  troop  train,  comfortably  installed  in  the  first  class 
compartment  of  a  car,  the  roof  of  which  was  filled 
to  its  capacity  with  soldiers  on  the  way  to  join  their 
regiments.  The  soldiers  maintained  a  somewhat 
frivolous  enthusiasm,  by  an  almost  continuous  fusil- 
lade, while  the  train  was  waiting  at  the  station.  It 
soon  became  manifest  that  there  was  an  element  of 
danger  to  anybody  who  appeared  in  the  immediate 
or  somewhat  remote  vicinity.  An  officer  standing  on 
the  ground,  gave  the  order  to  ''cease  firing'',  which 
was  only  very  imperfectly  executed.  He  then 
mounted  the  roof  of  the  car,  and  while  he  went  around 
among  the  men  and  instructed  them  individually, 
they  obeyed  his  order  while  he  was  standing  near 
them  and  treated  him  with  due  respect,  but  they 
continued  to  fire  occasional  joyousness  after  he  had 
passed  on  and  until  the  train  started. 

The  Turkish  officer  on  the  other  hand,  bears  an 
entirely  different  relation  to  the  Turkish  soldier. 
Everything  about  his  attitude  is  one  of  personal  su- 
periority and  absolute  control  of  life  and  limb.  He 
does  not  hesitate  after  the  first  loud  words  of  admoni- 
tion, reproach  and  certain  hyperbolical  forms  of  most 
terrible  threats,  to  strike  the  soldier  on  the  cheek 
with  his  open  hand  or,  if  the  form  has  a  little  more 
military  character,  he  uses  the  flat  of  his  saber. 

I  have  seen  a  Military  Pasha  call  on  the  carpet  a 
non-commissioned  officer,  with  whom  I  had  something 
to  do  and,  after  storming  about  in  a  most  frantic  way, 
announce  that  he  was  at  that  time  suffering  the  last 
drain  upon  his  patience,  and  that  on  the    very  next 


—108— 

occasion  for  reproval,  he  would  gouge  out  the  sol- 
dier's eyes.  Then,  to  be  more  impressive,  he  assumed 
a  dramatic  attitude,  extending  the  two  separated 
fingers  of  his  right  hand  with  a  hooking  gesture 
toward  the  soldier's  eyes  which  indicated  quite  clearly 
the  process  he  intended  to  employ.  As  a  fit  climax 
to  the  whole  proceeding,  after  the  soldier  had  faced 
about  and  was  near  the  door,  the  Pasha,  lowering 
his  voice  to  a  tone  that  was  almost  gentle,  called  the 
soldier  back  to  make  another  reference  to  the  penalty 
with  which  he  was  threatened.  The  soldier  was  in- 
formed that  the  Pasha  had  forgotten  to  tell  him  that, 
if  the  occasion  arose,  the  Pasha  would  take  particu- 
lar delight  in  executing  personally  this  summary 
sentence.  When  the  soldier  had  finally  withdrawn. 
His  Excellency  turned  to  me  in  the  gentlest  manner 
and  said  with  a  little  smile,  that  he  had  just  shown 
me  the  best  way  to  observe  discipline.  He  also  re- 
marked that  the  Turkish  soldiers  were  so  dense  and 
stupid  and  bestial  that  only  such  methods  were  ef- 
fective. I  have  seen  too  many  instances  of  this  same 
method  of  discipline  to  be  mistaken  about  its  custom- 
ary employment. 

Promotion 

Bulgarian  officers,  except  for  special  preference 
based  upon  educational  qualifications,  are  promoted 
by  seniority  with  an  age  limit  retirement,  as  follows: 

Captains  retire  at 48 

Majors  "     ''    52 

Lt-Colonels ''     " 55 

Colonels        '*     "    _     58 

General  officers  retire  at  .   65 

The  promotion  of  Turkish  officers  can  hardly  be 
fairly  considered  unless  it  is  taken  in  relation  with 
that  other  process  which  affects  so   frequently   their 


—109— 

careers,  namely,  demotion.  They  have,  however,  a 
scheme  of  promotion  by  seniority,  and  age  limit  re- 
tirement, under  which  second  lieutenants  retire  at 
41.  and  Field  Marshals  at  68.  Whatever  may  be  the 
effect  of  this  penalty  upon  officers,  it  is  convention- 
ally modified  by  the  gentle  and  sympathetic  process 
of  administration.  Pensions  are  very  small,  but  they 
are  eternally  enduring,  and  often  descend  from  one 
generation  to  another. 

The  retrograde  progress  sometimes  made  by 
Turkish  officers,  even  those  of  distinction,  will  be 
indicated  by  a  story  or  two  concerning  individuals 
whose  names  are  associated   with    recent    events. 

Nazim  Pasha  had  been  minister  of  war  for  less 
than  a  year  before  his  assassination.  Before  he  came 
into  that  office  he  had  only  recently  returned  to  the 
active  practice  of  his  chosen  profession,  as  Abdul 
Hamid  some  years  before  had  sent  him  to  Bagdad, 
where  he  carried  a  hod  for  a  bricklayer  for  a  period  of 
years.  A  prominent  foreign  official  told  me  he  would 
always  regard  Nazim's  death  as  untimely,  because  he 
believed  so  much  in  his  gentle  and  appreciative  dis- 
position that  he  thought  that  had  Nazim  lived  for 
the  requisite  number  of  years  he  would  have  repaid 
a  little  loan  that  this  foreign  official  extended  to  him 
about  the  time  he  returned  from  Bagdad.  The 
official  was  crossing  the  Floating  Bridge,  which  is 
the  Rialto  of  Constantinople,  when  he  was  accosted 
by  a  ragged  and  unkempt  individual  who  addressed 
him  in  familiar  and  almost  affectionate  terms.  After 
a  more  careful  inspection,  he  recognized  in  the 
stranger  the  familiar  features  and  personality  of  his 
erstwhile  friend  Nazim.  The  latter  told  the  official 
of  his  arrival  just  that  day  in  Constantinople  from 
the  enforced  and  fatiguing  sojourn  in  far  off  Bagdad. 
But  as  he  had  not  only  returned  to  the  Mecca  of  the 
Europeanized  Turk,  but  to  his  former  rank  in  the 


—110— 

army,  it  seemed  incumbent  upon  him  to  provide  him- 
self with  the  outward  evidence  of  his  position.  The 
official  loaned  Nazim  $40.00  with  which  Nazim  thought 
he  would  be  able  to  purchase  the  uniform  of  a  general 
of  brigade  which  he  was  expected  to  wear.  Although 
some  years  had  passed  since  that  time,  and  Nazim 
had  repaid  the  loan,  under  pressure  of  subsequent 
circumstances  he  had  again  negotiated  it,  and  the 
official  felt  that  had  sufficient  years  been  allotted  in 
Nazim's  career,  the  loan  would  finally  have  been 
discharged. 

After  Nazim's  assassination  he  was  succeeded  by 
Izzet  Pasha  as  Generalissimo.  Izzet,  in  his  day  had 
suffered  some  of  the  inconveniences  of  demotion 
that  had  befallen  Nazim,  and  was  sent  away  from 
Constantinople  by  Abdul  Hamid  for  station  in 
Damascus,  where  his  duties  confined  him  to  a  rock 
pile.  It  seems  that  while  Izzet,  in  his  early  career, 
was  the  Turkish  miHtary  attache  in  Berlin,  the 
Kaiser  knew  him  favorably  and  well.  Not  many 
years  ago,  while  on  a  visit  to  the  Sultan,  the  Kaiser 
mentioned  Izzet's  name  to  a  friend  of  the  latter,  and 
it  was  revealed  to  the  Kaiser  that  Izzet  was  then 
cracking  rock  in  Damascus,  in  compliance  with  the 
Sultan's  express  wishes.  Izzet's  friend  suggested 
to  the  Kaiser  that  he  make  a  casual  but  interested 
inquiry  of  the  Sultan  as  to  the  whereabouts  of  the 
attractive  young  Ottoman  officer  whom  he  had  known 
while  attached  to  the  Sultan's  embassy  in  Berlin. 
The  Sultan  regretted  that  this  distinguished  officer 
was  absent  on  a  somewhat  prolonged  tour  of  duty  in 
a  part  of  the  empire  so  remote  as  Damascus.  Later 
during  his  tour  the  Kaiser  reached  Damascus,  where 
he  was  greeted  by  the  official  representative  of  the 
Sultan  in  the  person  of  Izzet  Pasha,  as  a  general  of 
brigade,  although  this  high  dignitary  of  the  hour 
had  been  but  a  colonel  at  the  time  he  had  incurred 


— Ill— 
the  displeasure  and  distrust  of  the  Sultan  which  sent 
him  in  disgrace  to  Damascus. 

General  Staff 

The  Bulgarian  General  Staff  is  a  very  carefully 
selected  military  hierarchy.  Only  officers  who  have 
graduated  from  the  military  schools  of  Russia,  Italy 
and  France  are  eUgible  to  detail,  and  then  their 
subsequent  advancement  is  determined  by  their 
service  and  efficiency  records.  They  return  while  in 
the  lower  grades  for  periods  of  service  with  troops, 
and  many  of  them,  when  they  attain  advanced  rank, 
come  into  command  of  higher  units. 

The  Turkish  General  Staff  is  a  very  exclusive 
body,  selected  nominally  on  the  educational  attain- 
ments of  the  officer  and  his  training  in  foreign  schools 
and  armies,  but  the  usual  conditions  which  affect  all 
Turkish  administration,  that  of  favoritism  and  family 
influences,  obtains  in  this  branch  of  the  Turkish 
army.  Whatever  may  be  the  regulations  governing 
officers  of  the  general  staff,  the  fact  is  that  when 
once  estabhshed  in  this  preferred  situation,  they 
lose  contact  with  troops  and  have  little  or  no  field 
service.  Whatever  individual  accomplishments  some 
of  these  officers  possess,  they  were  unable  to  exhibit 
them  in  their  late  opportunities. 

Supply  Service 

There  is  no  special  corps  of  Bulgarian  supply 
officers.  Details  are  made  from  the  line  after  three 
years'  service  with  troops  followed  by  a  course  in  a 
special  school  in  Sofia.  With  every  division  there  is 
an  officer  of  the  Intendance  Department.  He  some- 
times has  some  junior  officer  assistants,  but  most  of 
the  work  is  done  by  civiUans.  What  system  there  is 
in  the  Turkish  army  I  do  not  clearly  understand, 


—112— 

except  that  the  principle  is  German  and  the  applica- 
tion is  Turkish.  But  one  can  be  morally  certain  that 
the  same  elements  of  favoritism  and  personal  relation 
determines  the  details  to  the  supply  service. 

Pay 

The  soldier's  pay  in  all  Eastern  armies  is  hardly 
munificent  enough  to  create  the  habits  of  a  spend- 
thrift; in  fact,  the  schedule  seems  to  be  carefully 
based  on  a  principle  which  sturdily  encourages  the 
virtue  of  frugality.  The  Bulgarian  soldier  is  paid 
$0.20  a  month,  and  the  Servian  soldier  receives  $0.30, 
while  the  rate  of  pay  for  the  Turkish  soldier  is  $0.90 
a  month.  One  might  think  that  the  Turk  is  overpaid 
as  a  warrior,  but  he  is  not.  His  munificent  stipend 
is  only  promised,  and  he  seldom  gets  it.  Sometimes 
his  fortune  fares  well,  as  it  did  while  the  army  was 
assembled  on  the  Chatalja  line,  for  then  he  received 
his  pay  regularly,  as  it  was  necessary  to  sweeten  his 
disposition  and  suppress  his  inclination  to  interest 
himself  in  politics.  When  I  left  Constantinople,  the 
civil  list  was  six  months  behind  in  its  payment. 

Clothing 

The  color  of  the  Bulgarian  soldier's  uniform  is 
hard  to  describe  as  it  is  something  of  a  mixture  of 
gray  and  red.  It  has  nothing  of  the  drab  or  olive 
shade,  but  might  be  called  a  brownish  gray;  a  solid 
color,  about  as  dark  in  its  density  as  olive  drab.  It 
looks  much  the  same  from  a  distance  and  aifords 
about  the  same  advantage  of  invisibility.  There  is  a 
collar  and  cuff  facing  indicating  the  various  arms  of 
the  service.  The  blouse  is  of  the  ordinary  military 
form,  with  dark  buttons  and  standing  collar.  The 
trousers  are  of  the  same  material  as  the  blouse,  baggy 
at  the  knees,  without  cut  to  conform  to  the  calf  of 
the  leg.     The  ofl^icers  wear  olive  drab  very  similar  to 


—113— 

our  own  service  uniform,  but  somewhat  lighter  and 
a  little  more  of  the  fawn  color,  with  a  very  conspicu- 
ous shoulder  strap.  Both  the  Turkish  officers  and 
soldiers  wear  the  English  service  olive  drab  made  by 
an  English  firm  in  Smyrna,  of  very  good  woolen 
cloth  of  domestic  manufacture. 

Head  Dress 

The  Bulgarian  officer  and  soldier  and  every  other 
official  in  Bulgaria  wears,  ever  and  always  without 
exception,  the  Russian  cap. 

The  Turkish  soldier  is  somewhat  hampered  by 
his  religious  tenets  in  the  selection  of  suitable  head- 
dress for  campaign,  as  the  Mohammedan  must  wear 
on  his  head  some  sort  of  a  device  that  has  no  rim  or 
visor  to  prevent  him  from  making  his  prayers  by 
touching  his  forehead  to  the  carpet.  As  a  Moslem 
wears  a  fez  in  civil  life,  and  wears  it  all  the  time, 
indoors  or  out,  asleep  or  awake,  when  he  becomes  a 
soldier  he  must  wear  a  head  gear  that  will  enable  him 
to  observe  these  conditions. 

Formerly  the  Turkish  army  wore  the  familiar 
red  fez  with  a  black  tassel,  but  when  the  army  was 
reformed  some  years  ago  and  put  into  olive  drab,  the 
red  fez  was  changed  to  the  same  color.  Later  an- 
other device  was  adopted,  which  gave  better  service 
in  campaign,  and  was  made  of  the  same  grayish  ma- 
terial as  the  overcoat.  This  device,  which  most  of 
the  Turkish  soldiers  wore  in  the  late  war,  was  based 
in  construction  on  the  principle  of  the  turban  which 
enabled  it  to  conform  to  religious  requirements.  It 
consisted  of  a  hood,  much  like  that  of  our  military 
overcoat  with  very  long  ear-laps  which  are  conven- 
tionally worn  wrapped  around  the  head,  but  which, 
for  purposes  of  protection,  were  lowered  and  wrapped 
around  the  neck. 


—114— 
Footwear 

The  most  interesting  and  important  element  of 
the  clothing  of  both  the  Bulgarian  and  the  Turkish 
armies,  was  the  footwear.  The  Bulgarian  peasant 
wore  a  combination  of  layers  of  felt  in  larger  or 
smaller  pieces,  wrapped  around  his  feet  and  legs, 
with  the  sole  of  the  foot  covered  with  a  rawhide  san- 
dal, which  combination  he  calls  an  "opanken.*'  This 
device  was  employed  almost  exclusively  by  the  foot 
troops  of  the  Bulgarian  army,  although  the  mounted 
troops  were  furnished  boots.  In  their  regular  mili- 
tary service  the  boot  is  part  of  the  uniform  of  all  the 
mounted  soldiers  but  there  seemed  to  be  a  scarcity 
of  supply  in  the  Second  War.  The  soldiers  who  came 
from  villages  displayed  their  urbanity  by  showing  a 
preference  for  boots  to  the  "opanken. "  The  peasants 
who  regularly  wore  this  footgear  were  very  well 
pleased  with  it  as  it  had  many  advantages.  The 
layers  of  wrapping  could  be  increased  to  suit  conditions 
of  winter  weather,  although  it  afforded  no  protection 
against  the  wet.  There  was  a  compensation  in  this 
disadvantage,  however,  because  if  the  soldier's  feet 
became  wet,  and  he  had  a  chance  to  seek  shelter,  he 
could  dry  them  at  once  by  inverting  the  cloth  and 
wrapping  around  his  foot  the  dry  portion,  that  had 
served  as  a  legging,  so  as  to  permit  the  portion  that 
had  become  wet  to  dry  by  evaporation  when  wrapped 
around  the  calf.  But  the  greatest  advantage  this 
footwear  had  served  was  the  preparation  of  the  Bul- 
garian for  military  service  by  saving  his  feet  from 
the  deforming  influence  of  modern  shoes.  As  a  class 
the  feet  of  the  Bulgarians  were  absolutely  normal. 

The  Turkish  army,  in  its  reformation,  had  adopted 
as  a  uniform  shoe,  a  low  brogan  of  the  type  of  for- 
mer issues  in  our  own  service  with  which  an  olive 
drab  woolen  puttee  leggin  was  worn.  This  imposed 
something  of  a  very  marked  departure  from  the  ordi- 


—115— 

nary  habits  of  the  Turkish  peasant,  whose  footgear 
conformed  to  Oriental  requirements.  The  Oriental's 
normal  state  is  an  indoor  one  in  which  he  wears  no 
shoes.  When  he  goes  out  of  doors  he  sHps  on  a  tem- 
porary foot  covering,  much  ^s  a  lady,  who  goes  out 
to  a  party  in  winter  time,  covers  her  slippers  with 
goloshes.  So,  when  the  Turk  has  to  adopt  a  footgear 
for  continuous  out-of-door  service,  he  is  a  bit  out  of 
his  element.  The  Turkish  soldier  simply  loves  slip- 
pers and  when  he  reverts  to  them  with  his  puttee 
leggings  it  makes  rather  a  weird  combination. 

Rations 

The  Bulgarian  ration  when  written  on  paper  is 
all  right  in  every  element  of  food  value.  You  may 
be  satisfied  to  know  that  it  consists  of  nine  well-bal- 
anced components,  with  sufficient  fuel  value  to  meet 
the  physiological  demands  of  able-bodied  soldiers  en- 
gaged in  a  hard  day's  work.  The  provision  for  mak- 
ing substitutions  can  be  so  arranged  that  it  compares 
favorably  with  the  ration  of  an  American  soldier. 
No  doubt,  in  time  of  peace,  this  ration  is  supplied,  or 
at  least  as  much  of  it  as  the  Bulgarian  soldier  wishes 
to  eat,  but  in  time  of  war  all  that  it  promises  to  the 
dietary  of  the  soldier  is  not  fulfilled.  But  with  all 
its  shortcomings  the  soldier  does  not  feel  that  he  has 
been  cheated  so  long  as  he  is  supplied  with  bread. 

In  civil  life  the  peasant's  principal  ration  com- 
ponent is  bread  of  a  very  good  quality,  and  very 
ample  quantity,  supplemented  by  a  meaty  element 
usually  in  a  form  of  cheese,  but  occasionally  in  the 
form  of  real  meat.  When  he  gets  meat  it  is  almost 
invariably  mutton.  When  the  peasant  is  enduring 
military  service  he  never  expects  a  bit  more  than  he 
gets  at  home,  and  is  satisfied  with  less.  The  hungry 
soldier  without  food,  when  he  makes  inquiry  about 
his  expected  ration,  only  uses  the  word  ''bread",  for 


—116— 

this  is  all  he  actually  demands,  although  whenever  a 
favorable  opportunity  offers  he  is  sometimes  bold 
enough  to  expect  cheese  or  meat.  The  meat  comes 
to  him  in  form  of  mutton  on  the  hoof,  and  he  always 
understands  the  difficulties  of  producing  this  article 
of  diet  when  it  is  not  forthcoming.  If  his  bread  is 
ample,  he  does  not  complain.  When  the  fortunes  of 
war  favor  him  and  he  has  something  like  his  full  ra- 
tion, and  a  reasonable  chance  to  expect  a  little  recrea- 
tion, he  does  not  seek  it  in  alcoholic  relaxation,  but 
searches  for  peppers  and  onions  with  which  to  satiate 
that  longing  for  stimulation  that  so  many  other  peo- 
ple find  in  alcohol. 

I  saw  hundreds  of  Bulgarian  soldiers  during  the 
time  of  demobilization,  when  they  were  free  to  roam 
about  the  town  and  seek  some  form  of  recreation 
contrasting  with  the  hardships  which  they  had  just 
escaped  on  the  actual  battle  line.  They  did  not 
celebrate  by  a  method  with  which  we  are  so  familiar, 
that  involves  the  saloon  as  a  necessary  element,  but 
they  were  seen  about  the  market  buying  peppers  and 
onions  and  garlic,  and  preparing  individual  messes 
brought  up  to  their  own  delectable  culinary  standard 
by  the  addition  of  these  savory  elements.  In  Kus- 
tendil  as  many  as  40,000  men  passed  through  that 
town  and  I  saw  only  one  drunken  Bulgarian  soldier. 
Perhaps  *' drunk*'  is  too  severe  a  term  to  apply  to 
him,  for  he  was  only  pleasantly  enough  intoxicated 
to  recognize  me,  as  I  was  about  to  pass  him  on  a 
narrow  path,  with  a  very  precise  military  salute, 
and  to  show  his  willingness  to  allow  me  the  right  of 
way  by  jumping  into  a  mud  puddle. 

The  ration  of  the  Turkish  soldier,  as  set  down 
on  paper,  is  copied  from  the  German  army,  with  a 
few  local  flourishes  added  which  promises  the  soldier 
some  of  the  particular  components  he  likes  the  most, 
but  which  the  Germans  do  not  care  about.      The 


—117— 

sanitary  inspector  of  the  army  at  Chatalja  told  me 
with  great  assurance  and  with  apparent  satisfaction 
that  the  ration  of  the  Turkish  army  had  a  greater 
calorific  Vfelue    than   that  of  any  other  European 
army.      In  practice,  however,  there  was  little  more 
ever  found  in  the  Turkish  soldier's  mess  than  bread 
and  mutton,  but  under  very  favorable  conditions  some 
vegetables  were  added  which  permitted  the  meat  to 
be  rendered  in  the  form  of  a  delectable  stew.      The 
Turkish  peasant's  principal  element  of  food  is  bread, 
although  he  consumes  a  great  deal  of  rice.     Perhaps 
a  form  of  rice  cooked  with  meat  and   condiments, 
which  is  called  *'pilaf/'  together  with  a  peculiarly 
curdled  milk  called  ''yourgert,''  is  the  customary  diet 
of  the  Turkish  peasant.     At  home,  both  the  Turkish 
and  Bulgarian  peasants  have  but  one  hot  or  cooked 
meal  each  day  and  that  is  served  about  noon.      The 
day  is  begun  with  a  cup  of  tea  or  coffee,  with  a 
permissible  addition  of  bread  and  cheese,  and  is 
ended  usually  with  bread  alone.      I  have  seen  this 
diet  prepared  regularly  in  a  Turkish  hospital  for  six 
months. 

Kitchens 

The  Bulgarian  army  was  equipped  with  a  limited 
number  of  portable  kitchens  of  the  Austrian  army 
type,  with  a  capacity  of  about  250  men  per  wagon. 
I  saw  only  one  of  these,  but  it  seemed  to  be  a  very 
satisfactory  device,  and  it  might  well  be  employed  in 
some  form  in  our  own  service. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  it  is  said  the  Turkish 
army  was  extravagantly  supplied  with  all  sorts  of 
appliances  that  any  agent  of  military  goods  in 
Europe  had  to  sell  them.  The  purchasing  officers 
had  been  very  much  attracted  by  the  liberal  com- 
missions the  European  dealers  were  able  to  offer, 
and  they  devoted   a  great  deal  of  energy  to  their 


—US- 
purchases.  The  army  had  all  the  mechanical  devices, 
in  some  quantity,  that  any  army  had  ever  used. 
Among  other  things  they  had  field  bakeries.  Mah- 
moud  Moukhtar  Pasha,  to  whose  campaign-in  Thrace 
I  have  referred,  accounts  for  two  field  bakeries  in 
his  train  at  the  beginning  of  the  campagin. 

The  Bulgarian  kitchens  in  the  field  were  very 
simple.  Each  company  was  supplied  with  three 
large  and  one  small  soup  kettles;  the  latter  were 
used  for  company,  platoon  and  squad  messing,  and 
the  larger  vessels  were  employed  when  a  company 
mess  was  conducted.  Two  of  the  two  larger  copper 
kettles  were  of  the  conventional  wash  boiler  type, 
and  they  were  used  on  pack  animals  to  carry  the 
mess,  which  was  always  prepared  in  the  form  of  a 
stew,  for  the  troops  when  they  were  in  an  advanced 
position  and  it  was  necessary  to  set  up  the  kitchen  in 
the  rear.  I  saw  one  Bulgarian  kitchen  down  in  the 
valley  where  water  and  wood  were  available,  which 
prepared  the  mess  for  a  regiment  that  was  in  posi- 
tion on  a  mountain  crest  about  a  mile  or  a  mile  and 
a  half  away,  and  from  there  the  stew  was  carried  up 
to  the  troops  once  a  day  on  pack  animals. 

The  Turkish  field  kitchens  which  I  saw  on  the 
Chatalja  line  would  hardly  be  identified  as  such  by 
one  whose  military  observations  had  been  confined 
to  an  experience  with  American  troops.  There  was 
frequently  no  shelter  more  than  a  small  tent  or 
shack  for  stores,  and  a  cauldron  or  two  placed  in  the 
ground  so  that  wood  could  be  burnt  under  them. 
At  mess  time  the  small  copper  pots  were  brought 
from  companies  for  the  food  to  be  issued  to  the 
squads.  The  Turkish  soldier  carried  a  wooden  spoon, 
the  handle  of  which  was  stuck  into  the  top  of  his 
puttee  legging,  so  that  it  was  always  under  his  eye 
and  ready  for  instant  service. 

I   saw  a    Bulgarian  field    bakery  at  Kustendil 


—119— 

which  illustrates  the  manner  in  which  the  Bulgarians 
handle  their  food  problem  in  the  field.      As  they 
have  no  equipment  of  this  kind  that  pretends  in  any 
way  to  be  portable,  the  bakery  was  set  up  out  of 
material  that  was  found  in  the  town  with  the  em- 
ployment of  the  skilled  laborers  of  the  locality  and 
but  little  assistance  from  the  supply  department  of 
the  army.     It  consisted  of  a  rough  shed  twenty  feet 
wide  and  150  feet  long,  along  one  side  of  which  was 
built  twelve  brick  ovens  about  ten  by  fifteen  feet. 
The  floor  of  the  ovens  was  laid  on  the  ground  and 
trenches  were   dug  in   front  of  the  ovens  for  the 
bakers  to  stand  in.      There  were  two  troughs  pro- 
vided for  each  oven,  and  racks  were  erected  at  the 
side  of  each  oven  to  hold  the  loaves  of  dough  until 
they  were  ready  to  be  baked.      One  qualified  baker 
was  assigned  to  each  oven  and  all  the  other  person- 
nel were  ordinary  details  from  the  troops.     There 
were  two  non-commissioned  officers  in  charge,  one  of 
whom,  in  this  particular  case,  was  a  gentleman  of 
some  educational  qualifications.     He  was  a  graduate 
of  the  University  of  Brussels,  and  had  intended  to 
return  for  a  course  in  political  economy.      It  was  he 
who  gave  me  the  data.      The  personnel  numbered 
168.     They  worked  in  night  and  day  shifts.     The 
proper  number  of  men  were  assigned  to  assist  the 
baker   at    each    oven,    the    baker    acting    only  as 
superintendent  in  the  preparation  of  the  dough,  all 
the   manual  work   being  done  by  the  baker^s  as- 
sistants; but  he  personally  attended  to  the  firing  of 
the  oven  and  the  actual  baking  of  the  bread.      The 
dough  was  carefully  weighed  to  make  a  loaf  of  one 
kilogram.     This  was  the  ration  for  one  day.      No 
pans  were  used.      The  bread  was  transferred  from 
the  troughs  to  the  ovens  on  boards,  and  then  placed 
on  the  brick  floor  of  the  oven  for  baking.     The  ovens 
were  fired  eight  times  in  twenty-four  hours.     At  the 


120— 


Zii" 


Ml 


M 


nn 
Z3» 


ID 


3" 


^ 


—121- 


time  of  my  visit  the  plant  was  running  at  more  than 
25,000  two-pound  loaves  per  day.  It  had  an  ordi- 
nary daily  capacity  of  35,000  loaves,  which  could 
have  been  increased  under  pressure.  It  took  three 
or  four  hours  from  dough  to  bread.  The  bakery 
was  constructed  in  five  days. 

The  Bulgarians  also  used  hardtack  in  about  the 
form  in  which  we  know  it,  which  they  called  military 
biscuit.  Six  of  these  were  tied  in  a  bundle  and  sealed 
with  a  red  seal,  providing  an  emergency  ration  which 
could  only  be  opened  by  the  soldier  on  special  and 
specific  orders.  Every  Bulgarian  town  has  a  village 
bakery  as  no  Bulgarian  family  bakes  its  own  bread. 
They  find  it  too  expensive,  as  the  fuel  economy  is 
greater  in  community  baking.  The  troops  in  march- 
ing depend  largely  on  the  baking  facilities  of  the  vil- 
lages when  they  do  not  construct  special  field  bakeries. 
I  saw  many  of  the  village  bakeries  making  hard 
bread.  It  seemed  to  be  an  art  that  most  of  the  Bul- 
garian bakers  were  skilled  at.  Many  of  the  bakeries 
in  the  villages  were  left  in  the  hands  of  women,  who 
seemed  able  to  conduct  them  with  great  energy  and 
efficiency  in  the  absence  of  their  husbands. 

Arms— The  Rifle 

The  rifle  of  the  Bulgarians  was  the  Mannlicher 
of  8  mm.  caliber.  The  Servian  rifle  was  a  Mauser  of 
7  mm.  caliber.  The  Greek  rifle  was  a  Mannlicher  of 
6.5  mm.  caliber.  These  small  arms  used  a  blunt  or 
ogival  projectile,  the  difference  in  caliber  being  suffi- 
cient to  be  distinguished  by  careful  comparison.  The 
Turkish  army  was  equipped  with  the  Mauser  of  7 
mm.  caliber.  The  projectile  was  different  from  the 
others  in  that  it  had  a  sharp  nose.  It  seemed  to  be 
the  consensus  of  opinion  that  the  sharp  nosed  bullet, 
under  certain  ballistic  conditions,  caused  the  more 
humane  wound  on   account  of  its  smaller  puncture 


—122— 

but,  as  its  center  of  gravity  in  much  nearer  the  base 
than  in  the  blunt  pointed  bullet,  it  had  a  disposition 
to  tumble  more  readily  under  certain  conditions, 
thereby  making  a  much  more  mutilating  wound. 

Bayonet 

The  Bulgarian  bayonet  was  of  the  short  type. 
The  experience  of  the  Bulgars  in  the  late  wars  has 
satisfactorily  confirmed  their  judgment  in  the  selec- 
tion of  a  short  rather  than  a  long  bayonet.  They  do 
not  believe  that  there  is  any  advantage  in  the  reach 
of  a  longer  arm,  and  they  are  convinced  that  the 
sturdiness  and  leverage  qualities  of  the  short  bayonet 
makes  it  superior.  The  Bulgarians  always  preferred 
to  fix  bayonets  before  going  into  action,  as  they 
feared  the  loss  of  time  and  the  insecurity  of  attach- 
ment, if  bayonets  were  fixed  after  firing  began. 

The  Turkish  bayonet  was  quite  long,  but  I  think 
it  must  have  been  of  some  advantage  to  the  morale 
of  the  Turkish  soldier,  in  that  it  made  him  feel  that 
he  had  that  much  advantage  over  the  Bulgarian.  I 
don't  know  what  the  Turkish  ordnance  experts  think 
of  this  equipment  after  their  late  experience. 

Ammunition 

The  Bulgarian  soldier  carried  150  rounds  of  am- 
munition in  leather  boxes  on  the  belt,  (two  in  front 
and  one  behind),  and  in  the  haversack.  There  were 
30  rounds  in  each  of  the  two  boxes  in  front,  40  rounds 
in  the  box  behind,  and  50  in  the  haversack.  There 
were  50  rounds  on  pack  animals,  and  100  in  the  divi- 
sion train,  making  300  rounds  per  man  in  all. 

The  Servian  soldier  carried  135  rounds  on  his 
person,  60  in  the  ammunition  wagon  and  100  in  the 
division  park;  295  in  all. 

The  Turkish  soldier  carried  150  rounds  on  his  per- 
son.    The  army  was  provided  with  a  great  number 


—123— 

of  battalion  ammunition  wagons  of  German  type,  of 
light  structure,  short  coupled,  with  a  body  in  the 
form  of  a  large  box,  with  compartments  to  hold  the 
ammunition  in  baskets.  They  were  to  be  drawn  by 
horses,  but  were  not  employed  on  account  of  the 
scarcity  of  these  animals.  In  Constantinople,  during 
the  war,  there  were  several  arsenals  and  depots,  in 
which  hundreds  of  these  wagons  could  be  seen  parked. 
Bullock  carts  were  used  in  the  field,  instead  of  this 
specially  designed  equipment. 

Equipment 


Pack 


I  do  not  know  what  the  Field  Service  Regulations 
prescribed  in  the  way  of  the  composition  of  the  sol- 
dier's pack  in  any  of  the  armies.  I  saw  a  lot  of 
Turkish,  a  lot  of  Bulgarian,  and  a  lot  of  Servian  sol- 
diers in  heavy  marching  order,  and  there  is  not  much 
difference  in  the  appearance  of  the  pack.  They  ap- 
peared to  prefer  the  blanket  roll,  and  they  were  all 
normally  supplied  with  blankets.  The  Turks  and 
Bulgarians  carried  a  haversack  much  like  that  of  our 
old  infantry  equipment,  and  the  Servian  soldiers  in 
addition  carried  knapsacks.  All  carried  the  canteen. 
The  Bulgarian  used  his  haversack  largely  for  his 
food,  and  small  articles,  and  carried  the  rest  of  his 
belongings  in  his  blanket  roll,  which  contained  the 
occasional  shelter  half.  The  regulation  weight  of  the 
Bulgarian  soldier's  pack  is  32  Kg.  (70  lbs,) 

Shelter  Tent 

The  Bulgarian  and  Turkish  shelter  tents  were  of 
rectangular  pieces  of  canvas,  making  about  the  same 
size  of  tent  as  our  old  pattern  without  the  triangular 


—124— 

flap  which  in  it  formed  the  rear  wall.  The  shape  of 
this  shelter  half  enabled  it  to  be  used  in  the  forma- 
tion of  large  tent  units  as  was  seen  in  every  Turkish 
camp.  The  Turks  lost  most  all  of  their  conical  tents 
in  their  campaign  with  the  Bulgarians,  but  there 
seemed  to  be  a  very  liberal  supply  of  shelter  tents, 
which  they  buttoned  together  to  make  into  tents  of 
larger  form.  The  shelter  tent  poles  of  the  Turkish 
equipment  was  particularly  good  because  they  were 
made  of  hard  wood,  with  sockets  and  ferrules  of 
turned  brass  on  either  end,  so  that  several  poles 
could  be  screwed  together  into  quite  a  length.  In 
this  way  a  tent  pole  could  be  made  which  would  sup- 
port a  large  area  of  canvas  formed  by  buttoning  to- 
gether a  number  of  shelter  half  pieces. 

Shelter  in  the  Field 

The  Bulgarian  soldier  in  camp  had  no  tentage 
except  the  shelter  half  he  carried  on  his  person.  The 
officers  had  individual  cubical  tents  with  pointed 
roof,  with  a  very  light  center  pole,  somewhat  longer 
than  the  four  side  poles.  In  the  campaign  in  Thrace 
the  Turkish  army  had  a  great  many  conical  tents  for 
camps,  but  the  Bulgarians  got  the  most  of  those  and 
they  used  them  very  readily  after  getting  possession. 
The  Bulgarians  suffered  many  hardships  on  the 
Chatalja  line  during  the  hard  winter  for  want  of 
heavy  tentage.  Many  suffered  from  frost-bite  and 
a  number  were  frozen;  many  might  have  perished  if 
they  had  not  been  fortunate  enough  to  get  so  much 
shelter  from  the  Turks.  Later,  in  the  2d  war,  after 
most  of  the  Turkish  heavy  tentage  was  expended  and 
many  of  the  soldiers  were  without  shelter  tents,  they 
built  huts  of  brush.  Even  some  of  the  field  hospitals 
made  up  their  shortage  of  tentage  by  the  construc- 
tion of  brush  huts. 


—126— 
Intrenching  Tools 

The  Bulgarians  were  well  supplied  with  equip- 
ment for  field  intrenching,  as  each  man  carried  a 
tool  of  some  class.  Every  three  men  carried  a  shovel, 
and  the  fourth  carried  a  short-handled  pick,  or  a 
hatchet.  After  the  fall  of  Adrianople,  when  a  great 
deal  of  Turkish  equipment  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
Bulgarians  and  Servians,  the  utility  of  the  shovel 
was  so  appreciated  that  each  soldier,  not  equipped 
with  one  of  these  handy  little  chest  and  head  pro- 
tectors, added  one  of  them  to  his  outfit  on  his  own 
initiative. 

I  was  told  repeatedly  by  Bulgarian  soldiers  that 
they  had  employed  their  shovels  as  head  shelters,  in 
advancing  under  artillery  fire,  first  at  their  own  in- 
stance, and  later,  by  instruction  of  their  officers. 
The  shovel  had  no  special  virtue  over  our  own,  ex- 
cept that  it  was  sharpened  on  one  edge,  and  this 
proved  very  valuable  in  making  personal  shelter,  as 
much  of  that  shelter  was  formed  out  of  brush.  The 
Servians  carried  a  man's-size  long-handled  pick, 
which  did  not  seem  to  be  as  much  in  the  way  as  one 
might  think. 

The  Turkish  intrenching  tools  were  about  the 
same,  but  I  am  not  sure  how  they  were  distributed 
among  the  men. 

Transport— With  Troops 

The  Bulgarians  on  a  peace  or  war  footing  had 
no  transportation  to  be  used,  either  in  field  or  supply 
trains,  as  a  part  of  the  equipment  of  the  army.  They 
depended  upon  carefully  prepared  plans  for  impro- 
vising their  trains,  by  the  employment  in  the  various 
districts  of  mobilization,  of  the  peasants'  wagons, 
most  of  which  were  bullock  carts.  The  civil  admin- 
istration  was  employed  to  assemble  this  transporta- 


—126— 

tion  where  it  was  called  for.  The  bullock  carts  were 
divided  into  columns,  and  two  non-commissioned  of- 
ficers and  a  few  armed  men,  as  guards,  were  assigned 
a  certain  number  of  carts,  and  the  train  was  complete. 
The  wagons  drawn  by  horses,  as  long  as  the  supply 
lasted,  went  to  the  field  trains.  The  peasant  owner 
accompanied  his  own  outfit,  and  this  plan  assured 
good  attention  to  the  stock. 

The  regulations  provided,  for  each  battalion,  four 
pack  animals  for  ammunition  and  one  pack  animal  to 
carry  cooking  utensils  and  the  baggage  of  the  officers. 
I  think  all  regiments  usually  succeeded  in  getting  a 
wagon  for  each  company.  Horse  drawn  wagons  were 
small,  as  were  the  animals,  and  they  could  not  possi- 
bly carry  more  than  a  thousand  pounds  under  favor- 
able conditions.  I  saw  a  number  of  battalions  en- 
train at  the  time  of  the  demobilization  and  each 
company  seemed  to  have  one  small  two-horse  wagon. 

The  Turks  had  attempted  to  provide  a  special 
field  and  supply  train,  and  had  in  service  a  great 
many  specially  constructed  wagons  of  an  uniform  type. 
They  were  all  of  such  size  that  they  could  be  drawn 
by  two  horses,  but  as  they  had  difficulty  in  finding 
the  horses,  they  practically  had  to  adopt  the  method 
of  the  Bulgarians. 

Motor  Transportation 

Automobiles  seemed  to  be  essential  to  the  head- 
quarters of  the  larger  commands,  which  were  liberally 
supplied  with  them.  General  Tochef,  commanding 
the  5th  Army,  had  his  headquarters  at  Kustendil, 
ten  miles  from  the  center  of  the  line,  which  he  could 
approach  over  a  splendid  macadamized  road.  In  an- 
other direction  the  headquarters  of  the  4th  Army  lay 
fifteen  or  twenty  miles  beyond  the  reach  of  a  good 
road  and  automobiles  could  not  be  used  for  personal 
transportation. 


—127— 
Motor  Trucks 

According  to  the  account  I  obtained  from  the 
agent  of  the  Benz  Automobile  Company  in  Constan- 
tinople, who  supplied  all  the  motor  transportation, 
the  Turkish  army  had  forty  motor  trucks  in  use  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war.  Fifteen  of  these  were  in 
Adrianople,  with  large  quantities  of  motor  supplies, 
and  the  Bulgars  took  them  all.  Three  sizes  of  trucks 
were  used;  two,  three,  and  five  ton.  The  oldest  had 
been  in  use  for  four  years  aad  was  still  doing  duty. 
They  were  used  only  about  Constantinople  and  on 
occasional  short  lines  of  communication  where  there 
were  good  roads.  The  Bulgars  had  a  few  motor 
trucks  besides  the  fifteen  they  had  captured  at  Adrian- 
ople. They  were  of  very  great  service  in  the  second 
war  because  of  the  number  of  good  macadamized 
roads  by  which  they  were  able  to  connect  their  lines 
on  the  southern  frontier,  with  the  railroad.  But  it 
was  not  possible  to  employ  them  in  any  way  except 
on  good  roads. 

Motor  trucks  were  used  to  some  extent  in  the 
transport  of  wounded  from  those  evacuation  hospitals 
that  were  connected  by  macadamized  roads  with  the 
railroad,  but  they  proved  to  be  somewhat  unsuited 
for  this  purpose,  which  is  quite  contrary  to  what  one 
might  naturally  imagine.  When  I  interviewed  a  num- 
ber of  patients  by  the  roadside  without  much  to  ac- 
count for  their  presence,  they  told  me  they  were  there 
because  the  driver  of  an  automobile  truck  had  an- 
swered their  prayers  to  be  placed  out  on  the  road 
rather  than  to  be  subjected  to  the  pain  of  further 
jolting.  They  had  concluded  they  would  fare  better 
by  taking  their  chances  of  being  picked  up  by  the 
bullock  carts  than  continuing  with  the  more  rapid 
transportation  that  the  motor  truck  afforded.  With 
all   their  humility,   the  bullock  carts  still  have  their 


—128— 

advantages.  The  difficulties  they  overcame  in  the 
Bulgarian  advance  from  Kirk  Kilisse  might  not  have 
been  accomplished  by  more  modern  forms  of  trans- 
portation. It  is  very  likely  that  the  bullock  carts  in 
the  present  state  of  development  of  Bulgarian  mili- 
tary resources  are  quite  superior  to  any  other  form  of 
transportation  for  her  army. 


Fifth     Lecture 


Some  Sanitary  Observations 

T  ARRIVED  in  Constantinople  November  3, 1912,  or 
^  three  days  after  the  formation  of  the  Chatalja 
lines  following  the  defeat  of  the  Turkish  army  in  the 
field.  About  two  weeks  later  the  Bulgarian  assault 
on  the  Chatalja  line,  which  occupied  three  days,  was 
made  and  failed.  By  this  successful  defense  Con- 
stantinople was  saved.  The  wounded  from  the  field 
campaign  were  still  coming  to  Constantinople  at  the 
time  of  my  arrival,  and  an  epidemic  of  cholera,  which 
had  begun  its  rage  in  the  Turkish  troops  of  the 
Chatalja  lines,  was  acknowledged  about  this  time  in 
Constantinople.  The  victims  of  the  disease  were 
arriving  in  the  outskirts  of  Constantinople  at  San 
Stephano  at  the  rate  of  several  hundred  a  day  from 
the  railhead  of  the  defenses  at  Heydemkui.  While 
the  cholera  camp  that  was  established  at  San  Stephano 
had  become  known  to  the  world  as  a  great  pest-hole, 
and  while  thousands  of  sick  were  at  first  without 
shelter  and  were  never  well  housed,  two  things  must 
be  said  in  extenuation  of  the  harsh  criticisms  of  the 
Turkish  administration.  First,  the  Ottoman  Empire 
was  in  great  peril  and  all  the  resources  of  trans- 
portation and  supply  were  desperately  needed  and 
duly  impressed  in  the  service  of  strengthening  the 
defenses  of  the  capital;  and,  second,  such  expedients 
as  were  employed,  though  harsh  and  abrupt,  were 

129 


—ISO- 
efficient  in  saving  Constantinople  from  a  cholera 
invasion.  All  trains  carrying  soldiers  from  the  front, 
whether  sick  from  any  cause,  or  stragglers  or  de- 
serters, were  impounded  together  without  shelter 
and  treated  alike.  The  sick  were  not  separated  from 
the  well  and  all  were  sheltered  as  facilities  became 
available.  Later,  many  cases  were  taken  to  the 
mosques  in  Constantinople  where  a  careful  and 
efficient  guard  system  kept  all  the  soldiers  separate 
from  the  civilian  population  and  saved  the  latter 
from  infection. 

From  my  own  experience,  in  charge  of  a  cholera 
camp  at  San  Stephano,  there  were  about  600  soldiers 
under  guard  in  a  compound  where  all  were  sheltered 
in  permanent  buildings,  sheds  or  tents  and  probably 
200  were  not  infected.  Of  the  remaining  400,  all  were 
undoubtedly  cholera  cases.  Though  200  of  them 
died,  the  death  rate  diminished  from  fifty  per  day  to 
one  per  day  in  the  first  ten  days  of  my  service. 
This  diminunition  in  the  death  rate  was  in  direct  ratio 
to  the  progress  of  rough  but  substantial  sanitary 
measures.  At  this  time  I  will  not  presume  to  esti- 
mate accurately  the  number  of  cases  of  cholera  in 
the  Turkish  army,  and  I  am  sure  there  can  never  be 
any  reliable  statistical  data  prepared,  but  there  must 
have  been  more  than  10,000  deaths.  The  mortality 
was  about  50  per  cent  in  my  cases,  but  I  believe  that 
the  rate  is  relative  to  the  conditions  under  which  the 
cases  are  treated.  I  believe  that,  with  the  same 
virulence  of  the  infecting  organism,  the  same  re- 
sistance of  the  patients,  and  the  same  conditions  of 
shelter,  sanitation  and  treatment  as  are  generally 
available  in  the  treatment  of  typhoid  fever,  for 
instance,  the  mortality  of  cholera  might  be  no 
greater  than  that  of  typhoid  fever.  In  other  words, 
if  cholera  were  treated'with  the  same  care  and  under 
the  same  conditions  as  typhoid  fever  is  treated  to 


—131— 

establish  its  best  mortality  statistics,  the  mortality 
in  cholera — in  some  epidemics,  at  least  — would  not 
be  greater  than  that  in  typhoid  fever. 

My  service  in  Constantinople,  in  an  improvised 
military  hospital,  covered  a  period  of  six  months, 
with  an  admission  of  500  surgical  cases.  I  was  act- 
ing there  in  the  capacity  of  chief  surgeon  of  the 
local  chapter  of  the  American  Red  Cross  Society, 
which  financed  our  establishment  and  we  assumed 
complete  charge  of  120  beds  which  we  found  occupied 
by  wounded.  This  provisional  hospital,  known  as  Tash 
Kishla,  the  last  military  hospital  to  be  established, 
was  filled  with  the  sick  and  wounded  last  to  arrive  in 
Constantinople  from  the  defeated  army. 

During  the  activities  on  the  Chatalja  line  we 
received  some  new  patients,  and  later,  after  hos- 
tilities were  resumed,  following  the  armistice  on 
February  3,  1913,  received  some  more  patients. 
After  that  time  all  our  patients  were  received  by 
transfer  from  other  and  better  hospitals  where  more 
active  services  were  maintained.  In  fact  Tash 
Kishla  became  the  dumping  ground  or  clearing  house 
of  the  military  hospital  system  of  Constantinople,  so 
that  the  cases  we  received  in  the  last  months  were 
the  class  of  old  infections  or  convalescents  which 
had  lost  their  surgical  interest  and  were  transferred 
to  us  from  other  hospitals  to  make  room  for  their 
more  interesting  cases.  It  may  be  observed,  in  this 
connection  that  the  Turkish  medical  service  in 
Constantinople  was  conducted  with  the  same  enter- 
prise and  surgical  zeal  that  sometimes  characterizes 
hospital  administration  in  more  enlightened  countries. 

It  is  naturally  incumbent  upon  a  surgeon  with 
any  pretention  to  professional  efficiency  or  scientific 
accomplishment,  when  he  has  completed  a  service  of 
any  kind,  to  prepare  a  report  in  which  statistics  are 
compiled  with  an  exactness  and  precision  that  ex- 


—182— 

tends  into  several  decimal  points,  from  which  he 
may  draw  conclusions  for  the  instruction  of  his 
colleagues.  In  the  surgery  of  civil  life  such  pro- 
cesses can  only  be  commended,  for  they  may  be  of  some 
professional  value  and  can  hardly  be  fraught  with 
any  danger.  The  same  may  be  said  of  the  surgery 
of  war,  except  that  the  conclusions  drawn  from  an 
individual  service,  however  active,  may  represent  an 
experience  confined  to  some  local  phase  of  military 
activity  or  administration  to  which  the  cause,  char- 
acter and  frequency  of  wounds  is  peculiar. 

I  have  seen  reports  of  two  eminent  and  distin- 
guished surgeons,  with  the  character  of  whose  re- 
spective services  I  am  personally  familiar.  These 
reports  carry  an  accurate  and  interesting  account  of 
their  special  work  which  no  doubt  will  be  of  exceed- 
ingly great  professional  value  and  will  find  permanent 
place  in  medical  annals.  But  I  believe  that  their 
personal  experience  or  that  of  any  other  operating 
surgeon,  in  the  course  of  any  war,  is  not  sufficient  to 
enable  them  to  draw  conclusions  that  will  establish 
reliable  statistics  on  the  wounds  of  war  because  such 
can  only  be  prepared  from  the  reports  of  all  phases 
and  conditions  of  the  military  activity  of  all  the  cam- 
paigns of  the  war.  The  character  and  cause  of  the 
wounds,  admitted  to  military  hospitals  must  always 
be  carefully  considered  in  relation  to  the  particular 
form  of  military  activity  from  which  they  have  re- 
sulted. In  different  actions  there  must  be  a  variable 
preponderance  of  wounds  from  the  different  arms 
by  which  the  wounds  were  inflicted  and  the  course  of 
these  wounds,  thus  received,  must  be  determined 
largely  by  the  nature  of  the  campaign  and  by  its  suc- 
cesses or  reverses,  which  determine  the  condition  of 
neglect  to  which  wounds  are  subjected  either  at  in- 
cidence or  in  subsequent  course. 

With  this  preface  and  caution  I  will  presume  to 


—133— 

give  a  brief  numerical  statement  of  my  own  exper- 
ience at  Tash  Kishla  hospital  In  317  gun  shot  wounds 
there  were  32%  shrapnel  and  68%  rifle  wounds.  In 
another  group  of  68  cases  in  the  same  hospital,  that 
came  under  my  observation,  but  without  my  admin- 
istration, there  were  37%  shrapnel  wounds  and  63% 
rifle  wounds.  These  ratios,  however,  apply  only  to 
these  particular  groups  of  cases,  which,  from  the 
circumstances  of  their  collection  at  this  particular 
place,  will  give  a  greater  proportion  of  shrapnel 
wounds  than  occurred  in  the  particular  battle  in 
which  they  were  received,  because  many  of  them 
came  to  us  for  the  reason  that  they  were  old  infected 
cases  and  infection  undoubtedly  occurs  with  a  great 
deal  more  frequency  in  shrapnel  than  in  rifle  wounds. 
In  Constantinople  there  is  a  Turkish  military 
hospital  in  Stamboul,  known  as  Giilhani,  which  is 
under  the  direction  of  the  German  Professor  Weiting 
Pasha,  who  has  held  his  position  as  medical  instruc- 
tor in  the  Turkish  army  for  12  years.  This  hospital 
enjoyed  the  advantage  of  location  at  the  terminus  of 
the  line  of  railways  which  led  into  Constantinople,  so 
that  hospital  trains  could  be  stopped  nearby  to  permit 
patients  to  be  carried  by  litter  directly  into  the  hos- 
pital. The  advantage  of  this  location  brought  to  this 
service,  at  all  the  stages  of  the  war,  the  more  seriously 
wounded  cases,  which  were  retained  until  convales- 
cence was  established;  when  they  were  transferred 
to  make  room  for  other  serious  cases.  The  service 
here  was  undoubtedly  the  most  active  in  the  city, 
with  always  a  greater  proportion  of  seriously  wounded 
cases  in  the  wards.  The  lighter  cases  were  only  ad- 
mitted when  the  supply  of  serious  cases  had  fallen 
below  the  capacity  of  the  hospital.  So  it  may  be  said 
that  while  the  statistical  reports  of  even  this  hospital 
will  be  of  undoubted  surgical  value,  they  will  not  show 
the  relative  proportion  of  the  wounds  of  war  in  re- 


—134— 

spect  to  their  gravity  course  and  relative  frequency 
of  their  causation. 

I  have  here  a  table  showing  such  statistics  from 
almost  1000  cases  as  Professor  Wei  ting  Pasha  had 
prepared  at  Giilhani  Hospital  at  the  time  of  my  de- 
parture from  Constantinople,  but  he  warned  me  that 
his  statistics  would  not  show  the  frequency,  charac- 
ter, and  result  of  wounds  as  they  occurred  through- 
out the  war. 

Wounds  of  the  Extremities 

(Exclusive  of  head,  thorax  and  abdomen)  ^^^r,ri 


Rifie 

Shrapnel                    Total 

Flesh  Wounds 

317 

129                                  446 

Penetrating 

8% 

23% 

Perforating 

92% 

77% 

Aseptic  . 

82% 

72% 

Infected 

18% 

28% 

Deaths 

4 

2      equals  1.3% 

Rifle 

Shrapnel 

Joint  Wounds 

146 

55                                  102 

Aseptic 

75% 

69% 

Infected 

25% 

31% 

Deaths 

7 

5     equals  6% 

Rifle 

Shrapnel 

Bone  Wounds 

254 

95                                   349 

Aseptic 

68% 

29% 

Rifle 

Shrapnel 

Infected 

32% 

71% 

Deaths 

16 

11    equals  8%             349 

TOTAL 

117=71% 

279=29%                       996 

\  Aseptic 

.---    76%     

--  58% 

"i  Infected. 

-.--    24%     

-_.   42% 

Total  deaths: 

45  or  4.5%  caused  by  sepsis,  gas  bacillus 

infection  and  tetanus. 

Typhus  was  epidemic  among  the  Turkish  troops 
at  all  times.     I  visited  a  hospital  on  the  Chatalja  Line 


— i35— 

where  the  cases  were  segregated,  as  many  of  them 
came  from  a  certain  portion  of  the  line  which  this 
hospital  served.  An  interesting  story  with  some  re- 
lation to  the  means  of  transmission  of  typhus  was 
told  me  there.  A  medical  officer  from  this  hospital 
went  to  Constantinople  and,  in  the  house  of  a  friend, 
discarded  his  underclothing  in  theprocess  of  personal 
renovation.  These  garments  were  appropriated  and 
utilized  by  his  undiscriminating  friend  who  died,  af- 
ter several  days  from  typhus,  without  other  cases 
occurring  in  the  neighborhood. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Second  War  I  went  to 
Bulgaria  for  another  season  of  professional  activity. 
Time  will  not  permit  more  than  a  reference  to  my 
field  service  there  in  the  Evacuation  Hospital  of  700 
beds  capacity  on  the  Macedonian  frontier.  All  our 
cases  came  to  us  after  a  four  day  journey  in  bull  carts. 
In  my  first  day's  service  my  division,  conducted  by 
an  English-speaking  Bulgarian  reserve  medical  of- 
ficer and  myself,  which  admitted  half  of  the  cases, 
received  nearly  500  wounded  which  were  treated  in 
some  sort  of  a  way  before  they  were  passed  into  the 
wards.  In  four  weeks  my  division  admitted  2,000 
patients,  all  wounded,  which  was  about  one  half  of 
the  total  number  admitted  in  that  time.  I  was  sur- 
prised to  note  the  comparatively  few  major  opera- 
tions that  were  indicated  in  this  number  of  4,000  cases. 
There  were  not  more  than  20  cases  taken  to  the  op- 
erating room  for  anesthaesia  and  formal  preparation. 
I  am  inclined  to  believe  that  something  like  this  pro- 
portion of  niajor  operations  will  hold  in  a  group  of 
cases  which  include  all  of  the  casualties  occurring  in 
one  military  zone.  Formal  surgical  interference 
should  be  delayed  until  a  base  hospital  is  reached, 
where  the  best  skill  and  facilities  are  available  and 
where  the  convalescence  of  the  patient  can  be  estab- 
lished or  the  autopsy  performed.    The  cases  admitted 


—136— 

to  hospitals  in  advanced  positions  deserve  the  max- 
imum of  surgical  judgment  with  the  minimum  of 
surgical  activity. 

Abdominal  cases  were  of  two  classes— with  and 
without  peritonitis.  The  first  class  uniformly  suc- 
cumbed to  operation  and  the  second  needed  no  inter- 
ference. I  am  confident  that  the  military  rule  of 
non-interference  in  abdominal  cases  in  the  field  is 
correct  and  should  be  applied.  Cranial  wounds  did 
not  do  well  after  operation,  and  I  believe  better  re- 
sults would  have  followed  if  the  most  of  them  had 
been  sent  back  to  the  base  without  {formal  operation 
in  the  field. 

In  our  cases  there  seemed  to  be  an  unusual  pro- 
portion of  compound  fractures  of  the  thigh  compared 
with  the  humerus.  These  cases  all  deserve  the  most 
conservative  treatment  and  immediate  transporta- 
tion to  the  rear.  Plaster  dressings  were  used  with- 
out rhyme  or  reason.  I  believe  that  any  medical 
service  in  the  field  will  not  suffer  if  plaster  of  paris 
be  not  supplied. 

The  first  aid  dressing  and  its  indication  you  know 
about.  Its  employment  in  the  field  justified  its  rep- 
utation for  keeping  clean  a  great  many  wounds  to 
which  it  was  applied. 

The  therapeutic  agents  most  indicated  and  em- 
ployed were  iodine,  benzine,  alcohol,  balsam  of  peru 
and  a  nascient  oxygen  preparation,  Merck's  'Terhy- 
dror'  which  has  three  times  the  strength  of  the  of- 
ficial hydrogen  peroxide  and  is  therefore  three  times 
as  efficient  in  the  same  bulk.  Iodine  has  its  uses  and 
is  the  most  valuable  of  all  antiseptics  in  military  sur- 
gery, but  its  recent  rise  to  fame  had  so  impressed 
the  Bulgarian  surgeons  that  their  gunshot  wounds 
often  had  a  hard  run  for  the  terminal  stages  of  con- 
valescence against  the  persistent  and  heroic  iodine 
treatment. 


—137— 
Sanitation — Personal 

There  is  little  to  be  said  about  the  personal 
hygiene  of  the  Bulgarian  soldier  because  he  went 
along  with  the  army  just  about  as  he  had  done  in 
civil  life,  and  the  conditions  under  which  his  military 
service  was  spent  were  hard  and  exacting.  He  had 
little  else  to  think  about  other  than  the  mere  problem 
of  his  existence  which  he  solved  in  his  primitive  way. 
For  the  Turk,  something  more  may  be  said  because 
his  religious  forms  prescribe  a  bath  on  Thursday,  as 
he  goes  to  the  Mosque  on  Friday  for  his  special 
weekly  devotion,  and  at  any  other  time  that  he  says 
his  prayers  with  proper  formality  he  must  wash  his 
feet.  As  a  good  many  prayers  are  said  between  the 
days  of  formal  worship,  thefe  is  a  constant  alertness 
on  the  part  of  the  Turk  to  perform  this  libation.  The 
Moslem's  religiously  prescribed  method  of  attending 
to  the  other  necessary  demands  of  nature  contributes 
directly  to  his  personal  sanitation. 

Camps 

I  saw  all  the  camps  of  the  army  at  Chatalja 
during  the  second  armistice  and,  at  that  time,  a  sur- 
prisingly great  number  of  sanitary  principles  were 
observed.  Sinks  were  all  properly  removed  from 
the  tents  and  a  guard  was  placed  over  them,  to  en- 
force the  sanitary  orders.  The  penalty  for  any  dere- 
liction was  flogging,  and  I  was  told  that  it  was  not 
often  necessary  to  administer  this  punishment.  The 
water  supply  of  these  camps,  which  was  very  widely 
distributed,  was  all  posted  so  as  to  indicate  the  quality 
of  the  water:  w^hether  potable,  suitable  for  animals 
or  washing  clothes,  or  use  prohibited.  At  the  base 
hospital  at  the  center  of  the  line,  there  was  a  labora- 
tory where  water  was  examined.  One  sanitary  com- 
pany had  its  drinking  water  kept  in  the  keg  in  which 


—138— 

it  had  been  transported  from  its  source  by  pack 
animals  and  from  which  the  water  was  drawn  off  by 
a  spigot.  I  saw  a  picket  line  that  was  clean  enough 
for  a  sanitary  inspector  in  our  own  army  at  a  maneu- 
ver camp.  The  manure  sometimes  did  not  reach  the 
ground  before  it  was  carried  off  by  an  orderly  to  the 
nearby  incinerator  where  fire  was  said  to  be  constantly 
burning.  Everything  was  scrupulously  clean,  as 
there  was  absolutely  no  conscience  on  the  part  of  the 
officers  in  keeping  their  men  at  work  policing  camp 
when  there  was  no  other  duty  to  perform. 

Medical  Service  with  Organizations 

The  Bulgarian  medical  service  with  organizations 
was  generally  deficient,  both  in  personnel  and  equip- 
ment. There  was  a  regimental  medical  service, 
which  gave  a  medical  officer  to  each  of  the  four  bat- 
talions in  a  regiment,  but  in  one  regiment,  I  know, 
the  medical  service  was  in  the  hands  of  a  dentist  and 
two  medical  students.  Bulgaria  accepted  her  sani- 
tary organization  rather  heroically  as  it  was  not  pos- 
sible to  bring  it  up  to  the  more  elaborate  standard  of 
modern  armies,  because  there  was  not  sufficient  medi- 
cal personnel  in  the  country  to  permit  it.  There  are 
only  650  doctors  in  Bulgaria.  Two  hundred  of  these 
are  in  the  regular  military  establishment,  but  all  of 
the  others  are  taken  from  civil  life,  conscripts  to 
military  service,  during  the  war.  There  is  a  system 
of  subordinate  medical  service  in  Bulgaria  which  is 
something  like  that  of  the  '*practicante''  of  the  Span- 
ish countries.  These  partly  qualified  medical  attend- 
ants were  called  'Teldchers*'  in  their  civil  practice, 
and  all  of  them  capable  of  performing  military  duty 
were  absorbed  in  some  capacity  by  the  army. 

I  saw  one  regimental  hospital  that  seemed  quite 
well  enough  equipped,  in  personnel  and  material,  to 
do  fairly  good  work.     It  was  one  mile  behind  the  line 


—139— 

of  the  regiment  to  which  it  belonged,  and  down  in 
the  valley  at  the  foot  of  the  hill  on  which  the  regi- 
ment was  placed.  It  was  close  enough  to  have  some 
of  i  ts  transportation  destroyed  by  shells .  A  telephone 
line  connected  it  with  the  regimental  headquarters 
on  the  hill  and  an  operator  was  kept  constantly  at 
the  telephone. 

Turkish  field  service  organization  was  superb  on 
paper  as  it  is  copied  from  the  German  army  in  almost 
its  entirety.  In  its  application  was  its  shortcomings. 
It  was  able  to  do  practically  nothing  in  the  first  war 
in  the  campaign  in  Thrace,  because  in  this  disorgan- 
ized army  medical  officers  lost  their  equipment,  and 
the  Turkish  medical  officer  has  very  little  resource 
when  he  is  taken  away  from  his  formal  relation  with 
his  duties. 

Field  Medical  Service 

The  Bulgarian  field  medical  service  was  entirely 
insufficient.  There  were  only  nine  organizations  that 
were  called  field  hospitals  and  two  large  evacuation 
hospitals  in  their  army  organization.  When  the  war 
began,  however,  hospitals  were  organized  in  some  of 
the  larger  towns  and  went  into  service  as  military 
hospitals.  On  the  whole,  the  medical  department 
did  well  with  what  resources  they  had  at  hand. 

The  Turkish  field  medical  service  was  well  or- 
ganized on  paper.  They  had  an  abundance  of  ma- 
terial, but  the  great  disorder  attending  the  retreat 
of  their  army  prevented  its  employment  and  resulted 
in  its  loss.  I  have  this  information  from  the  sanitary 
inspector  general  of  the  Turkish  army. 

Evacuation  of  Battlefields 

My  late  observations  in  the  evacuation  of  battle- 
fields has  not  extended  from  the  firing  line  to  the 
base  hospitals.      I  have  only  seen  the  results  of  the 


—140— 

work  performed  at  the  first  aid  stations,  regimental 
and  field  hospitals.  Cases  first  came  under  my 
notice  in  an  evacuation  hospital,  twenty  miles  in  a 
direct  line,  but  forty  miles  by  road  behind  the 
battlefield,  from  which  four  days  were  required  for 
their  transportation  to  this  hospital.  I  know  some- 
thing of  the  manner  in  which  the  first  stage  of  this 
work  was  performed  by  the  direct  testimony  of  those 
who  did  it,  and  from  the  inspection  of  regimental 
and  field  hospitals  during  an  armistice.  The  diffi- 
culties under  which  all  this  work  was  carried  on  in  a 
rough  country,  with  part  of  it  without  roads,  was 
very  great.  The  amount  of  equipment  at  hand  in 
some  instances  was  very  meager,  although  in  other 
locations  it  was  quite  ample.  In  one  army,  where 
the  war  was  one  of  position,  and  where  material 
could  be  gathered  in  abundance,  on  account  of  a 
railroad  terminal  within  a  few  miles  of  the  center  of 
the  position,  the  work  was  carried  on  without  much 
defect  and  in  some  instances  in  a  very  satisfactory 
way.  In  another  army,  which  was  moving  con- 
stantly in  the  field,  hospital  bases  were  only  reached 
over  improvised  roads,  and  the  work  of  caring  for  the 
wounded  was  attended  by  incomparably  greater  diffi- 
culties. In  the  latter  case  the  regimental  hospitals 
consisted  of  little  more  equipment  than  could  be 
carried  on  a  sanitary  personnel  and  there  was  abso- 
lutely no  shelter  except  what  could  be  constructed 
from  brush. 

Every  Bulgarian  battalion  was  supplied  a  light 
two-horse  wagon,  with  a  very  small  bed,  which 
would  haul  one  recumbent  patient.  This  vehicle 
was  given  up  to  the  sanitary  service,  to  be  employed 
as  roads  would  permit.  The  field  hospitals  were 
some  distances  from  the  rear,  but  their  position  was 
determined  by  the  topography  of  the  country  which 
often  gave  no  alternative  in   location.     The  trans- 


—141— 

portation  facilities  for  the  wounded,  while  they 
consisted  solely  of  bullock  wagons,  were  not  as  bad 
as  one  might  think,  because,  in  their  plodding  pace, 
these  lumbering  vehicles  on  rough,  impassable  roads 
were  much  better  than  any  other  form  of  transpor- 
tation. Their  structure  is  somewhat  flexible  and 
whenever  the  animals  feel  the  resistance  of  an 
obstruction  their  pull  becomes  more  steady  and 
causes  smoother  riding,  no  doubt,  than  traction  of 
any  other  kind. 

In  any  army  in  the  field,  it  should  be  understood 
that  the  wounded  man  can  never  be  cared  for  as  he 
would  be  in  the  hands  of  friends  or  under  conditions 
that  are  provided  by  the  public  in  civil  life.  Only  a 
small  portion  of  military  resources  can  be  diverted 
to  the  care  of  casualties  from  the  real  function  of  pro- 
ducing military  strength.  Casualties  are  bound  to 
occur,  at  times  in  greater  number  than  can  be  cared 
for  with  the  best  sanitary  equipment  an  army  can 
afford.  The  wounded  soldier  under  the  very  best  con- 
ditions is  a  ''poor  devil  out  of  luck,''  and  all  of  those 
responsible  for  his  care  should  understand  the  princi- 
ples upon  which  the  evacuation  of  battlefields  are 
based  and  they  must  be  able  to  reconcile  themselves 
to  the  many  unhappy  conditions  that  are  bound  to 
result.  The  effort  of  a  sanitary  department  at  the 
front  is  directed  primarily  to  a  protective  dressing 
and  the  removal  of  the  casualties  and  not  to  their 
further  treatment.  Only  the  rough  measures  that 
can  be  employed  to  protect  the  wounded  from  further 
accident  are  possible,  and  all  of  the  military  personnel, 
both  in  the  combatant  department  and  in  the  sanitary 
corps,  should  have  this  understanding,  so  that  they 
may  all  play  their  proper  and  appropriate  parts. 

Battlefield  Casualties 

The  wounds  of  the  battlefield  which  do  not  in 


—142— 

their  incidence  invade  vital  spots  or  destroy  enough 
tissue  to  cause  death,  sooner  or  later,  while  they  may 
be  classed  primarily  as  slight  or  severe,  depend 
almost  entirely  in  their  course  and  cure  upon  their 
sterility  or  infection.  The  gravity  of  the  infection 
(without  considering  the  resistance  of  the  individual 
patient)  depends  upon  the  character  or  virulence  of 
the  germ  which  causes  the  infection  by  its  growth 
in  the  wound.  Some  germs,  known  as  the  ordinary 
germs  of  suppuration,  which  may  cause  large  quanti- 
ties of  pus,  do  not,  by  their  growth  in  the  tissues, 
produce  by-products  or  excreta,  which  are  particularly 
poisonous  when  absorbed.  Other  germs,  however, 
when  they  once  begin  their  growth  in  a  wound, 
produce  a  poison  that  is  so  virulent,  or  so  readily 
absorbed,  that  the  wound  at  once  becomes  grave  or 
fatal. 

There  are  two  common  classes  of  virulent  in- 
fection of  battlefield  wounds.  The  first  is  caused  by 
the  group  of  germs,  producing  by  their  growth  a 
gas  which  is  indicated  by  the  gross  appearances  of 
swelling,  blisters  and  a  crackling  sound  on  pressure 
over  an  area  near  or  surrounding  the  injury. 
Wounds  in  which  such  germs  grow  are  tritely 
spoken  of  by  surgeons  as  "gas-bacillus  infections.'' 
The  secondiis  caused  by  the  tetanus  bacillus,  or  the 
germ  of  lock-jaw.  In  wounds  of  the  battlefield  these 
two  kinds  of  infection  are  always  liable  to  occur,  and 
when  they  do,  the  mortality  hovers  around  100  per 
cent.  These  infections  occurred  in  my  experiences 
in  the  Balkans  with  about  that  mortality,  but  with 
much  less  frequency  than  they  are  being  reported 
now  from  the  European  battlefields.  This  is  to  be 
expected,  however,  as  the  fields  being  fought  over 
in  Europe  are  germ-ladened  by  a  population  denser 
than  that  of  the  Balkans. 

These  germs  abound  in  some  localities,  and  under 


—143— 

military  conditions  which  prevent  the  best  sanitary 
service  and  they  are  liable  to  be  transmitted  from  one 
wound  to  another.  So,  it  follows  that  in  all  cases 
the  prevention  of  infection  is  the  primary  object  of 
a  sanitary  service  in  the  treatment  of  battlefield 
wounds. 

Rifle  Wounds 

Rifle  wounds  are  the  most  frequent  of  the  battle- 
field and  as  the  modern  small  calibre,  high  velocity, 
rifle  projectile  generally  destroys  little  tissue,  if  a 
vital  spot  is  not  invaded  a  cure  may  generally  be  ex- 
pected if  the  wound  be  not  infected.  This  was  my 
observation  in  Constantinople  and  Bulgaria.  It  was 
particularly  so  in  the  wounds  of  the  Turkish  army, 
because  the  only  patients  we  had  in  our  hospital  were 
those  who  made  their  way  to  the  rear  unaided,  ex- 
cept by  their  own  efforts  or  by  comrades,  and  their 
wounds  were,  necessarily  not  very  grave  in  their  in- 
cidence. 

Shrapnel  Wounds 

Shrapnel  wounds  have  been  the  subject  of  more 
general  and  even  professional  interest  than  other 
battlefield  casualties  in  recent  years.  There  are  only 
three  characteristics  of  shrapnel  wounds  which  give 
them  a  separate  class:  first,  multiplicity;  second, 
slight  penetration ;  and  third,  greater  laceration  than 
in  rifle  wounds,  which  makes  greater  susceptibility 
to  infection.  The  shrapnel  ball  does  not  so  often 
penetrate  vital  structures  and  under  conditions  favor- 
able for  treatment,  is  not  so  fatal  as  a  rifle  ball. 

There  has  been  much  recent  and  wild  speculation 
on  the  relative  frequency  of  rifle  and  shrapnel  wounds, 
sometimes  by  civil  surgeons,  who  may  have  seen 
considerable  service  in  the  treatment  of  wounds 
of  war.  But  in  the  great  majority  of  instances 
their  group  of  cases  was   selected   by  the  various 


—144— 

incidents  and  accidents  of  the  distribution  of  pa- 
tients from  the  battlefield  to  the  hospitals  and  they 
do  not  represent  all  classes  and  conditions  of  wounds. 
As  an  example,  I  may  mention  one  of  the  most  dis- 
tinguished civil  surgeons  of  Europe  whom  I  knew  in 
Constantinople  to  have  the  same  class  of  cases  that 
came  under  my  care.  His  report  as  a  surgeon,  on 
the  professional  aspects  of  his  cases  is  beyond  ques- 
tion, but  his  numerically  limited  experience  could 
hardly  qualify  him  to  deduce  that  the  preponderence 
of  shrapnel  wounds,  in  modern  wars,  has  inverted 
the  old  ratio  of  10%  shrapnels  to  90%  rifle  wounds. 
This  gentleman  was  so  impressed  with  this  conclusion 
that,  through  his  efforts,  a  resolution  was  passed  by 
the  Imperial  Ottoman  Medical  Society,  calling  on  the 
civilized  nations  of  the  world  to  agree  to  discontinue 
the  use  of  field  artillery  on  account  of  its  capacity  for 
inhumanly  murderous  destruction  of  life  in  battle. 

This  surgeon,  Prof.  Depage  of  the  University  of 
Brussels,  is  now  on  the  personal  staff  of  King  Albert 
with  the  Belgian  army,  and  with  all  due  respect  to 
his  eminent  professional  attainments,  I  believe  that 
his  statistics  when  compiled  after  he  finishes  his 
present  tragic  service,  will  probably  be  more  valuable 
because  they  will  be  based  on  a  vastly  larger  exper- 
ience. 

In  Kustendil  there  passed  through  my  hospital 
most  all  of  the  wounds  —  about  10,000  in  number — from 
one  army,  and  the  proportion  of  shrapnel  to  rifle 
wounds  was  about  20  to  80.  This  is  something  of  an 
increase  over  the  ratio  of  shrapnel  to  rifle  wounds  of 
older  statistics,  but  the  nature  of  the  campaign  was 
such  that  the  field  artillery  employed  was  greater 
than  the  usual  proportion  engaged  in  the  field  of 
operations  of  an  army. 


—145— 
Shell  Wounds 

Shell  wounds  include  all  degrees  of  lacerations 
and  destruction  of  tissues,  depending,  naturally, 
upon  the  proximity  of  the  victim  to  the  exploding 
shell.  Their  severity,  as  a  class,  is  always  greater 
than  those  resulting  from  small  arms  or  shrapnel, 
but  their  frequency  in  comparison  might  well  be 
called  rare. 

Bayonet  Wounds 

Bayonet  wounds  are  of  interest  in  a  military  hos- 
pital largely  because  of  their  infrequency,  but  this, 
in  a  measure,  is  due  to  the  fact  that  a  much  smaller 
percentage  of  these  than  any  other  class  of  battlefield 
wounds  reach  the  hospital  or  need  the  surgeon's  care. 
I  saw  only  a  few  of  them,  but  in  one  case  I  was  for- 
tunate enough  to  be  able  to  do  an  autopsy  as  the  sol- 
dier who  died  under  my  care  was  without  a  diagnosis. 
His  wound  was  in  the  left  chest  below  the  arm  pit 
and  the  laceration  suggested  a  shell  fragment  or  pos- 
sibly a  shrapnel  ball  as  its  cause.  The  autopsy  re- 
vealed a  deep  penetration,  downward,  and  the  stir- 
ing  up  of  viscerae  as  might  be  expected  from  the 
prying  or  rotary  movement  given  to  the  causative 
weapon. 

Traumatic   Gangrene 

As  this  opportunity  is  unfavorable  for  a  review 
of  the  entire  subject  of  Military  Surgery,  I  will  only 
mention  another  surgical  condition,  namely,  the 
gangrenes  incident  to  military  service.  The  condi- 
tions that  are  due  to  the  graver  and  more  advanced 
forms  of  infections,  in  all  classes  of  wounds,  may  be 
passed  over,  as  the  type  I  wish  to  mention  is  particu- 
larly and  peculiarly  incident  to  such  military  service 
as  I  saw  in  the  Turkish  army.  It  may  be  called 
**traumatic"  or  ^'constrictive'*  gangrene,  as  it  pri- 
marially  is  due  to  the  constriction  of  the  shoes  and 


—146— 

leggings  in  connection  with  such  injury  or  trauma- 
tism to  the  feet  in  hard  n^arching  that  causes  the 
feet  to  swell.  These  cases  in  the  Turkish  army,  af- 
ter the  first  campaign,  were  quite  numerous. 

The  Turkish  peasant  normally  wears  slippers, 
and  when  he  was  given  shoes  and  spiral  puttee  leg- 
gings, he  had  no  experience  upon  which  to  form  any 
judgment  concerning  their  use. 

After  some  abuse  of  the  feet  from  marching  in 
ill-fitting,  water-soaked  and,*  perhaps,  sand  or  mud- 
filled  shoes,  the  feet  swelled  enough  to  fill  the  shoes 
to  the  point  of  constriction  which  caused  some  swell- 
ing above  the  shoe  and  which  the  wet  and  illy  applied 
spiral  legging  further  constricted.  The  result  was  a 
partial  and  then  a  complete  interruption  of  the  circu- 
lation, beginning  in  the  skin  and  tips  of  toes  and 
then  gradually  extending  toward  the  knee  as  the 
condition  persisted.  I  have  the  authoritive  history 
of  one  of  my  cases  who  had  worn  his  shoes  between 
three  and  four  weeks  while  marching  in  the  rain  and 
mud  by  day  and  sleeping  without  shelter  at  night, 
because  he  never  could  find  what  he  considered  a 
proper  or  necessary  opportunity  to  take  off  his  shoes, 
namely,  a  place  indoors.  In  another  case,  the  soldier 
said  he  was  kept  marching  all  the  time  and  his  officer 
prevented  him  from  taking  off  his  shoes  as  he  was 
required  to  keep  himself  in  readiness  to  march.  His 
shoes  were  not  removed  for  more  than  two  weeks. 
I  do  not  offer  these  cases  as  a  general  indictment  of 
the  puttee  leggings,  which  I  believe  to  be  all  right 
in  its  proper  use,  but  only  as  a  most  pathetic  conse- 
quence of  its  abuse. 

These  cases  presented  an  interesting  surgical 
phase,  because  they  were  generally  not  infected,  and 
if  properly  treated,  natural  processes  effected  a 
separation  between  the  dead  and  living  tissue  with 
only  a  slight  assistance  from  the  surgeon.      The  line 


—147— 

of  natural  demarkatiou  was  invariably  very  much 
nearer  the  extremity  than  a  formal  amputation  would 
have  made  it.  Unhappily  for  a  great  many  of  these 
unfortunate  victims,  surgical  impatience  or  some 
other  non-commendable  attribute  was  responsible  for 
needless  amputations,  because  the  cases  were  mis- 
taken for  the  gangrene  of  the  ordinary  surgical 
variety.  Some  cases  were  fatally  infected  by  the 
operation  for  this  condition  which  most  probably 
would  have  been  spontaneously  cured  by  nature  and 
a  little  sanitary  attention. 

Vaso-Motor  Gangrene 

I  saw  in  Constantinople  another  type  of  gangrene 
which  must  have  resulted  indirectly  from  the  con- 
traction of  the  blood  vessels  caused  by  an  effect  on 
the  brain  by  concussion  from  a  high  explosive.  A 
soldier  was  rendered  unconscious  by  a  "great  ex- 
plosion,'' as  he  described  it,  which  hurled  him  many 
feet  and  covered  him  with  much  earth  and  many 
bruises,  but  no  open  wounds.  After  slowly  regaining 
consciousness,  his  hands  and  feet  remained  numb  and 
gradually  became  gangrenous,  until  various  portions 
of  the  extremities  separated  and  left  the  unfortunate 
victim  with  an  odd  variety  of  stumps.  One  hand 
was  left  with  only  enough  digital  remnants  to  give 
him  gripping  power  sufficient  for  him  to  feed  him- 
self, and  both  legs  carried  short  stumps  below  the 
knee. 


Appendix 


Chronological  Table  of  the  Principal  Events 

of  the  Balkan  Wars 
1912 

Oct.      8.  —Montenegro  declared  war. 
Oct.     13. — Graeco-Serbo-Bulgarian  note  to  Turkey. 
Oct.     14. — Montenegrin  capture  of  Touzi. 
Oct.    15.  —Peace  signed  between  Turkey  and  Italy. 
Oct.     16. — Berane  captured  by  the  Montenegrins. 
Oct.     17. —Turkey  declared  war  on  Bulgaria  and  Servia,  who 
accepted  the  challenge. 

Greece  declared  war  on  Turkey. 
Oct.     18. — Moustafa  Pasha  captured  by  Bulgarians. 

Elassona  occupied  by  Greeks. 
Oct.    20. — Bulgarian  advance  on  Adrianople. 
Oct.    21.— Greek  landing  in  Lemnos. 
Oct.     22.— Prishtina  captured  by  Servians. 
Oct.    23. — Novi  Bazar  captured  by  Servians. 

Dedeaghadj  captured  by  Bulgarians. 

Heavy  fighting  at  Adrianople. 
Oct.    24.  —Capture  of  Kirk  Kilisse  by  Bulgarians. 

Capture  of  Koumanovo  by  Servians. 
Oct.     26. — Bombardment  of  Adrianople. 
Oct.    26.— Capture  of  Uskiib  by  Servians. 
Oct.    27.— Capture  of  Ishtib  by  Servians. 
Oct.    28.— Capture  of  Veria  by  Greeks. 
Oct.    29. — Battle  in  Thrace  begun  at  Bunar  Hlssar. 
Oct.    30.— Capture  of  Thasos  by  Greeks. 
Oct.    31. — Rout  of  the  Turks  at  Lule  Bourgas  by  Bulgarians. 

Capture  of  Ipek  by  Montenegrins. 

Capture  of  Prizrend  by  Servians. 
Nov.     3.— Capture  of  Preveza  by  Greeks. 

Bombardment  of  Shkodra  by  Montenegrins  begun 
Nov.     4. — Turkish  appeal  for  mediation. 
Nov.     5.— Turks  retreat  on  Chatalja. 

International  squadron  comes  to  Constantinople. 
Nov.     9. —Capture  of  Salonika  by  Greeks. 
Nov.   13.— Negotiations  for  an  armistice. 
148 


—149— 

Nov.  17. — Bombardment  of  Chatalja  begun. 

Montenegrins  entered  San  Giovanni  di  Medua. 
Nov.  18.— Fall  of  Monastir  before  Servians. 
Nov.  20.— Hostilities  suspended  at  Chatalja. 
Nov.  21.— *'Hamidie"  torpedoed  by  Bulgarian  flotilla, 
Nov.  22. — Mitylene  occupied  by  the  Greeks. 
Nov.  24.— Scio  occupied  by  Greeks. 
Nov.   26. — Ottoman  and  Bulgarian  plenipotentiares  meet  at 

Bakhshaiskeuy. 
Nov.   28.— Durazzo  occupied  by  Servians. 
Dec.       3. — Armistice  signed  by  Turkey  with  Bulgaria,  Servia 

and  Montenegro. 
Dec.      16.— Peace  Conference  met  in  London. 
Dec.      16. — Naval  engagement  outside  Dardenelles. 
Dec.      20.— Kortcha  captured  by  Greeks. 

1913 

Jan.      16.— "Hamidie"  sinks  Greek  transport  "Makedonia'* 

in  Syra  harbor. 
Jan.     17.— Collective  Note  of  Powers  to  Turkey. 
Jan.      18.— Naval  battle  off  Tenedos. 

Jan.     22.— Ottoman  National  Assembly  declares  for  peace. 
Jan.     23. — Unionist  coup  d'Etat;  Nazim  Pasha  killed.      Mah- 

moud  Shevket  Pasha  Grand  Vizier. 
Jan.      30. — Ottoman  reply  to  note  of  Powers  delivered. 
Feb.        3. — Armistice    ended.     Bombardment  of  Adrianople 

renewed. 
Feb.      10.— Gunboat  "Asar-i-Tewfik"  stranded  in  Black  Sea. 
Feb.  8-10.— Battle  of  Boulair. 
March  6.— Capture  of  Yanina  by  Greeks. 
March  11. — "Hamidie"  sinks  Greek  transport  at  S.  Giovanni 

di  Medua. 
March  16.— Samos  occupied  by  Greeks. 
March  18. — King  George  I  of  Greece  assassinated. 
March  22.— Powers  send  identical  note  to  Allies. 
March  23.— Djavid  Pasha  surrenders  to  Servians  at  Skumbi. 
March  26. — Capture  of  Adrianople  by  Bulgarians  and  Servians. 
April     2. — Funeral  of  King  George  of  Greece. 
April    16. — Cessation  of  hostilities  at  Chatalja  agreed  on. 
April    23. — Shkodra  captured  by  Montenegrins. 
May      21.— Peace  delegates  meet  in  London. 
May      30.— Peace  preliminaries  signed  in  London,  with  Turko- 

Bulgarian   frontier  established  on  Enos-Media 

line. 


—ISO- 
June  29.— Bulgarians  attack  Servians  in  valleys  of  the  Var- 
dar,  Bregalnitca  and  Zletovska. 

June      30.     Greeks  crush  Bulgarian  battalion  at  Salonika. 

July      15.  —Roumanians  cross  the  Danube  at  Rostchuk. 

July  18.— Turks  advance  from  Chatalja  lines  and  occupy 
Adrianople. 

July  30.— Bulgarian  Army  received  orders  to  supend  opera- 
tions. 

Jul}'  31. — Armistice  for  four  days  beginning  at  1:00  p.m., 
this  day. 

Aug        6. — Armistice  extended  three  days  from  this  day. 

Aug.  9.— Treaty  of  Peace  signed  at  Bucharest  by  Bulgaria, 
Roumania.  Servia,  Montenegro  and  Greece. 

Sept.  29.— Treaty  of  Constantinople  established  Turko- 
Bulgarian  frontier. 

Economic  Effect  of  the  Results  of  the  War  Upon   the   Resources   of 
the  Ottoman  Empire 

While  this  observation  may  be  a  little  out  of  sequence,  I 
have  the  data  on  such  good  and  reliable  authority  that  they 
have  a  positive  value  in  their  authenticity,  whatever  may  be 
their  portion  of  interest.  I  made  the  note  at  the  time  of  con- 
versation with  an  European  in  high  official  position  in  the 
Turkish  fiscal  service.  He  said  that  he  could  speak  with  con- 
fidence because  he  had  very  recently  compiled  a  financial 
statement  which  contained  the  figures  which  he  easily  re- 
membered. The  statement  was  made  in  answer  to  the  ques- 
tion: "What  effect  will  the  loss  of  the  European  Provinces 
have  upon  the  resources  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,"  and,  the 
answer  was  that  the  effect  would  be  much  to  the  Empire's 
economic  advantage,  for  the  following  reasons :  the  annual 
military  expenditures  directly  chargeable  to  the  support  of 
the  army  maintained  in  the  "valayet  of  Adrianople,"  as  the 
province  of  Thrace  is  called  in  the  Turkish  administration 
system,  was  1,300,000  pounds  Turkish.  The  annual  revenues 
from  all  sources  was  1,100,000  pounds  Turkish,  which  left  an 
annual  deficit  of  200,000  pounds  Turkish  for  the  province  of 
Thrace  alone. 

The  annual  military  expenditure  for  the  support  of  the 
army  maintained  in  Macedonia  had  exceeded  the  total 
revenues,  in  the  preceding  years,  from  600,000  to  800,000 
pounds  Turkish.  Of  the  entire  disbursements  in  the  Euro- 
pean Provinces,  the  Ottoman  Empire  expended  one  third  or 
more  on  the  military  establishment  maintained  there. 

The  value  of  a  Turkish  pound  is  about  $4.50. 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 


AN     INITIAL    FINE    OF    25     CENTS 

WILL  BE  ASSESSED  FOR  FAILURE  TO  RETURN 
THIS  BOOK  ON  THE  DATE  DUE.  THE  PENALTY 
WILL  INCREASE  TO  50  CENTS  ON  THE  FOURTH 
DAY  AND  TO  $t.OO  ON  THE  SEVENTH  DAY 
OVERDUE. 


m    23 1i 
FEB   15  1944 

''''^   '69-6 

LOAN   DEPT 


PM 


LD  21-50m-l.'33 


5  53  y^  y 

X 

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UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFOFINIA 

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